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PREAMBLE
We are living in unprecedented times; as attested by recent headlines some of the positive trends 
observed in past years are kicking in reverse with ever more people affected by new combinations 
of risks and trends: climate crisis, conflicts, resource scarcity (water), inequality, food insecurity, 
malnutrition and obesity, environmental degradation, affect particularly people living in marginalized 
rural communities or poor city dwellers. 
After decades of steady decline, the trend in world hunger reverted in 2015, remaining virtually 
unchanged in the past three years at a level slightly below 11 percent. Meanwhile, the number of 
people who suffer from hunger has slowly increased. As a result, more than 820 million people 
in the world were still hungry in 2018, underscoring the immense challenge of achieving the Zero 
Hunger target by 2030. 
Today, over 110 million people are suffering from food crisis. It will only get worse if current trends 
cannot be reversed. Why is this happening? 
Multiple drivers are causing these trends and can be grouped in three clusters: 
- Socio-economic factors: demographic change, urbanization, growing inequality, unequal access to 
resources, unhealthy eating habits. Poverty.
- Environmental factors: climate change, soil degradation, over-exploitation of natural resources, 
water scarcity. Reaching the limit.
- Peace and security: armed conflict, good governance, rule of law. Fundamental rights.
Deepen a common understanding of the underlying dynamics of these trends was the reason why 
the European Union and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations co-organized 
the High Level Event “Food & Agriculture in times of crisis: working better together for long-term 
solutions” (1-2 April 2019). First in its kind, the event was organised on behalf of the Global Network 
against Food Crises. 
For this event, CIRAD prepared a booklet with key maps and facts1 to be complemented with a 
scientific report on critical drivers & trends, system components, interactions and critical challenges 
as regards food and nutrition security. Upon request of the European Commission, through the 
FAO Agrintel project (GCP/GLO/948/EC), CIRAD developed also an analytical framework on the 
trends that are shaping current food systems as well as to realize an assessment of the risks they 
are subjected to and which may lead to food crises (or worse) in the future. 
While the event represented a strategic opportunity for the international community and civil 
society to start tackling some of the key challenges posed by food crisis and the fundamental 
injustice of about 800 million people facing hunger, the scientific report hereunder takes stock 
of the current and future risks and challenges as regards food systems. In a next step FAO and 
CIRAD project to develop an approach and toolkit to realize diagnostics of food systems at sub-
national, national, sub-regional or regional level in order to identify and formulate transformative 
interventions improving their welfare benefits and environmental sustainability. 
Solutions exist and new approaches for efficient joint work are possible. 
There must be no more food crises. 
FOOD SYSTEMS AT RISK 
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INTRODUCTION 
The origins of this book lay in a series of questions raised by the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) as a contribution to a High Level Event of the 
Global Network Against Food Crises. This event, addressing ‘Food and Agriculture in Times of Crisis’, was held 
in Brussels on 2-3 April 2019 and asked whether food crises will be more or less likely in the coming decades, 
especially in Low-Income (LI) and Lower Middle-Income (LMI) countries. Through Agrintel, CIRAD was commis-
sioned by FAO to provide an analytical framework of the main drivers which might influence the occurrence of 
food crises and their trends. A booklet was produced for the event with maps and key figures1, with this report 
presenting the full narrative. 
In this report we concentrate on what is problematic if nothing is done. Even though many of us were temp-
ted to suggest ways forward and spend our working lives seeking more sustainable food systems, this is not 
the scope of the report. Instead, we have tried to bring together the most up-to-date scientific assessment of 
the danger humanity faces if present trends continue, with priority being given to food systems in LI and LMI 
countries (cf. Map 1).
Specialists in different domains were asked to summarise in a short chapter the latest information they could 
compile. Strong scientific evidence is now well established for many food system drivers and their various 
trends. For example, it is now widely accepted that climate is highly affected by different forms of food pro-
duction, transport and marketing. It is also well known that changes in diets towards the consumption of more 
animal products is contributing to deforestation in Amazonia because of the growth in the international mar-
ket for soybean for animal feed across the world. There is no doubt that existing food systems are associated 
with a pandemic of obesity and non-communicable diseases, which are responsible for more deaths than 
cardiovascular diseases. 
1. Bendjebbar P., Bricas N. and Giordano T., 2019. Food systems at risk. A scientific handout for the High Level Event of the Global 
Network on Food Crises: Food and Agriculture in Times of Crisis, Brussels, 2-3 April 2019, Montpellier, CIRAD, 48 p.
(https://www.cirad.fr/media/documents/actualites-doc/food-systems-at-risk-a-scientific-handout-cirad-2019).
Map 1: Country Income Groups. 
Source: World Bank.
11
2. Swinburn, B.A., Kraak, V.I., Allender, S., Atkins, V.J., Baker, P.I., Bogard, J.R., Brinsden, H., et al. 2019. The global syndemic 
of obesity, undernutrition, and climate change: the Lancet Commission report. The Lancet, 393(10173): 791–846 [online].
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)32822-8
However, it is often difficult to be precise about the magnitude of past (and even more so future) changes. 
Furthermore, they cannot be estimated because many mechanisms of action and retroaction are very closely 
interrelated and it is difficult to know how each driver contributes to one specific variable, input or output of 
the food system (yield, pollution, food security, diets, etc.).
Moreover, we are working in the domain of uncertainty. Many problems (or opportunities if we take a positive 
stance) have never previously existed. Even if it was possible to look backwards, to analyse the details of the 
dynamics of systems, it might not be very useful to do so, because most food system drivers (economic, en-
vironmental and demographic) are changing too fast and the dynamics in coming years might be different to 
those of the past. 
Furthermore, interconnections between the different elements of food systems have never been so obvious. 
Every day, new scientific evidence is published about these cumulative risks, which are very hard to predict. 
One of the latest, published in The Lancet, even suggests creating a new framework for the synergy of epide-
mics, or ‘syndemic’. The authors (Swinburn et al., 2019)2  include under this unique concept the three global 
epidemics (pandemics) of obesity, undernutrition and climate change, because they share common under-
lying societal drivers. 
Therefore, different visions of the past, and even more so of possible futures, co-exist. For many aspects, we 
must accept that we have limited information and to acknowledge that we have a very partial knowledge of the 
different mechanisms (biophysical, social or economic) underlying the functioning of sub-systems, together 
with their interactions. This is why the report’s authors have assessed the evidence and scientific controversies 
and provided their own points of view. Because of the complexity of systems, there is also a difficulty in the 
division of specific chapters. Some aspects are repeated several times while some others may not be so visible 
(for example, there is no specific chapter on the question of food loss and waste, nor for governance issues, 
nor conflicts and migrations) but we did our best to include the most important issues in other chapters.
The first section provides the framework of what comprises a food system, its drivers and outcomes, and 
how the main drivers have changed in past decades and are expected to change in coming years. There are 
multiple ways for dealing with the modelling/representation of food systems and our choice was based on our 
own experience and on the latest scientific literature and studies by international organisations. Our choice 
was also motivated by the need to assess, in the future, food systems on a local basis, where many political 
decisions will have to be designed and implemented.
Section 2 deals with the interactions between food systems and climate change. It concerns both the contribu-
tion of existing food systems to climate change (their carbon footprint, the specific contribution of the increase 
in animal production and deforestation), and one specific consequence of climate change on food systems, 
with a chapter dedicated to the emergence of new pests and diseases. 
Section 3 deals with the environmental consequences of existing food systems: over-exploitation of natural re-
sources, irreversible biodiversity loss and pollution of water, air and soil. It also assesses the possible feedback 
effects of these degradations of natural resources on food systems. 
Section 4 considers the social and economic dimensions of food systems. It reviews the implications of current 
trends for job creation, for the inclusion of small-scale actors, women, minorities and territories into food sys-
tems, and the implications of modern digital technologies. It shows that while food systems could be a major 
building block for prosperity and stability in many LI and LMI countries, current trends are threatening the 
ability of countries to meet this potential. There are inequalities between actors within food systems, including 
women and minorities, between territories, there are difficulties in making labour-intensive food systems a 
priority and there is a high risk of excluding many stakeholders from the benefits of digital technology, which 
may trigger further civil conflicts and food crises. 
Finally, Section 5 concerns food and nutrition security, an outcome determined by two other food system 
outcomes (environmental and social and economic). It deals first with the difficult question of food production 
which is sufficient to meet needs, then two chapters are devoted to the question of the international market 
for food products and its price instability. Finally, the last two chapters address the negative effects of chan-
ging diets on health and the increase in safety risks. ●
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THE SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS: FOOD SYSTEMS
Nicolas Bricas1
Food is much more than a means 
to meet nutritional needs
Food is essential in all societies. Gathering, hunting, fishing and 
agriculture have always been activities that provide the majority 
of the rural population’s livelihood. With job diversification and 
urbanisation, these activities have also become important sources 
of income, alongside the food processing and marketing that has 
developed to feed cities. But food functions are not limited to 
meeting biological needs, even though this is a fundamental one. 
Food is the first means of social interaction through meal sharing. 
It is a creative and artistic activity that gives pleasure through 
cooking and gastronomy, and again through meal sharing. Food 
is a fundamental way of building and displaying one’s identity. It 
passes through the body, which gives it a special symbolic status 
(Fischler, 1998). Finally, food is a way of connecting humans 
to their environment. To produce food, humans transform 
the landscape and interact with plants, animals and microbes. 
Although the hierarchy between food functions depends on the 
society in question, all of them, including food-insecure ones, are 
concerned about the origins of their food and its sensory and 
symbolic quality. This means that food does not deal only with 
nutrition and health but also with well-being and the way human 
beings live together and interact with their environment.
Food systems approach: a way to take 
into account all activities, from 
production to consumption 
and their outcomes
Since the dawn of humanity, food systems have changed 
profoundly. From mainly domestic activities organised inside the 
household, food production, processing and consumption, and 
even cooking, have become commercial and specialised activities. 
Post-harvest activities make it possible to stabilise products in 
order to store and transport them long distances, to extract 
their useful parts, to facilitate their use by incorporating services, 
to improve their nutritional, organoleptic or sanitary quality, 
and to make them available as close as possible to consumers, 
especially when they move away from production areas. The 
ways societies process and, even more so, cook products are 
expressions of their culture. The importance of post-harvest 
activities is growing with urbanisation and the development 
of market economies in rural areas. Today, all these activities 
generate added value, jobs and incomes in both rural and urban 
areas. The food sector is currently the world’s largest economic 
sector in terms of employment, with more than 2 billion people 
working in it. In Low-Income (LI) and Lower Middle-Income (LMI) 
S U M M A R Y
This chapter presents the framework used in 
this report. Food systems generate not only food 
but also environmental and socio-economical 
outcomes.
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
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countries, agriculture represented 68 percent and 
39 percent of employment respectively in 2016 
(ILOSTAT, 2019). In these countries, food processing, 
catering, transportation and distribution represent 
a growing share of employment in services and 
industry. For example, in Eastern and Southern 
African countries, agriculture represents 91 percent 
of employment in the food sector while in Brazil, 
agriculture represents 49 percent, food services 
26 percent and food processing 25 percent of food 
jobs (Townsend et al., 2017). 
The increasing importance of post-harvest, processing 
and marketing activities in job and income creation, 
their role in feeding non-farmers, in nutrition and 
health, in the consumption of energy and resources, 
in loss and waste, in biodiversity and pollution issues 
etc. have led to the scope being extended beyond 
agricultural production to entire food systems. 
By food systems, we first mean the chains of market 
and non-market activities and actors connecting food 
production, aggregation, transportation and storage, 
processing and catering, distribution, preparation 
and consumption, waste and resources management, 
as well as agro-input suppliers (seeds, fertilisers, 
packaging etc.) and the associated regulatory 
institutions and activities (adapted from Pothukuchi 
and Kaufman, 2000; FAO, 2018a) (cf. Figure 1). While 
these activities and actors are inter-connected by the 
circulation of food, each of them can be considered 
as sub-systems with specific interactions with other 
activities and actors that are not part of agriculture 
or food (Pothukuchi and Kaufman, 2000). Each sub-
system evolves in its own way, with some more 
industrialised than others, and general drivers may 
have an influence on some sub-systems but less so 
on others.
Taking a systems approach is more complex but it 
means we can take into account the interactions, 
influences and feedback between different activities, 
actors and institutions. Each sub-system includes 
actors whose sole purpose is not only food. Food 
systems do not cover all agricultural activities and 
some of its products are part of a larger bioeconomy: 
agriculture produces not only food but also energy 
(firewood and charcoal, draught animals and oils), 
materials (timber, straw, wood, latex, fibre and 
leather). Fertilisers can be provided by biomass 
(straw, leaves and animal manure) or chemicals and 
mining (chemical nitrogen phosphates and potash). 
Transportation, energy and consumption apply not 
only to food. Changes in these sub-systems have an 
influence on food systems.
A huge diversity of food systems
As a combination of numerous crops, multiple 
transformation processes, cooking and gastronomic 
cultures, levels of capital, technology etc., food 
systems are incredibly diverse. This diversity has 
been fashioned throughout the ages by human 
innovations, to take the best advantage of the locally 
available resources and products and better cope 
with local constraints. They are also constantly 
evolving and open to the incorporation of exotic 
products or experiences. Extending the notion of 
food systems, we can say that human microbiota 
have also been shaped by this diversity. Nothing is 
static in food systems: there are strong dynamics at 
work in an innovative context, resulting in an ever-
evolving mixture of different models of production, 
processing, distribution, consumption and waste 
management.
One way of developing agriculture, widely used in 
industrialised countries and promoted in developing 
countries, has been based on specialisation, 
mechanisation and the massive use of non-renewable 
energy sources (coal and oil) and fertilisers (chemical 
nitrogen and mining phosphates) and chemical 
solutions (pesticides) in place of biomass cycles 
(Daviron and Allaire, 2019). In the post-harvest 
sector, large-scale processing and mass production, 
commoditisation and globalisation of trade and large-
scale distribution (supermarkets) have developed. 
This development model saw an unprecedented 
improvement in productivity which translated into a 
large increase in food availability and better access 
(through economic growth and lower food prices). 
However, this ‘industrialised agriculture’ comes 
with environmental damage (pollution, resource 
depletion, biodiversity erosion and climate change) 
and social costs (inequities in accessing healthy diets 
and in income generation and sustainable livelihoods, 
and non-communicable diseases) that question the 
desirability of its spread around the globe.
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Figure 1: Food systems and their outcomes. 
Source: Author.
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Awareness of these effects has led several authors 
to pay attention to the outcomes of food system 
activities (Ingram, 2011; van Berkum, Dengerink and 
Ruben, 2018). Food systems do not provide only 
food but also jobs, income, infrastructure, skills 
(socio-economic outcomes) and ecological services 
(environmental outcomes) (cf. Figure 1). This means 
that food systems can make a significant contribution 
not only to food and nutrition security, but also to 
inclusive development and a viable environment for 
fighting climate change.
Food systems are strategic for 
inclusive development
Since Amartya Sen’s contribution, food security has 
long been recognised as a matter of access to the 
means to produce or buy food and not just a matter 
of producing enough (Sen, 1982). This is even more 
crucial now as the planet produces significantly more 
food than is nutritionally required. Food abundance 
alone does not guarantee food security. One of the 
main drivers behind the food security we observe 
today is a lack of access to food, either through the 
ability to produce enough food to cover all food needs, 
or physical access to food, or enough resources or 
money to purchase food. While food systems are 
therefore strategic in contributing to food security 
through the jobs and income sources they represent, 
the ways in which this development takes place 
have a strong influence on social inclusion. With the 
commodification of post-harvest activities, power 
relations and income distribution between men and 
women are changing more-or-less equitably (Enete, 
Nweke and Tollens, 2004; Harriss-White, 2005). 
Conditions of access to land and means of production 
are also an important determinant of inequalities in 
access to food. 
The choice in industrialisation between capital-
intensive and labour-intensive companies 
determines the speed of job creation. The regulation 
of competition between actors, within value chains, 
or between big and small companies, the conditions 
for applying product standards, the organisation of 
access to training, advice, credit etc., all affect income 
inequalities, or even the integration or marginalisation 
of certain activities. The ways traditional and 
indigenous food knowledge are considered (or 
not) in research and intellectual property policies 
may threaten food diversity and food cultures. In 
the absence of regulation, the modernisation of 
forms of food distribution, with the development of 
supermarkets and now electronic commerce, can 
result in the marginalisation of the poorest people’s 
access to quality food.
In countries where food activities account for the bulk 
of employment and income sources, the approach 
taken to developing food systems is therefore crucial 
in promoting more inclusive development. 
Food systems are strategic 
to building a viable environment 
and fighting climate change
The way people have organised their food systems 
has profoundly shaped their environment: the ways 
in which they have cleared or included forests in their 
agricultural production system, whether production 
has been specialised or not, how they have employed 
renewable or fossil energy resources, closed or 
unclosed nutrient cycles, whether animals are used 
for food or not etc. have fashioned landscapes and 
changed biodiversity. Some development models are 
found to have environmental impacts so significant 
that they threaten its equilibrium. The pollution 
food systems cause or their contributions to climate 
change have an impact not only where these 
production approaches are used, but all over the 
world. However, the negative environmental effects 
we have highlighted also reveal that other production 
methods can have positive effects, by recycling as 
much as possible the materials produced, creating 
biodiversity and capturing carbon (Frison and IPES-
Food, 2016; Mason and Lang, 2017). Food systems 
therefore have an important positive contribution 
to make in building a sustainable environment and 
combating climate change.
Three objectives for food systems
During the twentieth century, the aim of food systems 
was to increase food production and it could be argued 
that this has been spectacular. However, it has come 
with a heavy cost in terms of negative externalities: 
the increase in social inequalities and environmental 
degradation. This explains why the international 
community set itself Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) in 2015; food systems can contribute to these 
goals well beyond the sole objective of eradicating 
hunger. Fourteen important contributions of these 
systems can be identified out of the 17 SDGs (Caron 
et al., 2018; FAO, 2017, 2018b) and these can be 
grouped into three main goals: (a) food security and 
improved nutrition; (b) inclusive development; and 
(c) the creation of a sustainable environment and 
the fight against climate change (cf. Figure 1 and 
Figure 2). These three goals are interrelated: food 
and nutritional security cannot be achieved without 
combating impoverishment and reducing the effects 
of environmental degradation. ●
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THE SIX MAIN CATEGORIES OF DRIVERS SHAPING 
FOOD SYSTEMS
Pauline Bendjebbar1 and Nicolas Bricas1
In the near future, many different drivers are going to challenge 
food systems. Until now, many reports have emphasised the 
future trends and challenges for food systems around the world 
(Caron et al., 2018; Claquin et al., 2017; FAO, 2017; HLPE, 2017; 
Jahn et al., 2018; van Berkum, Dengerink and Ruben, 2018; WRI, 
2018), while this report concentrates on the future risks for food 
systems in Low-Income (LI) and Lower Middle-Income (LMI) 
countries, which might be the most vulnerable nations in the 
years to come. 
Depending on how they look at food systems, authors define 
different types of drivers (Caron et al., 2018; Claquin et al., 
2017; FAO, 2017; HLPE, 2011). Some authors consider two sets 
of drivers (socioeconomic and environmental) (van Berkum, 
Dengerink and Ruben, 2018), while others consider five groups 
of drivers: (1) biophysical and environmental; (2) innovation, 
technology and infrastructure; (3) political and economic; (4) 
socio-cultural; and (5) demographic drivers (HLPE, 2017). We will 
define and describe how these can affect food systems.
For our study on risks, we will distinguish six main categories 
of drivers shaping food systems in LI and LMI countries: 
demographic, biophysical and environmental, innovation, 
technology and infrastructure, sociocultural, economic and 
political (cf. Figure 3). We choose six over five, because we prefer 
to separate political drivers from economic ones as they refer to 
different dynamics.
Biophysical 
and environmental drivers
These drivers refer to the natural resources available, pollution 
and climate. They shape food systems mainly on the production 
side because food production is highly reliant on the availability 
of natural resources (water, land, biodiversity etc.).
Natural resources refers, according to the UN, to all “natural 
assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be used for 
economic production or consumption.” These elements are soil, 
land, water, fish, biodiversity (plants, animals, microbes etc.), 
forest and the minerals present in nature. The UN definition 
distinguishes four categories: mineral and energy resources, 
soil resources, water resources and biological resources. Some 
are fossil-based and can be considered as a finite stock and 
non-renewable (for example, mining phosphate). They are 
“exhaustible natural resources such as mineral resources that 
cannot be regenerated after exploitation.” Some others are 
renewable, which means that these natural resources “after 
S U M M A R Y
This chapter explores the different drivers that 
might affect the future of food systems, their role 
and impact on food systems and their outcomes..
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
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exploitation, can return to their previous stock levels 
by natural processes of growth or replenishment.” 
Among renewables, the UN definition distinguishes 
two types: conditionally renewable, which refers to 
natural resources that “after exploitation eventually 
reaches a level beyond which regeneration will 
become impossible” (for example, forests and fish) 
and fully renewable (for example, sunlight). The 
availability and cost of these resources determine the 
shape and nature of food systems since many of them 
are inputs in the agricultural production process (UN, 
1997).
Climate refers to “the average weather, or more 
rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of 
the mean and variability of relevant quantities over 
a period of time ranging from months to thousands 
or millions of years.” The IPCC defines climate change 
as “a change in the state of the climate that can be 
identified (e.g. by using statistical tests) by changes 
in the mean and/or the variability of its properties…
typically decades or longer” (IPCC, 2018). We choose to 
define it using the United Nations definition: climate 
change is “a change of climate which is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and which is 
in addition to natural climate variability observed 
over comparable time periods” (United Nations, 
1992). It affects food quality and availability. Climate 
change also affects the geography of food production 
and of plant and animal diseases. This might affect 
agricultural outputs since it will reduce and put 
pressure on the resources available for production. 
This means it might reduce crop yields and forest and 
animal productivity (FAO, 2017).
Demographic drivers
These drivers refer to population growth, urbanisation, 
migration and population displacement. They have a 
crucial influence on demand, in terms of the quantity 
of food needed, but also on the quality and type of 
food consumed, as well as the food environment.
Population growth refers to the increasing number 
of people in the world. This will have an impact on 
future food demand (FAO, 2017).
Urbanisation refers to the concentration of 
populations in cities and the way of life it induces: 
reduced agricultural production for self-consumption, 
access to food mainly through the market and high-
density population. Urbanisation is a big driver 
that shapes consumer behaviour and the food 
environment. Urbanisation induces changes in diets 
(more processed food, animal products and diversity) 
and in food habits (more purchases and out of home 
consumption). Urbanisation also has consequences 
for consumers’ food environments as well as for the 
organisation of the supply of food (FAO, 2017). 
Population displacement and migration will 
shape food systems. Displacement of people can 
be defined as “an individual who has been forced or 
obliged to flee from his home or place of habitual 
residence… in particular as a result of or in order 
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Figure 3: Blueprint of the drivers affecting different parts of the food systems.
Source: Authors.
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to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognized State border 
(according to the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement)” (UNHCR, 2019). There are many 
causes of displacements: armed conflicts, natural 
disasters, famine, and developmental and economic 
changes. Displacements can be internal and external. 
A migrant is defined by the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) as “the movement of a person or 
a group of persons, either across an international 
border, or within a State. It is a population movement, 
encompassing any kind of movement of people, 
whatever its length, composition and causes; it 
includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, 
economic migrants, and persons moving for other 
purposes, including family reunification” (FAO, 2019).
Innovation, technology 
and infrastructure drivers
Innovation, technology and infrastructure are major 
drivers of food systems. They influence both supply, 
for example, by improving system productivity, and 
demand (van Berkum, Dengerink and Ruben, 2018). 
They can produce major shifts in food systems. 
Innovation, technology include a wide range of 
more-or-less sophisticated ‘tools’ affecting agricultural 
and post-harvest activities and the productivity of 
labour and land. They also include new ways of 
managing and organising production, processing and 
marketing, and waste management, all along food 
chains and food systems (HLPE, 2017).
Infrastructure as a driver of food systems refers 
to transport and water and energy supply as they 
facilitate access to inputs and provide an outlet for 
produce. Infrastructure also includes marketplaces, 
storage warehouses, harbours, slaughterhouses 
and communication networks (mobile phones and 
internet). The nature of infrastructure provides 
different opportunities for some specific food systems 
to extend their operations: for example, cooling 
devices (cold stores and freezers etc.) providing long-
term conservation of minimally processed fresh 
products (fish, vegetables and meat) (HLPE, 2017).
Economic drivers
Economic drivers include different elements such as 
incomes, globalisation and trade, prices and financial 
systems. These drivers affect all aspects of food 
systems from production to demand. They provide 
opportunities that enable supply to meet demand 
or, on the contrary, can disrupt systems, for example 
through price crises.
Incomes have a big influence on diet composition. 
When incomes increase, consumption of more 
expensive food, such as animal products and 
processed food, also increases. Incomes also includes 
that of farmers and food producers, affecting their 
ability to invest in order to increase productivity. 
Many technologies are widely available but are not 
broadly disseminated because of the poverty among 
a major portion of the rural population. Finally, 
incomes can also concern State revenues. In this case, 
it determines a government’s capacity to invest in 
the agricultural sector, to implement policies and to 
regulate the sector.
Trade and globalization refer to the exchange of 
agricultural and food products at the local, regional 
and international scales. Trade not only takes place on 
physical markets but can also operate through virtual 
ones, such as futures markets. Trade has an impact 
on food and nutrition security because it affects 
different key variables such as food production prices, 
employment and government revenues. It also affects 
private and public investment in the longer term (FAO, 
2016). International trade has grown strongly thanks 
to the standardisation of products and the definition 
of grades, making it possible to exchange goods 
without seeing the product. Such commoditisation 
exists mainly for products exchanged on international 
markets. Globalisation shapes the food environment, 
in particular through the development of standardised 
industrial food products and the expansion of 
supermarkets through companies with a global reach 
(Claquin et al., 2017; HLPE, 2017).
Prices of inputs, such as energy and fertiliser, have a 
big influence on the way food systems develop. The 
level of food prices and their fluctuation also affects 
different parts of food systems, determining not only 
income and labour costs, but also consumption and 
investment decisions.
Financial system refers to the exchange of funds 
in which food systems are embedded and is linked 
to non-food markets. This means that a crisis in a 
financial system has consequences for agricultural 
and food products in terms of both prices and 
investments.
Socio-cultural drivers
These drivers refer to culture, religions and rituals, 
social traditions, education and health and values 
and identity. They affect mainly diets and the food 
environment by influencing lifestyles, social norms, 
attitudes and cultures embedded in food.
Cultures, rituals and social traditions: Food is 
a means of building and promoting one’s identity, 
of expressing one’s belonging to a community. All 
societies are defined as much by their diet and 
foodways as a language. Social norms, values and 
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practices evolve with increasing influences between 
societies. These acculturation processes have a 
strong influence on the organisation of food systems. 
They affect not only consumer demand but also the 
way business is done and the values attached to 
production or processing processes (HLPE, 2017).
Values and identity: Food is “central to individual 
identity, in that any given human individual is 
constructed, biologically, psychologically and socially 
by the food he/she chooses to incorporate” (Fischler, 
1988). 
Education and healthcare are also drivers of food 
systems (FAO, 2017). Education refers to the level of 
educational programme the person has completed, 
through school or training. Education has a strong 
impact on food systems, especially for consumers 
seeking access to information about products. In 
addition, education also has an impact on production, 
affecting farmers’ practices, and on economics in 
terms of employment and innovations. Health refers 
to “a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity” (WHO, 2019). If this state is not attained, 
food systems are under threat, either through the 
provision of agricultural labour or in support of 
consumer health. Healthcare is also important for 
food systems, driving the general health of consumers 
and labour forces, and ensuring well-functioning 
employment.
Political drivers
These drivers refer to governance, public policies, 
conflicts and humanitarian crises. They affect many 
of the drivers in food systems. 
Governance “mechanisms at different scales 
are crucial for the design, enforcement and 
implementation” of food system support policies. 
Governance refers to the ways public decisions are 
discussed and considered. But governance also 
involves multiple stakeholders from the private sector 
and NGOs (HLPE, 2017).
Public policies influence food systems through many 
tools, such as regulations and laws, investments, 
subsidies and taxes, information and legitimation or 
support for actors involved in food systems. While 
most countries have agricultural policies, few have 
food policies, or limit these policies to food availability 
and food safety (HLPE, 2017). 
Conflicts and civil unrest refer to political crises 
and civil or international wars with violence. Conflicts 
are a key driver of severe food crises and recently re-
emerged famines, while hunger and undernutrition 
are significantly worse where conflicts are prolonged 
and institutional capacities are weak. But conflicts also 
play an important role in population migration and 
displacement. Regions that welcome migrants can 
experience a rapid rise in population with a disruptive 
effect on food systems (HLPE, 2017).
Drivers can be internal to 
food systems and are interrelated
These drivers are intimately interrelated. These 
interrelations induce possible synergies, which 
amplify or accelerate their effects. 
While external drivers shape food systems, 
development options and the kinds of food systems 
chosen by some countries also have an impact 
on drivers. For example, production based on the 
massive use of energy and non-renewable resources, 
which prevails in industrialised countries, depletes 
natural resources, contributes to climate change and 
greenhouse gas emissions and increases inequalities. 
These drivers affect food systems, not only in 
the countries that have chosen these economic 
development options, but globally. These food system 
pathways can be considered as internal drivers. Food 
system configurations create path dependency, such 
as routines, social habits, infrastructure, food habits, 
organisational logics etc. This can cause inertia and 
halt potential changes in food systems.
External drivers evolve and some of their trends 
drive food system pathways. However, while they are 
evolving, food systems have their own intrinsic inertia, 
innovative pathways and trends which influence their 
own potential to change. 
In this report, we focus mainly on the major 
consequences and risks caused by external drivers 
to actual food systems. We focus on drivers that put 
food systems under pressure. We assume that some 
parts of the world, such as LI and LMI countries, are 
under a specific threat due to the unprecedented 
combinations of trends in drivers. ●
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MAJOR TRENDS IN FOOD SYSTEM DRIVERS
Pauline Bendjebbar1 and Nicolas Bricas1
Demographic trends
A fast-growing population in some countries. Based on 
the United Nations Population database, the world population 
is expected to increase from 7.7 billion in 2019 to 8.5 billion 
by 2030 (cf. Map 2). By 2050, this growth is expected to be 
particularly large in Africa, with an increase of 1.3 billion people, 
and in Asia, up 750 million people (UN, 2017a). The populations 
of 33 countries are expected to triple between 2017 and 2100. 
These are mainly LI and LMI countries (FAO, 2017). Africa will 
experience an increase in the proportion of young people, while 
Europe and Asia will see their population age (FAO, 2017).
In particular, population growth will be in urban areas. 
According to UN Population data (2019), urban populations in 
LI and LMI countries will grow at an annual rate of 3.9 percent 
and 2.4 percent respectively over the next 10 years. This means 
a 50 percent increase in the urban population between 2019 and 
2030. Map 3 shows the countries where urban populations will 
be larger than rural populations in 2030.
Between 2010 and 2050, the number of cities will grow by 75 
percent (cf. Map 4). In 2050, 66 percent of the world’s population 
is expected to be urban. The pace of urbanisation is faster in LI 
and LMI countries than in the rest of the world. Some 56 percent 
of the population in Africa and 64 percent in Asia will be living in 
cities in 2050 (HLPE, 2017). India, China and Nigeria are predicted 
to account for 37 percent of the projected growth in the world’s 
urban population between 2014 and 2050.
The population will also grow in rural areas in some 
countries. Again referring to UN Population data (2019), 
urbanisation should not mask the major increase in rural 
populations in some countries (cf. Map 5) and in particular in 
sub-Saharan African countries. Between 2019 and 2030, the 
rural population will increase by more than 20 percent in some 
of these countries. Rural population growth means there will be 
a quantitative increase in food demand and a need to create jobs 
in rural areas (UN, 2017a).
Migration and forced displacement are increasing both 
internally and internationally. In 2017, there were 30.6 million 
new internal displacements driven by conflicts and disasters 
across 143 countries and territories (IDMC, 2018). Natural 
disasters remain the main cause of population displacements at 
the global level, but conflicts are the main cause in Africa (cf. Map 
6) (IDMC, 2018).
The projected growing impact of global warming will certainly 
increase disaster-related displacements and potentially fuel 
social unrest and conflicts as populations migrate in the search 
for new land, water and food.  
S U M M A R Y
This chapter explores the trends in major external 
drivers that will probably present major challen-
ges and raise risks for food systems in the world 
over the next 20 years. This chapter focuses on 
only three main categories of trends because they 
are the easiest to predict and the least uncertain: 
environmental, demographic and socio-economic. 
This chapter describes some of the major trends 
for which we have some data available, although 
they are still debated by scientists. It will show 
how Low-Income (LI) and Lower Middle-Income 
(LMI) countries will experience some of the major 
challenges.
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
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International migrations are also increasing in some 
parts of the world, mainly motivated by the search 
for a better life and employment (UNHCR, 2018). 
International migrants move primarily between 
developing countries and often within the same 
region. Migration flows from Asia totalled more than 
30 million people between 2010 and 2015, out of 
which only 4 million migrated to Northern America 
Map 2: Total population evolution from 2019 to 2030 (in %). 
Data source: UN Population database 2019.
Map 3: Projected share of urban populations in 2030 (in %). 
Data source: UN Population database 2019.
and 4 million to Europe. Migration flows from the 
African continent totalled 10 million people between 
2010 and 2015, out of which only 2 million migrated 
to Europe (cf. Figure 4).
In general, food systems which are unsteady due 
to low food production capacities, low resilience, 
high pressure on resources and political insecurity 
generate more migrations and displacements.
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Map 4: Cities in 2018 and their growth rate 2018-30. 
Source: UN World Urbanization Prospects; The 2018 Revision.
Map 5: Expected rural population growth from 2019 to 2030 in %. 
Data source: UN Population database 2019.
Major environmental trends
Major environmental trends show that humanity 
is facing an alarming situation. This was already 
apparent in 1992 when 1,700 independent members 
of the Union of Concerned Scientists joined together 
for the ‘World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity’. Many 
researchers came together again in 2017 to reiterate 
the warning about potential irreversible damage to 
the planet. This damage concerned “ozone depletion, 
freshwater availability, marine life depletion, ocean 
dead zones, forest loss, biodiversity destruction, 
climate change, and continued human population 
growth” (Ripple et al., 2017) (cf. Figure 5).
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Map 6:  New internal population displacement by conflict and disaster in 2017. 
Source: IDMC 2018.
Figure 4: Estimated regional migration flows, 2010-2015. 
Source IOM, 2018 from UN DESA, 2015.
Datasets for the 2015 revision of international migration flows to 
and from selected countries available. The direction of the flow is 
indicated by the arrowhead. The size of the flow is determined by 
the width of the arrow at its base. Numbers on the outer section 
axis, used to read the size of migration flows, are in millions. So, for 
example, between 2010 and 2015, there was an increase of around 
4 million people in Northern America who were born in Asia.
As the figure 5 illustrates, many environmental 
indicators show that we are not yet changing trends 
towards more sustainable systems, which includes 
food systems. Indeed, all these trends affect food 
systems in all parts of the world. 
Socio-economic trends
One major trend is the evolution in incomes since this 
is driving food diets. A middle class is emerging in Asia, 
Near East and North Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Growth in the middle class is stagnating in Europe 
(from 724 million in 2015 to a predicted 733 million 
in 2030), North America (from 335 million in 2015 to a 
predicted 354 million in 2030) and Central and South 
America (from 285 million in 2015 to a predicted 335 
million in 2030) (cf. Figure 6).
Poverty and within-country inequalities remain high. 
ILO projections of the distribution of employment 
by economic level from 2019 to 2023 in LI countries 
show that despite an increase in the middle class, 
moderately and extremely poor income levels will 
remain the largest category of employment in these 
countries (near poor, moderately poor and extremely 
poor combined, in yellow, orange and red on the 
graph). This share seems set to remain the largest 
based on the predictions (cf. Figure 7).
Poor populations are much more vulnerable to 
shocks. After a shock, they may have difficulties in 
accessing adequate food, especially in urban areas.
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Figure 5: Trends over time, environmental issues identified in the 1992 scientists’ warning to humanity. 
Source: Ripple et al., 2018.
The years before and after the 1992 scientists’ warning are shown as grey and black lines respectively. Panel (a) shows emissions of 
halogen source gases, which deplete stratospheric ozone, assuming a constant natural emission rate of 0.11 Mt CFC-11-equivalent per year. 
In panel (c), marine catch has been falling since the mid-1990s, but at the same time, fishing efforts have increased (supplemental file S1). 
The vertebrate abundance index in panel (f) has been adjusted for taxonomic and geographic bias but incorporates relatively little data 
from developing countries, where there are the fewest studies; between 1970 and 2012, vertebrates fell by 58 percent, with freshwater, 
marine, and terrestrial populations decreasing by 81 percent, 36 percent and 35 percent respectively (file S1). Five-year means are shown 
in panel (h). In panel (i), ruminant livestock consists of domestic cattle, sheep, goats and buffaloes. Note that y axes do not start at zero 
and it is important to inspect the data range when interpreting each graph. Percentage change, since 1992, for the variables in each 
panel are as follows: (a) -68.1 percent; (b) -26.1 percent; (c) -6.4 percent; (d) +75.3 percent; (e) -2.8 percent; (f) -28.9 percent; (g) +62.1 percent; 
(h) +167.6 percent; and (i) humans: +35.5 percent, ruminant livestock: +20.5 percent. 
Food production per capita has never been higher. 
Food production has increased faster than population 
growth, even in those regions undergoing rapid 
demographic growth such as Africa (cf. Figure 8). As 
a result, food insecurity has improved but remains 
high despite food production that currently exceeds 
average caloric needs at the global level and should 
remain so. However, a turning point was reached in 
2015 (cf. Figure 9). Many reasons explain this reverse 
and many more might threaten food security in LI and 
LMI countries in the decades to come.
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Figure 6: The expansion of the global middle class (in millions).
Source: Kharas, 2017.
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Figure 8: Dietary energy supply in kcal/cap/day.
Source: FAOSTAT, 2019.
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Figure 10: Meat availability in kcal/cap/day. 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2019.
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Figure 11: Structure of animal product availability 
in selected countries in 2011-13.
Source: FAOSTAT, 2019
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Another major socio-economic trend is changes in 
food diets around the world. Food diets are evolving 
towards increased meat consumption. This growth 
will be particularly important in Eastern Asia (cf. 
Figure 10).
Although meat availability is increasing all over the 
world, the diversity of animal products consumed 
demonstrates the persistence of dietary differences 
between countries (cf. Figure 11).
More processed food is being consumed around the 
world due to the increasing industrialisation of food 
processing (Claquin et al., 2017). This has led to the 
extensive spread of some highly industrialised and 
standardised ‘global’ products, such as sodas and 
sugar. 
Another major trend is the evolution of food 
markets. National and local market trends show a 
Notes:  Net exports of cereals, oilseeds, sugar crops, meats, ﬁsh and dairy products
evaluated at 2004–06 constant international reference prices. Data from 2014 onward
are projections.
*“Asia” covers all Asia except for Central Asia and includes Southeast Asia, South Asia,
and East Asia (including China).
Source: FAO and OECD. 2015. OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015–2024. Paris, OECD
Publishing.  
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*“Asia” covers all Asia except for Central Asia and includes 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Asia (including China).
commoditisation of agricultural products. In sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, part of the food consumed 
in rural areas is self-produced. Nevertheless, markets 
have tended to expand everywhere. In Western 
Africa, around half of the value of food consumption 
in rural areas comes from markets. Around half of 
the starch products consumed by rural populations 
in the 16 countries studied by Bricas, Tchamda and 
Mouton (2016) are purchased, not self-produced. 
This proportion is even higher for animal and other 
products (Bricas, Tchamda and Mouton, 2016). 
Furthermore, supermarkets continue to spread 
across the world, with high growth trends in all LI and 
LMI countries (Reardon et al., 2003). 
International trade is expected to increase at the 
global level. Based on trends between 1995-1996 and 
2012-2013, transcontinental trade has increased, with 
more exchanges between Asia and Pacific countries 
(Claquin et al., 2017). Processed products will increase 
their share in the world market, while products 
historically traded internationally, such as cocoa and 
coffee, will remain so (Claquin et al., 2017). In Least 
Developed countries (LDC), between 2001-04 and 
2009-12 the share of raw commodities in the total 
value of agricultural exports increased from 37.8 to 
48.5 percent (cf. Figure 12) (FAO, 2015). However, 
the share of processed products in LDC agricultural 
exports shrank “from 31 to 26 percent” (cf. Figure 12) 
(FAO, 2015).
Conclusion
This description of some of the major trends is not 
exhaustive. We have chosen to focus on trends that 
may pose major risks for the future of food systems. 
These trends highlight the fact that LI and LMI countries 
might be the most vulnerable regions in the world. The 
following chapters and sections explore these trends 
in more detail and examine their consequences for 
food systems in LI and LMI countries. ●
References
Bricas, N., Tchamda, C. & Mouton, F., eds. 2016. L’Afrique à la 
conquête de son marché alimentaire intérieur. Enseignements de dix 
ans d’enquêtes auprès des ménages d’Afrique de l’Ouest, au Cameroun 
et du Tchad. Études de l’AFD 12, Paris, AFD.
Claquin, P., Martin, A., Deram, C., Bidaud, F., Delgoulet, 
E., Gassie, J. & Hérault, B. 2017. MOND’Alim 2030, panorama 
prospectif de la mondialisation des systèmes alimentaires. Paris, La 
Documentation française.
FAO. 2017. The future of food and agriculture – Trends and challenges. 
Rome. 166 pp.
FAO. 2018. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 
2018. [online] http://www.fao.org/3/ca5162en/ca5162en.pdf
Internal displacement monitoring centre (IDMC). 
2018. Global report on internal displacement. GRID. (also 
available at www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/ 
grid2018/downloads/2018-GRID.pdf).
International Organization for Migration. 2018. World Migration 
Report 2018. [online] https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/
wmr_2018_en.pdf.
Kharas, H. 2017. The unprecedented expansion of the global middle 
class: an update. Global Economy & Development working paper 
100. Washington, DC, Brookings.
Reardon, T., Timmer, C.P., Barrett, C.B. & Berdegue, J. 2003. 
The rise of supermarkets in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
American journal of agricultural economics, 85(5): 1140–1146.
SECTION 1. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
32
Ripple, W.J., Wolf, C., Newsome, T.M., Galetti, M., Alamgir, M., 
Crist, E., Mahmoud, M.I. et al. 2017. World scientists’ warning to 
humanity: a second notice. BioScience, 67(12):1026–1028 [online]. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/bix125
UNHCR. 2018. Global trends. Forced displacements in 2017. 
Geneva, UN. (also available at
https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdfhttps. 
United Nations. 2017. World population prospects: the 2017 
revision, key findings and advance tables. Working Paper ESA/P/
WP/248. New York, UN.
02
F O O D  S Y S T E M S
C O N T R I B U T E  T O  A N D
A R E  I M PA C T E D  B Y
C L I M AT E  C H A N G E
SECTION
SECTION 2 
Food systems contribute to and are impacted by climate change 
Chapter 2.1 
Food systems emission and climate change consequences J. Demenois, G. Chaboud and V. Blanfort .......................... 35
Chapter 2.2 
Climate change, animal product consumption and the future of food systems G. Duteurtre, M. Habibou Assouma, 
R. Poccard-Chapuis, P. Dumas et al.  ...................................................................................................................................... 39
Chapter 2.3 
Deforestation for food production L. Feintrenie, J. Betbeder, M.-G. Piketty and L. Gazull  .................................................... 43
Chapter 2.4 
Risks of new pests and diseases A. Binot and C. Cilas  ................................................................................................... 47
Conclusion : 
Food system adaptation and mitigation: managing trade-offs C. Dutilly and É. Hainzelin .......................................... 51
02 FOOD SYSTEMS AT RISK: NEW TRENDS AND CHALLENGES 35
FOOD SYSTEMS EMISSION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
CONSEQUENCES
Julien Demenois1, Géraldine Chaboud2 and Vincent Blanfort3
Contribution of food systems 
to climate change
Food systems are a major driver of environmental effects, 
including climate change. They have contributed to the crossing 
of several of the proposed ‘planetary boundaries’ that attempt 
to define a safe operating space for humanity on a stable 
Earth system, in particular those concerning climate change 
(Springmann et al., 2018). The Agriculture, Forestry and Other 
Land-Use sector (AFOLU) is responsible for just under a quarter 
(≈10–12 GtCO2eq/yr) of anthropogenic GHG emissions, mainly 
from deforestation and agricultural emissions from livestock, 
soil and nutrient management (Smith et al., 2014). Annual direct 
GHG emissions from agricultural production in 2000–2010 
have been estimated at 5.0–5.8 GtCO2eq/yr (Smith et al., 2014), 
including emissions from biomass burning (12 percent) and 
energy use in agricultural machinery (Vermeulen et al., 2012). 
Indirect GHG emissions from the pre-production stages (mainly 
the manufacture of fertilisers) have been estimated at 0.35-0.77 
GtCO2eq/yr and post-production stages (processing, packaging, 
transport, refrigeration, retail, catering, food management and 
waste disposal) at 1.1 GtCO2eq/yr (Vermeulen et al., 2012). So, 
food systems contribute between 19 and 29 percent of total 
anthropogenic GHG emissions. Agricultural production is by far 
the main source of emissions in LI and LMI countries, while post-
production stages emit GHG emissions equal to the production 
stages in HI countries (Vermeulen et al., 2012). 
Although there is little information available, an estimated one-
third of the food produced in the world for human consumption 
is lost or wasted during the production to consumption stages 
(Gustavsson et al., 2011; HLPE, 2014). In HI countries, most 
food loss and waste (FLW) occurs at the downstream stages of 
the food supply chain (retail and consumption) and is related 
to patterns of over-production and over-consumption. In LI 
and LMI countries, FLW is supposed to mostly occur at the 
upstream stages (harvest, storage, transport and processing) 
due to infrastructural, financial and technical constraints 
(Gustavsson et al., 2011). FLW represents a significant use of 
natural resources along food supply chains and pollution is 
emitted in vain. FLW contributes to GHG emissions in two ways: 
through waste management activities (for example, disposal in 
landfill) and through the embedded emissions associated with 
its production, processing, transport, retailing and consumption. 
The latter are far more important in terms of impact than the 
former. The carbon footprint of FLW has been estimated at 
3.3 GtCO2 equivalent (excluding GHG emissions from land-use 
changes). Reducing FLW by one half would reduce environmental 
pressures by between 6 and 16 percent compared with the 
baseline projection for 2050 (Springmann et al., 2018).
S U M M A R Y
Food systems are responsible for up to one-third 
of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions. These emissions include carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) and 
are therefore a major driver of climate change. 
The environmental pressures on food systems 
are likely to intensify, as humanity is arguably 
already operating beyond planetary boundaries. 
The projection for changes between 2010 and 
2050 shows that these pressures will result in an 
increase of between 80 and 92 percent in GHG 
emissions in the absence of technological change 
and other mitigation measures. Apart from being a 
significant source of GHG emissions, food systems 
are significantly impacted by climate change. Une-
ven climate change effects, in combination with 
differences in adaptation capacity, could exacer-
bate existing inequalities between High-Income 
(HI), Low-Income (LI) and Lower Middle-Income 
(LMI) countries.
1. CIRAD, UPR AIDA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
2. Montpellier SupAgro and CIRAD, Chaire Unesco 
Alimentations du Monde, F-34093 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
3. CIRAD, UMR SELMET, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
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Impact of climate change 
on food systems
Apart from being a significant source of GHG 
emissions, climate change is affecting people and 
the environment around the world, as shown by 
the 2018 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). The State of Food Security and 
Nutrition in the World (FAO, 2018) also found climate 
change to be one of the key drivers behind the rise 
of hungry people in the world, reaching 821 million 
people in 2017. By the middle of this century, higher 
average temperatures, changes in precipitation, rising 
sea levels, as well as the possibility of an increase in 
damage from pests and diseases, are expected to 
affect several agricultural sectors. 
In particular, the number and frequency of recorded 
natural disasters are increasing significantly. These 
events often destroy critical agricultural assets and 
infrastructure, disrupting production cycles, trade 
flows and livelihoods. This affects food security and 
causes additional disruptions throughout value chains 
(FAO, 2017). Indeed, extreme weather events and 
geopolitical crises are the dominant drivers of food 
production shocks, even if their relative importance 
varies across sectors (Cottrell et al., 2019). Over half 
of all shocks to crop production systems have been 
the result of extreme weather events, reinforcing 
concern about the vulnerability of arable systems 
to climatic and meteorological volatility around the 
globe.
In addition, climate change will impact livestock 
production, as well as fisheries and aquaculture, 
the performance of small- and medium-sized food 
and agribusinesses, transportation infrastructure 
with consequent disruption to food supply chains 
and the exodus of climate refugees. This impact 
will be uneven across regions and countries. Arid 
and semi-arid regions will be exposed to even 
lower precipitation and higher temperatures and, 
consequently, experience yield losses. Conversely, 
countries in temperate areas are expected to benefit 
from warmer weather during their growing season. 
Faced with climate change, LI and LMI countries are 
the most vulnerable and it could exacerbate the 
food security challenges they already experience. 
For example, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly West Africa, have been found to be the 
hardest-hit regions, partly due to higher climate-
induced crop yield losses and because their national 
economies depend on agriculture for a significant 
share of GDP and employment. Simultaneously, 
small-scale family farmers have little access to 
innovative technologies, services and inputs, which 
limits their capacity to adapt to a changing climate. 
As a result, these regions are expected to experience 
a significant drop in agricultural production due to 
climate change (cf. Map 7) and imports of agricultural 
products are expected to increase. Uneven climate 
change effects, in combination with differences 
in adaptation capacity, could exacerbate existing 
inequalities and further widen the gap between HI 
and LI and LMI countries (FAO, 2018). ●
BOX 1 
future climate risk in southern mali1
Crop yield losses caused by climate change are expected to be 
high in many regions of sub-Saharan Africa and smallholder 
farmers, who rely heavily on agriculture for their livelihoods, 
have been identified as highly vulnerable to climate change. In 
southern Mali, a study has assessed the future climate change 
risk according to farm type and degree of food self-sufficiency. 
It shows that cereal crop production in the region of N’Tarla in 
southern Mali is gravely threatened by climate change. Some 
40 percent of the country’s population lives in this region, which 
represents half of Mali’s cultivable land. 
The current climate is typical of the Sudano-Sahelian zone of 
West Africa with conditions that are already drier and tempe-
ratures, which are warmer. Predictions suggest that the cur-
rent climate warming trend will continue and even accelerate. 
By mid-century (2040-2069) annual maximum and minimum 
temperatures are expected to increase by 2.9 °C and 3.3 °C 
respectively compared with the climate trend of the past 30 
years (1980-2009). Rising temperatures are expected to have 
a critical impact on crop yields by reducing the length of the 
crop growth cycle and increasing the intensity and duration of 
droughts due to larger soil water evaporation losses. Under 
these future climate conditions and without changing current 
cropping practices, simulation models predict crop yield losses 
and a reduction of food availability for all farm types, and this 
is in an area where most of the population of is already facing 
food insecurity problems. 
However, the adverse impact of climate change will differ 
among farmers if coping strategies are adopted. Projections 
show that large- and medium-sized farms can offset the yield 
losses induced by climate change and remain food self-suffi-
cient with crop management solutions such as early planting 
and increased fertiliser use. In contrast, results show that any 
of these adaptive crop management measures would not be 
enough to protect small farms from the negative consequences 
of climate change on crop productivity and food self-sufficien-
cy. These smallholders will remain food insecure. Farmers will 
need off-farm employment or other forms of social support to 
cope with climate change. The results of this study are in line 
with many other studies and model predictions showing that 
agricultural performance in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be 
strongly affected by future climate change.
1. Based on Traore et al., 2017
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Map 7: Projected impact of climate change on agricultural productivity.
Source: Cline, 2007.
Projections include the effect of CO2 fertilisation. No effects of technical progress on agricultural productivity were assessed.
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CLIMATE CHANGE, ANIMAL PRODUCT CONSUMPTION 
AND THE FUTURE OF FOOD SYSTEMS
Guillaume Duteurtre1, Mohamed Habibou Assouma1, René Poccard-Chapuis2, Patrice Dumas3, Ibra Toure1, 
Christian Corniaux4, Abdrahmane Wane5, Alexandre Ickowicz1 and Vincent Blanfort1
Livestock and GHG emissions: 
how the rise in demand for animal products 
is generating risks for food systems
Over the past 40 years there has been a huge increase in 
demand for animal products, driven by demographic changes, 
economic growth and urbanisation. Between 1977 and 2017, the 
world’s population almost doubled and per capita consumption 
of animal products increased by 50 percent. This resulted in a 
leap in world meat production from 122 to 330 million tonnes 
and milk production soared from 317 to 811 million tonnes 
(FAO, 2019). The latest projections predict that these trends will 
continue at the global scale, in particular in emerging countries 
where household incomes are rising and increasing the demand 
for animal products.
Market growth has resulted in major environmental impacts. 
Throughout the world, intensive animal production and 
industrialised value chains have emerged (Steinfeld, de Haan, and 
Blackburn, 1997). This ‘livestock revolution’, together with cropland 
extension for feed and food, have exacerbated the human 
pressure on land and natural resources. Twenty billion animals 
make use of 30 percent of the terrestrial land area for grazing, 
33 percent of the global cropland area for producing animal feed 
and 32 percent of freshwater resources (Herrero et al., 2016). 
These changes have had a big impact on the rise in GHG 
emissions, consequently accelerating climate change. The 
world’s livestock sector generates around 7.1 GtCO2eq/yr, which 
represents 14.5 percent of global anthropogenic GHG emissions. 
The GHG emissions depends on the regions of the World but 
are not fully correlated with livestock production volumes 
(Figure 13). The sector is associated with enteric fermentation 
(2.8 GtCO2eq/yr), feed production, processing and transportation 
(3.2), manure management (0.7) and land-use change emissions 
(0.6) (Gerber et al., 2013). These figures are still debated in the 
scientific community. In particular, the contribution of livestock 
in land-use change-related emissions and carbon sequestration 
is not yet properly assessed. Among all livestock related GHG 
emissions, fossil fuel consumption in itself (from production to 
distribution) accounts for a significant share, at an estimated 1.4 
GtCO2eq/yr. 
Chemically speaking, about 44 percent of GHG emissions are in 
the form of methane (CH4) and 29 percent in the form of nitrous 
oxide (N2O). The rest (27 percent) is due to carbon dioxide (CO2) 
(Gerber et al., 2013).
Because of enteric fermentation, emissions per unit of protein 
produced are higher for ruminant meat and milk than for pork, 
poultry and aquaculture. In particular, beef and cattle milk 
S U M M A R Y
The livestock sector contributes around 14.5 
percent of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Developing mitigation strategies 
is a serious challenge, especially if we anticipate a 
rapid growth in the consumption of animal pro-
ducts in Low-Income (LI) and Lower Middle-In-
come (LMI) countries. Across the planet, livestock 
systems are highly diverse and the livestock sector 
offers many possibilities for carbon sinking that 
can help to reduce emissions. In particular, carbon 
sequestration in grasslands, rangelands and feed 
crop fields and manure recycling are crucial in the 
assessment of the carbon efficiency of livestock 
value chains. Supporting sustainable livestock 
production systems, together with sustainable 
animal product market chains and consumption, 
requires the completion of GHG inventories based 
on landscape carbon balances.
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production account for 64 percent of the sector’s 
GHG emissions, while pigs and poultry account for 
9 percent and 8 percent respectively. Among the 
huge diversity of livestock sub-systems, some are 
less carbon costly. Grassland systems, based on the 
use of natural pastures and cultivated meadows, 
together with integrated crop-livestock systems, 
generally generate lower emissions than landless 
systems based on industrial feed (cf. Box 2). In order 
to manage the roles of these different livestock 
sub-systems, trade-offs must be made taking into 
consideration their multiple functions.
Multi-functionality of livestock 
systems requires an understanding 
of the trade-offs between 
climate mitigation and 
other ecosystem services 
Livestock provides direct livelihood and economic 
benefits to at least 1.3 billion producers and retailers. 
As an economic activity, livestock contributes up to 
50 percent of agricultural GDP globally (Herrero et al., 
2016). Animal breeding is well adapted to many areas 
with restricted resources or to harsh environments. It 
offers opportunities for a wide diversity of communities 
and social groups in nearly all ecosystems. Milk 
production, for example, contributes to the livelihoods 
of more than 121 million families throughout the 
world. Most of these are very small farms, with an 
average of three cows (IFCN, 2015). 
Due to its multi-functionality, livestock plays an 
important role in the sustainable development of 
rural territories. It provides meat, milk and eggs 
which contribute to nutrition and balanced diets, 
particularly in LI countries though self-consumption. 
Livestock also provides energy for transportation 
and ploughing, and manure for organic fertilisation. 
Moreover, cattle and other livestock have an 
important role in household economics in LI and 
LMI countries as they often serve as a form of 
savings and a mechanism for managing economic 
risk, used by rural households to ensure survival 
and overcome periods of food insecurity (Alary, 
Duteurtre and Faye, 2011). This is at the core of some 
peoples’ livelihoods, as illustrated in pastoralism. In 
addition, livestock has always played a crucial role in 
agricultural intensification processes (HLPE, 2016). In 
particular, livestock systems based on grazing have 
the ecosystemic capacity to store carbon in the long 
term in the form of organic carbon, which contributes 
to carbon sequestration at the global scale (Soussana, 
Tallec and Blanfort, 2010).
Animal products also have a high cultural value 
and significance in many LI and LMI countries, 
as demonstrated in many religious and cultural 
practices. They contribute to food security through 
their participation in local and international trade. At 
the same time, the consumption of animal products 
may result in nutritional disorders.
Designing low-carbon livestock 
systems that contribute to 
sustainable food systems 
The serious challenges posed by global warming 
mean that we have to address both the transition to 
low-carbon livestock systems and sustainably satisfy 
the growing demand for livestock products in LI 
and LMI countries. These transitions must consider 
the various roles livestock plays in local ecosystems 
and communities and the importance of the carbon 
sequestration process (Vigne et al., 2017). 
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Figure 13: GHG emissions from livestock and livestock production by commodity and regions.
Source: Gerber, P.J. et al., 2013.
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On the production side, the carbon balance must 
improve at the landscape level. Understanding 
potential synergies between adaptation, activities 
designed to sustainably increase production and 
mitigation are important. Climate-smart agriculture 
(CSA) approaches will help to guide the actions 
needed to transform and reorient livestock systems 
(FAO, 2017).
In the humid tropics, where livestock systems have 
developed over forests, efforts to curb deforestation 
are a priority in order to preserve forest biodiversity 
and carbon stocks. Grasslands are good candidates 
to increase carbon uptake in soil while still ensuring 
basic food production in these ecosystems (Stahl et 
al., 2017). Tropical pastures, often established after 
deforestation, can be exploited with CSA practices. 
Those include no fires and no overgrazing, grazing 
rotation plans and the use of mixtures of grasses and 
legumes to reduce nitrate use. A better integration 
of livestock activities in forestry and agricultural 
landscapes (agro-sylvo-pastoralism) can also be a 
source of carbon mitigation (Vigne et al., 2016). 
The environmental impacts of intensive and extensive livestock 
systems are highly debated in the scientific community. Exten-
sive pastoral systems are assumed to be responsible for the hi-
ghest rates of GHG emissions per unit of animal product, despite 
their small contribution to global GHG emissions. In fact, the car-
bon balances available for tropical agro-ecosystems are based on 
default emission factors provided by the IPCC, with high degrees 
of uncertainty due to the lack of in situ measurements in tropical 
systems.
To better assess the carbon balance of African pastoral systems, 
a study has been conducted in Ferlo, an open rangeland region 
in northern Senegal. The assessment took an ecosystemic ap-
proach. All the main sources of GHG emissions were considered, 
such as methane emissions due to enteric fermentation and 
emissions from manure, soil, surface water ponds, termites, bush 
fires and pump motors, and all sources of carbon sequestration 
were taken into account, including natural carbon sequestration 
by soil, trees and livestock. Carbon balance components were 
assessed monthly to account for the highly seasonal monsoon 
climate and the mobility of pastoral herds.
The study concluded that the annual carbon balance of the pas-
toral ecosystem was -0.04 GtCO2eq/yr. This shows that total GHG 
emissions were mitigated by carbon accumulation in trees, soil 
and livestock. The carbon balance varied considerably with the 
seasons. This seasonality is explained by both pastoral practices 
and environmental factors. The negative carbon balance found in 
this study contrasts with the traditional reputation that African li-
vestock systems have a major impact on climate change because 
of their low productivity per animal. 
The other benefits of this ecosystemic approach are a better 
understanding of the drivers of the carbon balance, making it 
possible to identify appropriate and effective mitigation options 
with reference to the seasonal and between-year dynamics of 
the carbon balance. More widely, these new results call for more 
ecosystemic approaches to be applied to the analysis of carbon 
balances in agricultural systems worldwide. The challenge is to 
fully account for both negative and positive effects of agricultural 
activities on climate change.
1. Based on Assouma et al., 2019
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BOX 2 
pastoralism in the sahel: a zero-carbon livestock system?1
In drier tropical regions dominated by rangeland 
ecosystems, livestock plays an important role in the 
reorganisation of nutrient and carbon cycles through 
the recycling of dry matter to the soil in the form of 
manure. Harvesting surplus forage at the beginning 
of the dry season also has the potential to reduce the 
risk of bushfires and increase livestock productivity 
(Assouma et al., 2019). 
Downstream innovations must also be promoted. 
Several studies have investigated the large mitigation 
potential of dietary changes. For example, vegetarian 
or ‘flexitarian’ diets could substantially reduce the 
burden of livestock in carbon emissions. In LI and LMI 
countries, however, animal product consumption is 
on the rise. In this context, low-carbon labels, climate 
mitigation certification mechanisms or short value 
chains could be efficient tools for reducing GHG 
emissions. These market mechanisms require the 
completion of GHG inventories based on landscape 
carbon balances in order to inform consumers. ●
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DEFORESTATION FOR FOOD PRODUCTION
Laurène Feintrenie1, Julie Betbeder1, Marie-Gabrielle Piketty2 and Laurent Gazull3
There is a critical link between food systems and deforestation. 
Because of their climate and soil characteristics, potential arable 
lands are usually covered with forests under natural conditions. 
In LI and LMI countries, commercial agriculture is the most 
important driver of deforestation, followed by subsistence 
agriculture (FAO, 2016). Hosonuma et al. (2012) estimated that 
commercial agriculture contributed to 68 percent of deforestation 
in Latin America between 2000 and 2010, and to about 35 percent 
in Africa and Asia, while subsistence agriculture contributed to 
27 percent and 40 percent of deforestation in each continent. 
Agriculture is also involved in forest degradation, though timber 
extraction and logging drive most forest degradation, followed by 
fuelwood collection and charcoal production, uncontrolled fires 
and livestock grazing (Hosonuma et al., 2012; Carter et al., 2018). 
Deforestation, forest degradation 
and loss of ecosystem services 
Forests provide multiple ecosystem services, such as carbon 
sequestration, biodiversity preservation, soil protection and 
regulation of water resources. More specifically, tropical forest 
evapotranspiration cools the local climate through feedbacks with 
clouds and precipitation. Deforestation (complete destruction of 
forest cover) and forest degradation (modifications of forests 
due to the accumulation of disturbances over time) threaten the 
provision of forest ecosystem services. Massive deforestation 
would lead to a decrease in carbon storage and an increase 
in GHG emissions. It also leads to the reduction of convective 
clouds involving a significant reduction in precipitation and an 
increase in average temperatures (Bonan, 2008). 
Currently, one-third of the planet’s forests are considered as 
primary or intact while the other two-thirds are subject to human 
activities and degradation. In tropical areas, carbon gains from 
forest growth are cancelled out and exceeded by carbon losses 
from deforestation and degradation, leading to a net emission 
of 425.2 ± 92.0 Tg C year–1. Forest degradation affects about 
60 percent of the world’s tropical forests and accounts for 68.9 
percent of the current overall tropical forest carbon loss (Baccini 
et al., 2017). The evolution of tropical forests will play a key role 
in the possible mitigation of climate change.
Song et al. (2018) have reported that the global tree cover area 
(including all agroforestry systems, much degraded forests and 
plantations) increased by 2.24 million km² from 1982 to 2016, 
an increase of 7.1 percent. The overall gain is mainly due to an 
increase in forest cover in the subtropical, temperate and boreal 
climate zones (green pixels, cf. Figure 14) balancing the net loss 
of tree cover in the tropics (pink pixels, cf. Figure 14). These 
S U M M A R Y
Deforestation contributes to carbon emissions and 
therefore to climate change. Within food systems, 
agricultural production is the stage which plays 
the largest role in deforestation and forest degra-
dation, and it is therefore the focus of this chap-
ter. There is a critical link between food systems 
and deforestation. Arable lands most often have a 
forested past. It might be ancestral, with defores-
tation having happened in the early occupation of 
land by humans or be very recent on current forest 
frontiers. Over the past two decades, commercial 
agriculture has overtaken subsistence agriculture 
as the main driver of deforestation in LI and LMI 
countries, especially in tropical areas.
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estimates do not consider imported deforestation, 
caused by the production of imported agricultural 
and forestry products. FAO (2015) agrees on the 
estimate of tree canopy loss. However, it reported a 
net forest loss between 1990 and 2015. 
In rural landscapes, forests provide ecosystem 
services essential to agriculture, such as habitat for 
pollinating species and beneficial insects, maintaining 
soil stability and fertility, facilitating water infiltration 
into the soil for better renewal of groundwater 
reserves, acting as a buffer zone transforming heavy 
rainfalls into networks of small rivers with limited 
erosive impact, protection against strong winds 
and regulation of the micro-climate. Forests, when 
appropriately planned and managed, can withstand 
and protect against natural disasters of varying 
degrees and types (FAO and RECOFTC, 2013; Carter 
et al., 2018). Forest spatial organisation is recognised 
as a key factor in providing these ecosystem services. 
Small-scale farming allows for discontinuity in 
production areas. Plots usually range from less than 
one to a few hectares in size. Corridors of forests 
and buffer zones around hydrologic networks might 
be easier to protect in landscapes dominated by this 
production system.
The role of agriculture 
in deforestation
Recently, high resolution imagery and fast image 
processing have been used to address the question 
of which type of agricultural systems have the largest 
influence on deforestation, looking at the size of 
clearing as a proxy of the type of production. Austin et 
al. (2017) have provided an analysis of deforestation 
evidence from 2000 to 2012, examining the trends 
in forest clearances of different sizes by country, 
region and development level. Their findings suggest 
that, in general, tropical deforestation increased 
between 2000-2006 and 2007-2012. More than  50 
percent of this increase related to the expansion 
of medium, large and industrial-scale clearings (10-
100 ha, 100-1,000 ha and >1,000 ha respectively), 
with a more pronounced trend in South East Asia 
(especially in Indonesia, Malaysia and Cambodia) and 
South America (especially in Bolivia and Paraguay). 
The opposite trend was observed in Brazil, where 
deforestation decreased, with more than 90 percent 
of this from a reduction in medium and large-scale 
clearings. Austin et al. (2017) also provide evidence 
that the deforestation profiles in most Central 
American and African LI and LMI countries continue 
to be dominated by small clearings (more than 80 
percent of the country’s deforestation). In South East 
Asia, Philippines and Thailand show the same trend 
with 90 to 92 percent of the increased deforestation 
related to small clearings.
Small-scale agriculture includes family farming 
for subsistence and sales of surpluses, as well 
as managerial farming mixing family labour with 
permanent hired labour for commercial production. 
These farms might be included in informal value chains 
and their importance on the market at the national 
and global scale is therefore often underestimated, 
even though they are key players for certain crops. 
For example, smallholders of less than 2 ha produce 
70 percent of all rice but only 10 percent of maize at 
the world level (Samberg et al., 2016). Taken together, 
they represent a huge population and are a priority 
target for SDGs tackling poverty alleviation, food 
security and access to health services and education.
Where there is a growing population, small-scale 
farmers consume forest land to expand the productive 
agricultural area, use timber for housing construction 
and wood for fuel. Agricultural conversion of forests 
might also be a means to land appropriation and 
transmission. In LI countries, small-scale agriculture 
is mainly organic and labour-intensive by default4, 
mostly because of the lack of cash or access to inputs 
and materials. Farmers benefiting from technical 
advances in agriculture sometimes expand to sell 
more agricultural products rather than spare land. 
This means agricultural intensification does not 
systematically lead to less pressure on forests (Rudel 
et al., 2009; Byerlee, Stevenson and Villoria, 2014). 
Besides, De Fries et al. (2010) have shown that tropical 
deforestation is more closely correlated with urban 
population growth and the development of export-
oriented agriculture rather than growth in the rural 
population.
Austin et al. (2017) have demonstrated that 
industrial-scale agriculture played an increasing 
role in deforestation during the 2007-2012 period in 
Paraguay, Bolivia and Peru in South America, and in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam in South 
East Asia. Agriculture in these countries is increasingly 
directed towards the export of commodities. 
When the price of the commodity is high enough, it 
becomes profitable to stretch the agronomic limits 
of the ecosystem by huge installation investments. 
When replacing forests, these costs might be partially 
covered by the sale of timber and wood.
Large-scale land-based investments in agriculture 
are also an answer to political strategies seeking 
to diversify national economic resources, populate 
national border areas, boost the national economy 
and balance imports and exports of food, fibre 
or energy. While they might be a great economic 
4. However, this might not always be the case in main cash crop agricultural systems nor in peri-urban agriculture (see Chapter 3.3).
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opportunity for host countries, they may also be a 
threat to natural forests and possibly to access to 
land by local populations. They create new living 
areas, with a local increase in the human population 
which increases pressure on natural resources and 
creates high local demand for food crops and animal 
proteins, for fuelwood and for timber for housing. 
Adjacent forests might suffer from higher pressure 
from hunting and gathering, slash and burn for 
agriculture and small-scale logging (Feintrenie, 2014). 
They are a frequent target for activist NGOs. However, 
industrial companies must meet requirements 
from the governments of host countries of their 
production sites as well as in the countries of origin 
where the companies are registered. A consequence 
of these pressures is the definition of strategies and 
commitments by many agri-business companies 
towards responsible production schemes such as 
certifications or zero-deforestation pledges (Tonneau 
et al., 2017). ●
Figure 14: Satellite-based record of global tree canopy (TC) cover, short vegetation (SV) cover and bare ground (BG) cover 
from 1982 to 2016. 
Source: Songe et al. 2018.
A satellite-based record of global TC, SV and BG cover from 1982 to 2016. a, Mean annual estimates. b, Long-term change estimates. 
Both mean and change estimates are expressed as per cent of pixel area at 0.05° x 0.05° spatial resolution. Pixels showing a statistically 
significant trend (n = 35, two-sided Mann - Kendall test, P<0.05) in either TC, SV or BG are depicted on the change map. Circled numbers in 
the colour legend denote dominant change directions: 1, TC gain with SV loss; 2, BG gain with SV loss; 3, TC gain with BG loss; 4, BG gain 
with TC loss; 5, SV gain with BG loss;  and 6, SV gain with TC loss.
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Sourisseau et al. (2015) have described the diversity of family 
farming systems and their interactions with the environment. 
Many examples of non-industrialised family farming are given to 
argue that where forests are available for agricultural conversion 
and where labour is not a limiting factor, expansion is the main 
strategy to increase family agricultural income.
Indonesia is well known for its complex agroforestry systems, 
also called agroforests, and when dominated by rubber, ‘jungle 
rubber’. These agroforests preserve most forest ecological 
functions (FAO, 2016). They protect soils, regulate hydrological 
resources and micro-climates and preserve a high level of 
biodiversity. Farmers who develop and manage them are 
sensitive to the complexity of plant, insect and animal interactions 
and recognise their aesthetic quality. Behind this pleasant 
picture hides the deforestation of natural forests in response 
to commercial opportunities. Coffee, cocoa and rubber were 
first planted in medium and large-scale plantations according to 
industrialised agricultural practices. Local farmers, often working 
in these plantations, began intercropping these cash crops in 
their upland rice and food crops. They have added commercial 
agriculture to their subsistence farming. The complexity of the 
botanic composition in these agroforests is mostly spontaneous: 
after three years of rice and food crop cultivation, the plot is 
abandoned until trees become productive. In the case of coffee 
or cocoa this is only a matter of a few years, while in the case of 
rubber, it might be up to 15 years. Then the farmer returns to 
the plot, cleans it, preserving useful trees (valuable timber trees 
and fruit trees) and opens a path to the cash crop trees. Useful 
trees might be planted to enrich agroforests where space allows 
it (Feintrenie, Schwarze and Levang, 2010).
The environmentally friendly practices in agroforests do 
not compensate for the forest and wildlife habitat losses 
necessary for their establishment. Other features of these 
agroforests translate into lower agricultural yields and income 
generation compared with mono-specific plantations. Because 
of this, agroforests are increasingly being converted into more 
productive mono-specific plantations. Feintrenie, Schwarze and 
Levang (2010) analysed this common trajectory in three sites: 
Sulawesi (cocoa), Lampung (coffee and damar) and Eastern 
Sumatra (natural rubber). They found that the main drivers of 
conversion of forests to agroforests or agroforests to mono-
specific plantations are identical: economic opportunities.
BOX 3 
non-industrialised family farming might not always be forest friendly: 
the example of agroforestry in indonesia
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RISKS OF NEW PESTS AND DISEASES
Aurelie Binot1 and Christian Cilas2
Effects of climate change on the emergence 
and prevalence of health risks 
Climate change induces the disruption of ecological and 
sociological patterns. In particular, climate change has the 
potential to affect disease emergence (Watts et al., 2017) because 
of its effects on annual and seasonal cycles affecting the spatial 
distribution of climate-sensitive pathogens. Regarding diseases 
strongly linked to ecological dynamics, such as vector-borne 
diseases, climate variations determine the presence and density 
of pathogen vectors and hosts (whether plant, animal or human) 
at any given place (Roger et al., 2016). For instance, climate 
change allows mosquitoes, ticks and other parasites transmitting 
diseases to move to areas where they were previously unknown, 
threatening new food systems and populations. Diseases such as 
malaria, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), dengue and 
Rift Valley fever are likely to emerge or re-emerge in disease-free 
areas, threatening the safety and health of human and animal 
populations.
A recent study has highlighted that most of the important 
pathogens among protozoa and helminths, vector-borne, 
food-borne, soil-borne and water-borne transmission routes 
are sensitive to climatic factors (ranging from 63 percent to 82 
percent), particularly temperature and rainfall. Among them, 
zoonotic pathogens seem to be more sensitive to climate than 
exclusively human or animal pathogens (McIntyre et al., 2017). 
Climate change combined with other global changes such as 
the intensification of food farming systems, the globalisation 
of trade and the erosion of biodiversity will undeniably 
accelerate the emergence of these new health risks, in particular 
infectious vector-borne zoonotic diseases, crop pests and anti-
microbial resistance. Taking into consideration that higher local 
temperatures are associated with increased rates of resistant 
infections (Blair, 2018), antibiotic resistance combined with 
climate change is probably one of the major crises to be faced 
in the future.
Cascade of impacts on livestock 
and crop production
These changes induced by climate change in host/pathogen 
interactions generate a cascade of impacts on livestock and crop 
production, affecting food security, livelihoods and potentially 
leading to migrations and social disequilibrium, with a subsequent 
impact on host/pathogen interactions (Figure 15). In addition, 
the increase of sanitary and phytosanitary threats resulting from 
climate change would hamper regional and international trade, 
S U M M A R Y
Climate change will affect the social and envi-
ronmental determinants of the health of human, 
animal and plant populations around the world. It 
will challenge the social and biological capacities of 
food systems to regulate the emergence of pests 
and pathogens. Especially in Low-Income (LI) and 
Lower Middle-Income (LMI) countries, food sys-
tems will be dealing with new pests, diseases and 
emerging pathogens (viruses, bacteria, mycoplas-
ma and fungi) severely threatening the health of 
vulnerable people and potentially exacerbating 
social and economic inequalities.
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especially for LI and LMI countries, if appropriate risk 
management is not developed (FAO, 2008).
In the case of plants and crops, insect pests are also 
an important plant health problem, for example 
locusts in the Sahel zone. Pests and diseases reduce 
crop productivity, compromise sustainability, reduce 
food availability and affect the quality of production. 
These threats are particularly present in tropical 
agrosystems. Climate change, coupled with global 
change (such as globalised trade, increased human 
and animal mobility, biodiversity erosion and drastic 
land-use change), alters the behaviour of pests and 
diseases on plants and their geographical distribution 
(War et al., 2016). There is a genuine risk that pest 
and disease pressure will increase as a result of 
environmental and agrosystem disturbances. This is 
a concern for all agricultural stakeholders, including 
those in temperate countries where the introduction 
of new pests, diseases and weeds is widespread. 
It is common knowledge that the list of such 
introductions in Europe is becoming ever longer, 
with the onset of disturbing phenomena that are a 
real threat to food security, but it is also the case in 
tropical countries, where pest and disease distribution 
areas are increasing at an alarming rate. The impact 
of climate change on pest populations and their 
natural enemies in the tropics is even harder and 
more complicated to grasp; changes in pest status, 
insect lifecycles, exotic introduction and the dramatic 
development of diseases or insect populations and 
extension of their ranges are being observed. Based 
on examples of insects and diseases affecting several 
tropical agrosystems, it is clear that the impact of 
climate change on these pests is important and it is 
essential to develop new agroecological protection 
strategies while promoting the conservation of 
natural regulation services to sustainably reduce pest 
and disease risks (Carvalho, 2017). 
Despite the fact that pest and disease management 
have made a substantial contribution to the increase 
in food production over recent decades, plant 
pests and diseases still reduce the global harvest 
by between 10 and 16 percent, and are particularly 
problematic in LI and LMI countries (Chakraborty and 
Newton, 2011; Campbell et al., 2016). To better assess 
the effect of climate change on pests and diseases 
and on food production, more modelling studies are 
needed (Cilas et al., 2016; Donatelli et al., 2017).
To minimise, prevent and manage the impact of 
diseases, some breeding programmes are developing 
disease-resistant varieties to contain the spread 
of disease and minimise its effects on crops. The 
introduction of shade trees could be effective for 
maintaining the air temperature at field level and 
to protect crops from multiple pests and diseases. 
Moreover, shading could reduce sudden temperature 
changes, which are detrimental to the biological 
balance of agrosystems, thus contributing to the 
agroecological regulation of pests. Such ecological 
services can be preserved while mitigating the impact 
of climate on biodiversity. 
With regard to zoonotic diseases (infectious diseases 
transmitted between animals and humans) drug 
resistance and environmental pollution are now 
major public health problems worldwide. They will 
be exacerbated by climate change because it affects 
environmental and socioeconomic equilibriums. 
Social and ecological disruption caused by climate 
is so complex that it cannot be accurately predicted. 
Figure 15: The infectious disease climate change cascade.
Source: Heffernan, 2018.
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BOX 4 
rice cropping: 
climate change-related disease spread
Rice is the most important food crop in LI and LMI countries 
and the staple food of more than half of the world’s population. 
This cereal is grown in many countries under a variety of clima-
tic conditions, from the wettest areas in the world to the driest 
deserts. Based on population projections from the United Na-
tions and income projections from the Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), global rice demand is expec-
ted to rise from 490 million tonnes (milled rice) in 2018 to 555 
million tonnes in 2035. 
Changing climatic conditions are helping diseases to spread to 
new localities and exacerbating their impact. In addition to the 
already widespread diseases affecting rice, emerging diseases 
are increasingly becoming serious threats. Apart from the ma-
jor diseases already established (Rice Yellow Mottle Virus in 
Africa, blast everywhere, tungro and bacterial blight in Asia, 
hoja blanca in South America, green coal in China, Rhizoctonia 
in Asia and South America), we are faced with the worldwide 
re-emergence of helminthosporiosis (caused by the fungus Bi-
polaris oryzae). This disease caused a famine in Bengal in the 
1950s, and its currently high global prevalence is worrying. In 
South America, a bacterium is expanding (Burkholderia glu-
mae). Many pests also exist in rice and are proliferating; to 
control them, research has shown the existence of a mecha-
nism in tropical irrigated rice systems that supports high levels 
of natural biological control (Settle et al., 1996; Sester et al., 
2014). These results have supported a management strategy 
that promotes the conservation of existing natural biological 
control through a massive reduction in insecticide use and a 
corresponding increase in habitat heterogeneity.
Despite the large proportion of climate-sensitive 
pathogens, their response to climate change 
depends on complex drivers (McIntyre et al., 2017). 
Therefore, such risks are particularly difficult to 
address through conventional sectoral approaches. 
Given the framework of food systems threatened 
by climate change and its cascading impacts on 
health and livelihoods, there is an urgent need for a 
comprehensive integrated risk mitigation approach 
to address zoonotic and antimicrobial resistance-
related diseases.
Managing such emerging risks requires conceptual 
and innovative methodological frameworks 
promoting integrated approaches to health, such as 
the ‘One Health’ or ‘Ecohealth’ approach (Duboz et al., 
2017). These integrated approaches acknowledge that 
human, plant and animal health are interdependent 
and bound to the health of the ecosystems in which 
they live. It aims to foster improved cross-sectoral 
collaboration and involve stakeholders at different 
levels. It is both a science-based and an institutional 
movement, promoting systems thinking and involving 
social and technical sciences sharing knowledge to 
support and strengthen integrated risk management 
actions at the agrosystem level.
Addressing the health impacts of climate change 
directly implies increasing the resilience of human 
and animal populations — and the underlying 
economic and food systems such as livestock and 
crop production — at an ecosystem level. ●
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CONCLUSION 
OF SECTION 2
Food systems contribute to climate change with 19 to 
29 percent of the total 50 GtCO2eq/yr of anthropogenic 
emissions. These can be categorized in direct 
emissions from agricultural production and indirect 
ones from agriculture-driven land use change, as 
well as emissions resulting from the activities of pre-
production (manufacturing and distribution of inputs) 
and post-production (processing, storage, transport, 
refrigeration, retailing and catering). Agricultural 
production is by far the main source of emissions 
in LI and LMI countries. Although the presence of 
significant barriers to adopting climate-resilient and 
low-carbon practices, faced mainly by smallholder food 
producers (FAO, 2017), has been noted9, Smith et al. 
(2008) estimated that the total mitigation potential of 
agricultural production could be 1.5-1.6 GtCO2eq/yr, 
with a great share (70 percent) coming from LI and LMI 
countries. However, mitigation benefits and greater 
GHG efficiency might be slashed by growing emissions 
resulting from rising consumption in these countries.  
Indeed, climate change will have growing implications 
in LI and LMI countries. By the middle of this century, 
higher average temperatures, changes in precipitation, 
rising sea levels, and an increase in the frequency 
and intensity of extreme weather events will result 
in a decline in food production and increased food 
insecurity, but also in more unstable yields resulting 
in price instability and related crises (Chapter 5.3). In 
addition, LI and LMI countries’ food systems will have to 
cope with new pests and diseases, emerging pathogens 
– viruses, bacteria, mycoplasma and fungi – severely 
threatening the health of vulnerable people and 
exacerbating social and economic inequalities, leading 
to global health crises (Chapter 2.4). 
In a context of increased climate stress, no global 
solution exists to improve the ability of LI and LMI 
countries’ agriculture to mitigate its contribution to 
FOOD SYSTEM ADAPTATION 
AND MITIGATION: 
MANAGING TRADE-OFFS
Céline Dutilly1 and Étienne Hainzelin2
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global GHG, and simultaneously supply a growing 
demand for food. If certain actions can be developed 
to mitigate climate change in certain ecosystems, 
regions or food systems (i.e. limiting agriculture-driven 
land use change, reducing methane emissions from 
rice cultivation or limiting the consumption of animal 
products in High Income Countries (HIC)), most of the 
efforts in LI and LMI countries will have to be dedicated 
to the necessary food system adaptations to climate 
change. First of all, governments will need to anticipate 
these drastic changes in production systems and 
their transformation to plan for action. Research and 
development institutions are essential in this dynamic 
process. They must provide short-term decision 
support and long-term perspectives, by forecasting 
trends and proposing measures that may be applied 
without social costs. Second, technical and policy 
interventions must be situated within a broad holistic 
approach, maintaining the multiple roles and functions 
of agriculture in rural areas. Simultaneously, it seems 
essential to develop resilient landscapes to reduce 
the dispersion of pests and diseases affecting plants 
and animals. Finally, HIC policies (agriculture, industry, 
trade, migration regulation, investments and health) 
have effects on LI and LMI countries situations, and 
improved policy coherence is necessary to facilitate 
action in LI and LMI countries. Moreover, concerns 
around regional mismatches between responsibility 
for climate change and adaptation costs call for 
global mechanisms to prevent poor producers and 
consumers to support most of the consequences of 
climate change.
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RESOURCE OVER-EXPLOITATION AND RUNNING OUT
Éric Malézieux1 and Lionel Dabbadie2
Food systems around the world are highly dependent on both 
renewable and non-renewable resources. Given the growing 
population, maintaining and displaying available and sufficient 
cropland, energy, phosphorus, freshwater and biological 
resources to provide adequate food for humanity has now 
become a major challenge. 
Land-use and land-use changes 
Land-use and land-use changes have become core issues for 
the future of food systems. Most of the world’s soil resources 
are in fair to very poor condition and their condition is getting 
worse. In particular, 33 percent of land is already degraded due 
to erosion, salinisation, compaction, acidification and chemical 
pollution (FAO, 2015). Most lands that have been recently cleared 
of natural vegetation and forests to grow crops or graze livestock, 
suffer from increased erosion and losses of soil carbon, nutrients 
and soil biodiversity. Intensive non-sustainable agriculture 
has degraded wide areas, including the contamination of soils 
through excessive use of inorganic fertilisers and pesticides. 
In traditional agriculture, intensification can also result in soil 
degradation, a particularly significant threat in sub-Saharan 
Africa where yield gaps are high. In this region, agricultural land 
is especially prone to erosion and nutrient depletion: soil erosion 
accounts for more than 80 percent of land degradation, affecting 
more than 20 percent of agricultural land (FAO, 2015).
Moreover, with the exception of some parts of Africa and South 
America (Le Mouël, de Lattre-Gasquet and Mora, 2018), there 
is little opportunity for the expansion of agricultural areas. 
And much of the additional land available is not suitable for 
agriculture, with the ecological, social and economic costs of 
bringing it into production being very high, sometimes with 
acute competing claims. In addition, demand for alternative 
liquid fuels has driven the diversion of cropland to biofuel 
production, reducing cropland for food production. Biofuels 
produced from agricultural crops may reduce food supply and 
boost price volatility, increase CO2 emissions and hold back rural 
development in LI countries (HLPE, 2011, 2013). 
Pressure on land has numerous impacts. Understanding the 
impact of land-use change on both food production and climate 
requires new indicators and metrics (Searchinger et al., 2018). 
Biodiversity is under particular threat, with an erosion of the 
ecosystem services it provides, due to land-use changes and 
unsustainable agricultural practices. A considerable number of 
species are under threat due to over-exploitation of habitats or 
pollution. Tropical forests are already reduced and fragmented. 
Marine ecosystems are threatened and freshwater biodiversity 
S U M M A R Y
Food systems around the world are highly 
dependent on both renewable and non-
renewable resources. Drivers such as population 
growth, urbanisation and climate change put a lot 
of pressure on resources that have become core 
issues for the future of food systems. Cropland 
availability is limited in most parts of the world, 
adding pressure for cropping intensification. Fossil 
energy and phosphorus shortages are expected to 
occur within a few decades, with particular impact 
in Low-Income (LI) countries where farmers are 
more vulnerable to volatile prices. The availability 
of very unevenly distributed freshwater resources 
shows a similar picture, with an increasing number 
of regions reaching alarming levels of water 
scarcity. Some world fish stocks have been over-
exploited and are now depleted. But the situation 
is not without hope. While we need to intensify 
food systems to meet the challenge of a growing 
population, new ways to produce with less impact 
on the environment and more resilience to climate 
change need to be widely adopted.
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is decreasing. Agriculture, through land pressure, 
contributes significantly to these changes and, in 
return, is itself impacted. Agricultural intensification 
has led to a strong homogenisation of agricultural 
landscapes and the loss of natural and semi-natural 
habitats (Foley et al., 2005), leading to serious 
biodiversity losses. 
The impacts of land-use change on biodiversity and 
carbon sequestration are greater in LI countries 
and closely linked to international trade, which 
is the main driver. Between 2000 and 2011, the 
erosion of biodiversity can be linked to cattle and 
cereal production, while the reduction in carbon 
sequestration can be mainly linked to forestry 
and cattle. The regions experiencing the greatest 
biodiversity loss are Central and South America, Asia, 
and Africa. When looking at the relative change over 
this period, the impacts in Asia are striking for both 
biodiversity loss and carbon sequestration, and are 
mainly linked to oil production and the forestry sector 
(Marques et al., 2019).
Fossil fuels
Fossil fuels are used in large quantities in food systems. 
The food sector (including input manufacturing, 
production, processing, transportation, marketing 
and consumption) accounts for approximately 30 
percent of global energy consumption and produces 
more than 20 percent of global GHG emissions  (FAO, 
2016a). However, subsistence producers around 
the world have very low energy inputs, with energy 
usually derived from human and animal power. 
Industrial agriculture requires lots of energy for 
chemical inputs, farm machinery, heating protected 
crops and irrigation systems. But industrialising 
agricultural systems by increasing fossil fuel inputs 
may no longer be a feasible option. Finite supplies 
and increasingly difficult access to fossil fuel have 
already impacted fuel and food prices in most parts 
of the world (HLPE, 2011). Their impact will certainly 
increase in the coming decades.
Phosphorus
Phosphorus (P) is another critical non-renewable 
resource for agriculture. Currently, nearly 90 percent 
of extracted phosphorus is used in the global agri-
food system, most of it used unsustainably as a crop 
fertiliser (Childers et al., 2011). Inefficient phosphorus 
use in agri-food systems is a threat to the global 
aquatic environment and people’s health. The 
Green Revolution required a large increase in the 
use of inorganic phosphorus. Projections show that 
economically viable mineral reserves will become 
depleted within a few decades and, as a major nutrient, 
there is no substitute (Cordell and Neset, 2014). 
Phosphorus-induced food shortages are therefore a 
possibility, particularly in developing countries where 
farmers are more vulnerable to volatile fertiliser 
prices. Indeed, Africa is the world’s largest exporter 
of mineral P but, compared with Europe, P fertiliser 
is more expensive in sub-Saharan Africa, both in 
terms of its real price and as a percentage of a farm’s 
budget. This means that P accessibility for a sub-
Saharan African farmer is considerably lower than 
for a European farmer, even though both are using 
mineral P from the same source (Cordell, Dranger 
and White, 2009). Soils depleted in P are already 
responsible for lower crop yields and increased inter-
annual variability in food production in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Vitousek et al., 2009). Sustainable solutions to 
such future challenges exist and involve closing the 
loop in the human phosphorus cycle (Childers et al., 
2011).
Freshwater resources
Freshwater resources and irrigation are important 
for adapting to climate variability and moreover 
for climate change, as well as for increasing land 
productivity. More than 70 percent of all available 
freshwater in the world is used by agriculture (HLPE, 
2015; FAO, 2018a). Although irrigated areas occupy 
less than 20 percent of the world’s total arable area, 
they generate more than 40 percent of the total 
production value globally (HLPE, 2015; FAO, 2018a). 
This disproportionate contribution is attributed to 
greater productivity in irrigated areas as a result of 
higher and more stable yields and more intensive 
cropping, as well as to the cultivation of higher value 
crops compared with rainfed cultivation (FAO, 2018a). 
How much cropland can be irrigated under future 
conditions is therefore a key question for determining 
food production. Only 6 percent of the cultivated area 
is equipped for irrigation in Africa. This figure falls to 
only 3.4 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, compared 
to 40 percent in Asia (FAO, 2016b). Ultimately, the 
potential for converting rainfed land to irrigated 
land is determined by the water resources available. 
However, freshwater resources are very unevenly 
distributed across the planet, with an increasing 
number of regions reaching alarming levels of water 
scarcity. Over-withdrawal of surface and groundwater 
has already led to depletion of water resources and 
environmental damage in some regions in India, 
Pakistan and China. The pressure on renewable 
water resources from irrigation will increase slightly, 
especially in countries that already suffer from water 
scarcity in the Near East/North Africa and South Asia 
(FAO, 2018a). The right incentives and technologies 
to use less water and increase water use efficiency 
(such as using drip irrigation, reusing wastewater, 
water harvesting and storage etc.) will be necessary 
(FAO, 2018b).
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Fish 
Fish is an important component of healthy diets 
throughout the world, providing 20 percent of 
the average per capita intake of animal protein to 
nearly 3.2 billion people (FAO, 2018b). As a result 
of demographic growth and dietary changes, global 
demand continues to increase, leading to a growing 
pressure on the resource (cf. Box 5). Inland fisheries 
also play a major role in food security and nutrition 
in many developing countries and their importance is 
probably underestimated. Inland fisheries continue 
to grow in several countries, especially China, India, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russian Federation 
and Mexico, but given that freshwaters are one of 
the ecosystems most heavily impacted by humans 
(pollution, habitat loss and degradation, draining 
of wetlands, river fragmentation and poor land 
management), concerns have emerged with regards 
to their sustainability (Funge-Smith, 2018).
Could aquaculture be a solution for reducing pressure 
on wild stocks? Currently, 70 percent of aquaculture 
production is fed using home-made or commercial 
feed. Although fishmeal and fish oils are still used to 
feed farmed fish, new technologies and progress have 
allowed aquaculture to become a net fish producer: 
for every kilogramme of wild fish consumed, 4.5 kg of 
fish is produced (IFFO, 2017). The challenge now is to 
fill the demand gap, while maintaining environmental 
and social impacts within boundaries that do not 
affect the sustainability of the system. Agroecology 
and exploiting the synergies between aquaculture 
and agriculture are promising options.
Sustainable agricultural methods and reduced 
dependence on fossil fuels are essential to address 
the food security challenge and critical for the 
transition to sustainable food systems based on 
renewable energy. Becoming ‘energy-smart’ along the 
food chain by reducing the high dependence on fossil 
fuels will require new policies and institutions and 
significant investments in new agricultural practices 
and clean energy technologies. 
For the future, it is also important to consider 
the evolution of food diets. As incomes rise, one 
generally predicts a shift towards a higher proportion 
of non-staples in the diet (FAO, 2018c). At the level 
of food systems, this means that one can expect a 
disproportionate growth in the supply chains of non-
staples such as fruit and vegetables, meat and fish, 
dairy and edible oils, thereby contributing to changes 
in local cropping systems. Meeting the challenge 
of feeding the world’s population will require new 
agricultural pathways that combine efficient use of 
arable land without deforestation, restoration of 
soils, mindful choices between the use of agriculture 
for food, animal feed and energy, efficient multiple 
uses of water, attention to global nutrient cycles, 
protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services, 
as well as adaptation to climate change in a context 
of increasingly limited supplies of fossil energy and 
correspondingly rising energy prices. While we need 
to intensify our food systems to meet the challenge 
of a growing population with evolving diets, we must 
do so in a way that preserves resources and is more 
resilient to climate change. ●
BOX 5 
fish resources: is it too late?
FAO has been monitoring the status of the world’s marine 
fish stocks since 1974, highlighting that the share of stocks 
unsustainably harvested has regularly increased, representing 
one-third of the total in 2015 (cf. Figure 16, from FAO, 2018b). 
The production of capture fisheries has stagnated since 1990 
at around 90 million tonnes, while aquaculture production 
has increased from less than 10 million tonnes in the 1970s 
to more than 80 million tonnes in 2015 (FAO, 2018b). Some 
over-exploited fish stocks can recover when sustainable fishery 
management systems are implemented, as highlighted by the 
bluefin tuna fishery in the Mediterranean (Rouyer et al., 2018), 
but once an ecological threshold has been passed, changes 
cannot be reversed (Ben Rais Lasram, Menard and Cury, 2018). 
For the future, new threats are likely to create fresh pressure 
on wild stocks: climate change, pollution (including plastic 
nanoparticles), habitat degradation etc.
Biologically sustainable Biologically unsustainable
Overﬁshed
Maximally sustainably ﬁshed
Underﬁshed
0
20
40
60
80
100
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Figure 16: Evolution of the sustainability 
of capture fisheries production (1975-2015). 
Source FAO, 2018b.
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RISKS OF IRREVERSIBLE BIODIVERSITY LOSS
Étienne Hainzelin1
Biodiversity as a foundation 
for food systems 
 Biodiversity encompasses all “living organisms from all sources 
and the ecological complexes of which they are part, including 
diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems” 
(United Nations, 1992). It is the driving force of ecosystems and 
at the origin of many goods and services and, indeed, of human 
existence and well-being. However, biodiversity is facing major 
challenges: most human activities make use of biodiversity and, 
simultaneously, threaten its integrity directly or indirectly, for 
example through anthropogenic climate change.
Food systems represent a very large part of human activity, 
responding to very basic human needs and mobilising 
biodiversity at all stages. Primary food production depends on 
ecosystem functions and services on 40 percent of emerged land. 
Food processing uses many services provided by biodiversity, 
such as fermentation, and consumers, through their intestinal 
microbiotas, process food into well-being and health.
At the same time, food systems are putting real pressure on 
biodiversity through several drivers and pathways, the main one 
being the conversion of natural ecosystems to agriculture. These 
interactions between food systems and biodiversity, with multiple 
feedback loops, generate risks that might be severely aggravated 
by the way food systems operate and evolve. Some authors 
estimate that agriculture represents one of the major threats 
to biodiversity through land-use and ecosystem artificialisation 
at three embedded and interacting scales: ecosystemic, specific 
and genetic diversity (FAO, 2019).
How does industrialisation 
of food systems affect biodiversity?
For years, agriculture has comprised of harnessing biodiversity, 
domesticating and combining plants, animals and microbes 
in a very wide range of agricultural systems on all continents 
and shaping agricultural landscapes. Innovation was mainly 
rooted in biodiversity at different scales. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, agriculture in the northern hemisphere 
went into a process where production was based on selected 
varieties, synthetic fertilisers and pesticides, in addition to 
mass mechanisation heavily reliant on fossil fuels. It has led 
to industrialised agriculture and food systems, and resulted in 
the artificialisation of agricultural fields; biodiversity is reduced 
to a uniform and synchronous canopy, usually consisting of a 
single genotype of some major species, with the rest of the living 
organisms being systematically eliminated as ‘limiting factors’. 
S U M M A R Y
Biodiversity is the driving force of ecosystem 
services and has been the foundation of 
agriculture for many, many years. The drastic 
evolution of agriculture over the past century in 
industrialised and some developing countries, 
based on improved varieties and synthetic inputs, 
greatly increased production but has led to the 
artificialisation of agroecosystems and great 
losses of specific and genetic diversity. In turn, 
these losses have hampered food systems in 
different ways: degraded ecosystem services 
affecting crop yields and resilience, reduced crop 
biodiversity, and highly specialised industrialised 
food processing, which has decreased the diversity 
of the food supply and its nutritional value.
1. CIRAD, DG, Gatineau J9H 4S7, Canada; University 
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This transformation has affected not only most of 
the agricultural land in developed countries, but 
also some sections of agriculture in Low-Income 
(LI) and Lower Middle-Income (LMI) countries, 
the Green Revolution being based on the same 
rationale and principles. This has been reinforced 
by the globalisation of markets, which tends to lead 
to regional specialisation, the segregation of crop 
and animal production, and the industrialisation of 
the processing and distribution of food products 
(Martin et al., 2019). The link between biodiversity 
and agriculture has somehow been broken. Because 
these transformations provide large increases in 
yields and economies of scale, they have been very 
attractive to developing countries as a pathway 
for modernisation. Although agriculture in these 
regions remains very diverse, in terms of production 
systems, farm size and intensification levels, with 
the cohabitation of multiple trajectories and models, 
this modernisation process is making progress (Bosc 
et al., 2015).
This evolution affects biodiversity in agroecosystems 
and beyond in several ways: 
• When the production process draws more resources 
than the ecosystem can sustainably provide, species 
populations and biodiversity are depleted. When 
cropping systems get simpler (i.e. mono-cropping 
at large scales) and regions more specialised, the 
diversity of species is eroded, not only for crop species 
but also for the other compartments of above- and 
below-ground biodiversity. This is particularly true 
for the complex soil-living communities which, for the 
most part, constitute a “hidden biodiversity” yet to be 
described (FAO, 2019). This erosion is irreversible and 
affects trophic chains and ecosystem services (De 
Clerck, 2017). 
• The use of pesticides has a direct effect on 
biodiversity, at the plot scale and on auxiliary 
species, such as pollinators and soil biota. Through 
trophic chains, its leads to a drastic reduction of 
the ecosystem services that agricultural production 
needs (van Lexmond, 2015). Because of the multiple 
connections between natural and cultivated areas, 
this pressure reaches beyond agricultural land to 
natural areas, at the landscape and regional scales, 
decreasing the resilience of these areas.
• The impact on crop genetic diversity is the subject 
of concern and controversy, partly because there 
is no consensual tool to measure it (van de Wouw 
et al., 2010). However, there is clearly a loss of 
diversity when traditional varieties or races are 
replaced by improved varieties (Khoury et al., 2014). 
This can generate a genetic homogenisation at the 
global scale and possible weaknesses to pests, as 
historically illustrated by many examples in maize, 
banana and wheat (Bioversity International, 2017).
Most of the time these losses of biodiversity are 
irreversible, with many studies showing that the 
state of degradation of biodiversity across the planet 
has long passed the boundaries of sustainability 
(Springmann et al., 2019).
What risks for food systems 
in LI and LMI countries? 
Eroded biodiversity hampers food systems in 
different ways: 
• The first major risk is the degradation of the capacity 
of ecosystems to support production, especially soils. 
Plateauing yields have been reported in several 
crops and 20 percent of the world’s cultivated land 
has lost productive capacity (FAO, 2019). Eroded 
agrobiodiversity also triggers a vicious circle where 
more external inputs are needed to maintain yields, 
making farmers more dependent (Frison and IPES, 
2016). Documented collapses in insect populations 
and diversity at a rapid rate (biomass declining at 
an annual rate of 2.5 percent for three decades), 
exemplify this fast-growing risk for agriculture and 
food production (Sánchez-Bayo, and Wyckhuys, 
2019).
• Reduced diversity in production decreases the 
diversity of the food produced in a given region and 
it is not easy to compensate for this on markets (de 
Clerk, 2017; Jones, 2017). In southern countries, the 
industrialisation of agriculture, with its larger and 
more specialised farms seeking economies of scale, 
might degrade the nutritional value of products 
(Herrero, 2017). Most public policies and incentives 
designed to increase production accentuate the 
risk of poorly diversified diets, food systems and 
landscapes (cf. Box 6).
• At the processing stage, besides clear advantages 
(efficiency, labour productivity, cost per food unit etc.), 
industrialisation and a high degree of specialisation 
reduce food chain biodiversity, therefore decreasing 
nutritional quality and diversity (Remans, 2014).
• Ever-evolving and ever-adapting agrobiodiversity 
represents the creativity of life; its irreversible 
erosion means less capacity to innovate and adapt 
in the future, especially to climate change. Living 
in the ‘Anthropocene’ epoch, we already recognise 
biodiversity’s finiteness in the form of impoverished 
landscapes and precarious ecosystems.
The market globalisation of agriculture has been a 
reinforcing driver in biodiversity erosion, as several 
researchers have shown (Khoury et al., 2014). By 
increasing product fluxes and genetic material 
exchanges, it has reinforced these perturbations, 
either by erosion (i.e. reduced number of commodity 
species) or outbreak risks (i.e. invading species and 
exotic pests). Furthermore, the wide use of pesticides 
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and antibiotics has generated very serious problems 
in antibiotic resistance (Morand and Lajaunie, 2018) 
and pesticide resistance (Heap, 2014).
What are the emerging solutions?
In their diversity, food systems have the resources 
to counter these risks, provided their actors can 
innovate based on new foundations: 
• Production systems should reintegrate diversity at 
the plot, farm and landscape scales, not only to boost 
ecosystem services supporting crop production and 
protection, but also for the benefit of environmental 
integrity and health. Diversification is one of the best 
options to improve the nutritional value of production 
(Herrero et al., 2017; Remans, 2014). 
• Plant, animal and microbial agrobiodiversity, in and 
around the plot, above- and below-ground, must be 
preserved and valued as a precious capital. In situ 
conservation involving farmers would powerfully 
leverage their resilience and innovation capacity. 
This could lead to a new biotechnology based on 
complex specific combinations instead of an over-
simplification (HLPE, 2017).
• A radically new approach of all food system actors 
and policy makers focused on performance at 
each step of the value chain, not limited to yields 
and productivity, but encompassing nutrition and 
environmental footprints (Frison and IPES, 2016). ●
Increasing intra- and interspecific diversity in cropping systems 
results in enhanced ecosystem services linked to crop nutrition 
(closing nutrient cycles, capture of atmospheric nitrogen, reduced 
leaching and run-off etc.), weed control (mulching, allopathy etc.) 
and pest management (breaking pest cycles, biocontrol etc.). It 
also improves the diversity of products available, although the 
way agricultural diversity translates into dietary diversity at the 
farm household level is not always straightforward nor easy to 
demonstrate. 
In Malawi, a country in semi-humid tropical Africa, more than 
70 percent of rural people live below the poverty line, with se-
rious food security challenges. Almost one-third of Malawian 
households experience severe food insecurity and calorie defi-
ciencies, 50 percent of children under the age of five are stunted, 
60 percent of pre-school age children are deficient in vitamin 
A and nearly three-quarters are anaemic (Nyantakyi-Frimponga 
et al., 2017). 
Through a large cross-sectional household survey (1,000 diversi-
fied smallholders with farm sizes of less than three acres) in two 
districts in Malawi, Nyantakyi-Frimponga et al. (2017), compared 
their health, food security and nutrition status. Household heads, 
spouses or another well-informed adult within the household 
were interviewed using a structured questionnaire specifically 
designed for the study, including questions on their self-per-
ceived health and a Household Food Insecurity Access Scale 
(HFIAS) module to explore household food insecurity. The key in-
dependent variable was the use of agroecology (adopted by 571 
households and not adopted by 429 households), understood as 
a set of farming practices mimicking natural systems, diversifying 
crops and increasing agrobiodiversity with attention paid to inte-
ractions with adjacent natural landscapes and taking particular 
care of soil by mulching and legume cropping.
The results showed that households which had adopted agroe-
cology were more likely to report optimal health status and the 
average treatment effect showed that adopters were 12 percent 
more likely to be in optimal health. The paper concludes that with 
the adoption of agroecology in the semi-humid tropics it is pos-
sible for households to diversify their crops and diets, which has 
strong implications for improved food security, good nutrition 
and human health.
At the country level, Jones, Shrinivas and Bezner-Kerr (2014) ex-
plored plausible causal mechanisms that may operate between 
farm production diversity (crops and livestock) and diet diver-
sity, based on data from a nationally representative sample of 
farming households in Malawi. The combination of increased 
farm diversity with dietary diversity was significantly greater in 
households lead by women compared to those headed by men, 
and in wealthier households. There was an especially strong link 
between legume, vegetable and fruit consumption with greater 
farm production diversity. More diverse production systems 
may contribute to more diverse household diets. However, this 
relationship is complex; it may be influenced by gender, wealth, 
control of household decisions, the relative market-orientation of 
a household’s agricultural production and the specific nature of 
farm diversity.
Jones (2017) has also explored how agricultural biodiversity, 
diet quality and anthropometric outcomes are associated in LI 
and LMI countries. A comprehensive review of five databases 
revealed that agricultural biodiversity has a small but consistent 
link with more diverse household and individual diets, although 
the magnitude of this association varies with the extent of the 
existing diversification of farms. Greater richness in on-farm crop 
species is also associated with small, positive increments in linear 
stature in young children. Agricultural diversification may contri-
bute to diversified diets through both subsistence and inco-
me-generating pathways and may be an important strategy for 
improving diets and nutrition outcomes in LI and LMI countries.
BOX 6 
diversifying crop systems to improve the food security and nutrition of smallholders in malawi
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THE EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURE’S ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXTERNALITIES ON FOOD SYSTEMS
Étienne Hainzelin1 and Benoit Daviron2
Pollutant diversity and sources 
 The environment is a major sink for numerous pollutants, derived 
mainly from human activities. All environmental compartments 
are concerned (soil, water and air), with specific and complex 
dynamics. Pollutants belong to two main categories (Edwards, 
2002; OECD, 2017; FAO, 2015): 
• Inorganic pollutants are mainly heavy metals (arsenic, cadmium, 
lead, mercury etc.). Cadmium is the most serious heavy metal 
likely to contaminate agricultural soils. Due to its high mobility 
in the soil, it can be easily absorbed and transferred to the food 
chain. 
• Organic pollutants are highly diverse (hydrocarbons, phenolic 
compounds, fertilisers, pesticides, micro-plastics etc.) and their 
accumulation in the environment is due to the absence of any 
biological process to degrade them (xenobiotic molecules) or 
to the relative slowness of the degradation process. ‘Chemicals 
of Emerging Concern’ are new challenges, including products 
such as nanoparticles, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, hormones, 
detergents and certain industrial chemicals whose effects are 
not always understood and/or measured. 
Pollution may come from different sources (Thangavel, 2017); it 
can be a single discharge point, which means control strategies 
can be employed, or a more diffuse source at the landscape 
level via air-soil-water systems, which requires complex analyses 
involving these three compartments in order to tackle the 
pollution (IPES-Food, 2017): 
• Large quantities of urban solid waste, mostly treated in landfills 
or incinerators, can eventually affect groundwater and the soil 
quality of cultivated ecosystems in the vicinity. Sewage sludge, 
sometimes applied on cropland, can also be highly contaminated 
with heavy metals and pesticides (Rodríguez-Eugenio, 2018).
• Many industrial chemicals pollute land near their production 
sites but can also be transported to other systems through 
discharges into aquatic systems or wind dispersal. These 
chemicals include heavy metals, inorganic gaseous emissions, 
and volatile organic compounds (Rojas et al., 2016).
• Agriculture is a major contributor to pollution in many regions 
of the world through the use of synthetic inputs, such as fertilisers 
and pesticides, and animal waste (Lelieveld et al., 2015). When 
applied in excess, only a fraction of fertilisers are absorbed by 
plants and the rest can contaminate groundwater or river systems 
through leaching or run-off. Phosphates generally also bring 
heavy metal contaminants, such as cadmium. Agrochemicals are 
also a major pollutant affecting soils and water. Organochlorine 
insecticides that can persist in the soil for decades can be 
bioconcentrated from the soil to final consumer along the food 
S U M M A R Y
A healthy environment is essential for the 
proper functioning of both natural and cultivated 
ecosystems and, as such, plays a major role 
in food systems. Many different sources, 
including the agricultural sector itself, emit and 
accumulate pollutants in different environmental 
compartments (soil, water and air). When there are 
excessive pollutant levels, ecological functioning 
is hampered by eroded biodiversity, disrupted 
nutrient cycling, toxicity and depleted soil fertility, 
and can lead to reduced yields and contaminated 
food products. Many pollutants end up in water 
through leaching and run-off and have negative 
impacts on aquatic ecosystems, reducing fish and 
seafood stocks. Pollutants can also contaminate 
the food chain and cause food toxicity risks, and 
this is particularly true when pollutants undergo 
gradual biological concentration along the food 
chain. 
1. CIRAD, DG, Gatineau J9H 4S7, Canada; University 
of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
2. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
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chain. Antibiotics, used on a large scale in animal and 
fish production, are causing growing concerns for 
the resistance they can generate (Rodríguez-Eugenio, 
2018; IPES-Food, 2017)
Effects on food systems
There are two main impact pathways on food 
systems: through degradation of the productive 
capacity of land or aquatic ecosystems and through 
contamination at different stages of food production. 
The impact of a pollutant will depend on its toxicity 
and its persistence. This means heavy metals have 
much more serious effects than relatively transient 
chemicals. An ecosystem’s resilience to the effects 
of a pollutant depends in part on its biodiversity, 
stability and the existence of alternative processes 
for performing essential functions.
Agroecosystem degradation and reduction of production 
potential 
While some degradation processes can be observed 
directly, soil contamination cannot, making it an 
insidious hazard, a ′hidden danger′ (FAO, 2018). 
The analysis is further complicated by the diversity 
of contaminants (in particular persistent organic 
pollutants, constantly changing due to developments 
in agrochemistry), their random circulation, their 
transformation through biological activity in soils 
and the ability of soils to store, immobilise and 
degrade. However, the effects may appear suddenly 
after changes in land use that alter environmental 
conditions. 
The impacts of soil pollutants are highly diverse and 
chemicals such as pesticides can have direct toxicity 
effects on surface and subsoil biota. These in turn can 
have major influences on soil ecology by changing the 
availability of organic matter that provides nutrients 
to other living organisms, modifying the plant 
rhizosphere or altering the soil pH. These changes 
can have an impact not only on population size but 
also on the functions of terrestrial ecosystems that 
affect production (Rodriguez-Eugenio, McLaughlin 
and Pennock, 2018).
Impact on aquatic ecosystems and fish resources 
Acute or chronic pollution with a wide range of 
organic and inorganic compounds entering the 
aquatic ecosystem is likely to impact both wild and 
farmed aquatic species through direct (toxicity) or 
indirect effects (Ryder, Karunasagar and Ababouch., 
2014). Aquaculture might allow for better control of 
the risk through ensuring the composition of fish 
feed and monitoring water quality. 
Another source of pollution likely to affect ecosystem 
and production systems is eutrophication, which 
results from organic and inorganic nutrients rich in 
nitrogen and phosphorus being released into water 
bodies. Depending on its intensity, eutrophication 
can lead to changes in the assemblage of species 
(with micro- or macro-algae proliferation), reduced 
biodiversity, changes in trophic food webs or massive 
fish kills as a result of deoxygenation and the release 
of toxic gases by anoxic bacteria (van Beusekom, 
2018).
A rapidly growing concern is plastic pollution, 
especially micro- and nanoplastics, as they have 
become ubiquitous in inland waters and oceans and 
are of growing significance. Evidence is still lacking on 
their real impact and additional research is required 
for nanoplastics, as their size could allow some of 
them to cross cell membranes and enter blood 
circulation (Lusher, Hollman and Mendoza-Hill, 2017).
Food system contamination
Food represents the main source of human exposure 
to some of these pollutants and, despite the lack of 
comprehensive data, food contamination is a serious 
threat to human health (WHO, 2015). Heavy metals 
are ubiquitously distributed in the environment, 
reach plant and animal-derived food and can 
cause chronic or acute toxicity and serious human 
pathologies (Rodríguez-Eugenio, 2017). Numerous 
organic pollutants can contaminate human food, 
even at very low concentrations, exemplified by 
endocrine-disrupting chemicals (EDCs). The risks 
can increase through the biomagnification process, 
where some pesticides stored in the fatty tissues of 
animals are gradually concentrated along the food 
chain until their consumption by humans. 
Synergic effects
In nature, organisms are exposed not only to a 
single pollutant but often to many chemicals in large 
quantities or in trace amounts. Interactions between 
various chemicals (for example, antibiotics and 
cadmium) can increase or decrease the overall effect 
(Wang et al., 2018). In other words, the resulting effect 
may be greater or lesser than the simple combined 
effect or be unchanged. It is also possible that a 
compound may not be toxic itself but may become so 
in the presence of another compound. Ecotoxicology 
struggles to address these possible complex cocktail 
effects.
Trends in developing countries
Asian countries experiencing rapid industrialisation 
are confronted with considerable contamination of 
their agricultural soils. For example, large quantities 
of mercury from the chemical industry and gold mines 
are released into the environment (Sari et al., 2016). 
Arsenic is also naturally present in groundwater 
in many parts of Bangladesh and western India 
(Rahman, Dong and Naidu, 2015; Mojid et al., 2016). 
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This poses a threat to agriculture, particularly in rice 
fields. Intensive pesticide and fertiliser use has also 
resulted in the accumulation of organic pollutants 
in the region’s soils and eutrophication in water. In 
China alone, heavy metal contamination may result 
in a reduction of more than 10 million tonnes of food 
supplies each year (FAO, 2015). Many studies have 
shown the existence of high levels of organochlorines 
in vegetables and other food products (Lam, Pham 
and Nguyen-Viet, 2017).
In Africa, mining, the oil industry and poor urban 
waste management are highly significant sources 
of pollution. According to a study of ten Ogoni 
communities in southeast Nigeria, pollution from oil 
spills has led to concentrations of hydrocarbons and 
heavy metals in water, air and soil that are 900 times 
higher than allowable levels (UNEP, 2007). However, 
soil pollution through agrochemicals is of less 
concern than in other parts of the world because of 
their low level of use, with the exception of intensified 
peri-urban horticulture where groundwater is often 
contaminated (Sorensen et al., 2015). There are also 
several examples of mismanagement, as illustrated 
by reported cases in Botswana and Mali, where 
more than 10,000 tonnes of pesticides, including 
very dangerous organochlorine compounds such as 
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), aldrin and 
heptachlor, have leaked from damaged containers 
and contaminated the soil (Cachada et al., 2018). 
The growing threat of lead pollution, through petrol 
additives or battery recycling, also illustrates contexts 
where regulations are weak or absent (Gottesfeld 
et al., 2018). 
In the Near East and North Africa, in addition to the 
excessive use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides, a 
frequent source of soil and water pollution is the use 
of wastewater for irrigation and sewage sludge as a 
fertiliser (Mekki and Sayadi, 2017). ●
Even though sub-Saharan African countries are the smallest 
users of pesticides in the world, African agriculture is far from 
being ‘organic by default’. Since the 1970s, farmers have been 
using pesticides on their crops to prevent pest invasions and crop 
losses. Back then, the use of pesticides was mainly dedicated 
to export crops, such as cotton, coffee, tea, bananas and other 
tropical fruits. Driven by urbanisation and changes in diet as well 
as the growing population, the demand for fruit and vegetables 
in urban markets is continuously increasing. In order to meet this 
demand, peri-urban horticulture is increasing and the import 
value of pesticides in Central, East and West Africa grew by 
261 percent between 2000 and 2010.
The risks associated with this growing pesticide use are being 
increasingly documented. First,  there are risks in terms of the 
quality of the pesticides used. Indeed, they are often not adequate 
for the crop targeted. For instance, studies have shown that 
farmers in Benin generally spray cotton pesticides on vegetable 
crops in Cotonou. In addition, most of the time the products 
used are not good quality pesticides; sometimes they come from 
international out-of-date stock, which means they are no longer 
effective. Sometimes products used by farmers are forbidden on 
international markets, but still sold in African markets. 
The study on market gardens in Cotonou showed that of 
15 pesticides used, only two were officially allowed by the 
national regulations. Furthermore, the study reports inadequate 
farmers’ practices and misuse of pesticides that are a threat 
to their own health and for their families and final consumers. 
Pesticides are often sprayed at the wrong moment and the 
period between spraying and sale is often not respected. This 
means that consumers buy vegetables on the market that should 
not be consumed. Additionally, farmers’ lack of awareness, poor 
equipment and reuse of pesticide containers for other family 
uses, the absence of instructions (sometimes due to repackaging 
or illiteracy) and the difficulty for farmers in converting dosages 
usually prescribed for hectares for their small farms generate 
high risks for human and environmental health. Finally, the 
overuse of pesticides on certain crops can cause a high risk of 
pest resistance, as has been illustrated with tomato bollworm in 
Benin.
The increasing use of pesticides in horticulture, combined with 
urban sprawl, competition for land (involving the production of 
more food on smaller plots), as well as industrial and transport 
pollution, are aggravating risks for food systems seeking to 
comply with food security objectives and environmental integrity.
1. Based on De Bon et al., 2014
BOX 7 
pesticide use in horticulture in sub-saharan africa:  
an increasing risk for food systems1
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Figure 17: Least Developed Countries: chemical inputs used 
in agriculture from 1990 to 2016 (1,000 tonnes).
Source: FAOSTAT, consulted on February 15, 2019.
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LARGE-SCALE LAND AND WATER ACQUISITIONS: 
WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD SECURITY?
Ward Anseeuw1, Amandine Adamczewski Hertzog2, Jean-Yves Jamin3 and Stefano Farolfi3
Large-scale land and water acquisitions 
for food production 
Although these acquisitions of land and water are aimed at a 
wide range of production, most - and a still growing number 
of them - are focused on agricultural and food production 
(Land Matrix, 2018). Adding to earlier concerns about the 
land footprint of large-scale agribusiness plantations, a fuller 
consideration of the wider range of economic consequences is 
now mushrooming, leading to questions related to their broader 
impacts on sustainability, food security, competition with local 
farming systems, delocalisation of production and virtual water 
use etc., which may lead to potential food crises.
Even though the ‘global land rush’ that peaked in 2007–2011 
has now slowed (mainly resulting from lower commodity prices 
and the large number of failing large acquisition projects), the 
evidence suggests that the squeeze on natural resources, 
especially land and water,  is currently being felt more acutely 
in many places, as new deals continue to be concluded and 
many existing deals enter the implementation phase (Cotula and 
Berger, 2017). 
Looking beyond the role of transnational corporations, local 
actors and national processes are currently also driving land 
acquisitions for natural resource investments, highlighting 
beyond international land acquisitions, national dynamics, with 
speculation, corruption and domestic concentration becoming 
increasingly prominent. Other trends emphasise how national 
strategies to promote economic growth are driving land 
acquisitions not only for agriculture but also for industrial use 
and the construction of infrastructure to improve connectivity for 
international trade. In addition, there is the role of urbanisation 
and the increasing pressures on water and rural land from land-
use conversion and natural resource use. Urbanisation not only 
entails the expansion of big cities, but also the concentration of 
people into smaller towns, where schools and health services, 
water and communications are more readily available. It is often 
associated with the spread of unregulated land markets and 
land speculators (Cotula, Anseeuw and Baldinelli, 2019).
The underlying land water nexus
In light of the fact that the majority of global freshwater is used 
for agricultural purposes, the complementary analysis of global 
food and water systems is essential. ‘Water for food’ has become 
an important slogan in the current debates on poverty reduction, 
food security and climate change in sub-Saharan Africa. Water is 
both a target and a driver of the popularly known phenomenon 
S U M M A R Y
Since 2007, the world has seen a rush towards 
natural resources, particularly land as well as 
water. It resulted from a convergence of the 2007-
2008 food price crisis in a context of growing 
populations and changing diets, and the search 
for alternatives to financial investment products. 
Although data is scarce, recent estimates show 
that about 42 million hectares have been acquired 
(Nolte, Chamberlain and Giger, 2016). Contrary 
to what is often highlighted, these lands are not 
the most marginal, underused and unowned, but 
are close to other resources, especially water, as 
well as infrastructure (roads and transport) and 
services. This means the resource acquisition 
phenomenon is embedded in a complex matrix 
of resources and processes which is increasingly 
under pressure. That  said, attention has so far 
mainly been sectoral, focused on land issues and 
neglecting this interconnectedness. However, the 
water implications of these land deals are starting 
to surface. 
1. CIRAD, UMR ART-DEV, I-00142 Rome, Italy; 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), I-00142 Rome, Italy; University of Montpellier, 
F-34090 Montpellier, France.
2. CIRAD, UMR G-EAU, Saint-Louis, Senegal; University 
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of land acquisitions. This key factor has been largely 
ignored despite the interconnectedness of water and 
land (Mehta, Veldwisch and Franco, 2012). Land is 
not always valuable from an investor’s point of view. 
Land requires added properties such as access to 
water that turn land deals into lucrative businesses. 
In some regions, particularly in the Sahel area, land 
investors would face a high degree of risk in drought 
periods and securing access to water is critical. Every 
land acquisition is also a ‘green water grab’, which 
becomes a ‘blue water grab’ if land is irrigated (Dell 
Angelo et al., 2017).  
Unlike land acquisitions, water acquisitions have 
no commonly accepted definition in either the 
academic or international development arenas. 
Water acquisitions can be abstractly defined as a 
circumstance where powerful actors are able to 
appropriate water resources at the expense of 
traditional local users, often with negative impacts 
on the environment (i.e. loss of environmental 
services, discharge of untreated wastewater into the 
environment, water and soil pollution or degradation, 
etc.). 
The underlying dynamics in the ‘acquisition’ of 
irrigation water might differ from those driving land 
investments because they may involve more varying 
levels of consent and power relations. For instance, 
in regions characterised by abundant land but scarce 
water, communities might favour land acquisitions 
but be reluctant to allow investors the rights to 
withdraw water from rivers or aquifers. Often, water 
remains the hidden dimension of large-scale land 
deals. Agreements upon water are rarely included 
in land acquisition contracts and, when included, 
they are inadequately valued. The loss of water 
rights for smallholder farmers and the potential 
impacts of large-scale land use, occasioned by the 
agricultural production activities of investors, are 
other dimensions that are not adequately considered 
when lands are leased out (Woodhouse and Ganho, 
2011).
Large investment projects as drivers 
of conflicts over natural resources
Although significant investments in the agricultural 
sector are needed, acquisitions of land, water and 
other natural resources are all the more problematic 
with regards to food security since many of these 
large investment projects have not delivered on their 
promises, not only in terms of production, but also 
in terms of job creation and service/infrastructure 
development. So not only have local communities 
tended to lose access to their resources, but the 
promise of feeding the world through these large-
scale investment models remains unfulfilled.
The consequences are numerous and not restricted 
only to driving conflict over land, water and other 
natural resources. In this changing context, new 
questions are being raised about the values that rural 
people attach to land, natural resources and small-
scale farming. The ways that natural resource disputes 
are playing out affects different users in different 
ways. In some countries, for example, pastoral 
communities have been hit by an increasing number 
of land and water conflicts, the loss and fragmentation 
of grazing land, barriers to mobility, drought and the 
breakdown of customary institutions. Such factors 
have fuelled conflict in areas where farming and 
herding overlap, for example, in many parts of East 
and West Africa. Similarly, the continued expansion 
of agri-business continues to squeeze the rights 
that indigenous peoples and farming communities 
claim to the territories they depend upon for their 
livelihoods, food systems and social identity. People 
have also raised concerns about the exacerbation of 
poverty and dependency associated with large-scale 
investment projects. This trend has been reported 
to have severely affected collective property rights 
over the land, water and other natural resources of 
indigenous and farming communities (Anseeuw et al., 
2012).
Indeed, competition over resources may change the 
institutional arrangements for their management in 
these new investment areas and far beyond in the 
case of water. While land is fixed, water is fluid and 
part of the hydrological cycle. Water acquisitions 
can therefore potentially affect greater numbers of 
water users (Franco, Mehta and Veldwisch, 2013) and 
can certainly have consequences for communities 
and populations living far away downstream, even 
in different countries. Negotiating water-use rights 
allocations should therefore involve not only local 
communities, but also national governments and 
regional bodies, especially international water basin 
organisations or agreements between countries (for 
example, the dispute over Nile River water, involving 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan, relying on treaties 
signed in the early twentieth century between colonial 
powers) (Cascão and Nicol, 2016).
Developments in international policy arenas, 
including the “voluntary guidelines on the responsible 
governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests 
in the context of national food security4”or the 
“principles for responsible investment in agriculture 
and food systems5”, present new opportunities for 
organisations, communities and social movements 
4. http://www.fao.org/cfs/home/activities/vggt/en/ 
5. http://www.fao.org/cfs/home/activities/rai/en/ 
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to advocate for systemic reforms to land and 
water governance. However, these international 
frameworks have only been mildly harnessed to 
advance their implementation and promote equitable 
and sustainable development and food security. 
In the Office du Niger (ON) region in Mali, while around 100,000 
ha is currently being cultivated, mostly by smallholders, a total 
of 600,000 ha of land has been allocated in the past ten years to 
investors for large-scale farming (Adamczewski et al., 2013). This 
process has largely bypassed the official procedures established 
by the local state body (Office du Niger) at the regional level 
(Adamczewski-Hertzog et al., 2015). Between 2010 and 2012, 
the allocation of new land shifted to the national level, with an 
attempt to recentralise the management of land deals and 
associated benefits at the highest level, despite contrary efforts 
by foreign donors to strengthen the ON institution. The Ministry 
of Agriculture (and even different ministries and the Presidency 
itself) allocated land on political and other grounds rather than 
on technical considerations. 
ON experts (former directors, consultancy companies, etc.) and 
donors (foreign development agencies involved in the very costly 
funding of land development for irrigation) understand the 
contradictions attached to land allocations, but they are not key 
decision makers and have been side-lined. Hydrological realities 
and natural limits are not adequately considered and challenges 
continuously arise. Competition for water in the dry season is 
likely to rapidly become a source of tension, notably in dry years 
when the issue of priorities will be critical. Furthermore, they 
also signal that accessing land does not mean accessing water. 
Investors (even if investments are not always visible in the field) 
have deployed different strategies to negotiate priority access to 
water in order to avoid or limit the occurrence of future water 
shortages. 
After 2012, ON, whose decision-making power was strengthened, 
decided to renegotiate the water rights granted with different 
investors. The negotiations focused on projects that had not 
started. Planned land development in the Office du Niger area 
is likely to result in water reallocation. Without the availability 
of public capital to develop new irrigated land for farmers, the 
state has opened up irrigable spaces to investors. To secure their 
private schemes, access to water is a priority. Water allocated 
to new investors would directly or indirectly lead to a decrease 
in water allocation to other users within and downstream of 
the ON area and deeply impact their water-based livelihoods 
(Adamczewski-Herzog et al., 2015).
BOX 8 
risks on water issues: case study of the office du niger area in mali
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There is a high risk that without the uptake of these 
principles at the heart of national policy processes in 
the coming years, further civil conflicts may arise with 
dire consequences on food security and nutrition. ●
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CONCLUSION 
OF SECTION 3
Some evolutionary paths taken by food systems, 
especially industrialised ones which have been 
spreading since the beginning of the twentieth century, 
have caused and are still causing serious environmental 
problems. These problems relate to the finiteness of 
natural resources used in the production process (land, 
water, fossil fuels, phosphorus etc.), the irreversible 
loss of biodiversity and erosion of ecosystems, 
and the contamination of different environmental 
compartments, especially water and soils. 
The industrialisation of agriculture has affected the 
environment at many levels, even in LI and LMI countries. 
First, the status of the world’s soils is alarming, with 
one-third of agricultural soils degraded. Soils are crucial 
to environmental integrity; they are a non-renewable 
resource with a high degradation potential and slow 
regeneration rates. They represent the habitat of 
precious - and mostly unknown - ecosystems and they 
are clearly a key resource to productive and healthy 
food systems. 
Biodiversity, the real engine of above- and below-
ground ecosystems, has been severely eroded virtually 
everywhere in the world, with differentiated kinds 
of pressure. In LI and LMI countries, pressure on 
land and natural habitats. along with water and soil 
contamination, have played a major role in this erosion. 
Although most production systems in these regions 
are still biodiverse (Herrero et al. 2017), intensification 
processes based on artificialisation and simplification 
are gaining ground, raising new and intense threats. 
Finally, the non-renewable resources needed by such 
food systems, such as land, fossil fuels and phosphorus 
with different time horizons for when they will run out, 
will eventually collide with the finiteness of the planet. 
There are no substitutes for these resources and their 
dwindling will hamper food systems. Some essential 
renewable resources, such as freshwater, should not 
theoretically follow this finiteness, but in reality they 
are also badly affected by the degraded environment 
and are dwindling in many regions. Large-scale land 
and water acquisitions in various parts of the world are 
frequently worsening these problems. 
MUCH-NEEDED FOOD SYSTEM 
TRANSFORMATIONS TO RESPECT 
AND RESTORE ENVIRONMENTAL 
INTEGRITY
Étienne Hainzelin1
1. CIRAD, DG, Gatineau J9H 4S7, Canada; University 
of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France
Simultaneously, eroded biodiversity and dwindling 
resources are drastically affecting the capacity of food 
systems to meet food security objectives. These risks 
threaten the integrity of the environment on which 
all food systems depend, from production through to 
consumption and waste, to produce adequate food in 
terms of quality and quantity. In LI and LMI countries, 
food production capacity is already affected by these 
risks, such as soil degradation due to intense pesticide 
and synthetic fertiliser use.
Under the pressure of several imperative constraints, 
food systems must produce more and better food. 
Industrialised agriculture managed to reach incredible 
yields but the environmental price paid has been very 
high and will be felt by generations to come in the form 
of impoverished and contaminated environments. 
A transformation of food systems is much needed, 
allowing for the intensification of production based 
on healthy and biodiverse environmental matrices. 
Some of these transformative intensification pathways 
are already known; in short, they should seek to close 
nutrient cycles by avoiding losses, erosion and leaching, 
managing agriculture effluent, building new solutions 
against pests and competitors in place of pesticides, 
such as biological control, and drastically reducing 
contaminant sources.
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RISKS OF MASS UNEMPLOYMENT AND WORSENING 
OF WORKING CONDITIONS
Thierry Giordano1, Bruno Losch2, Jean-Michel Sourisseau1 and Pierre Girard1
Examining the labour markets in most developing countries is 
a sobering experience: underemployment is a common feature 
and jobs are often precarious and provide very low incomes. 
Vulnerable employment rates3 stand at 76 percent. Added to this 
vulnerability is the extreme and moderate working poverty rate4, 
which amounts to 66 percent in developing countries and is even 
higher amongst women and youth (ILO, 2018). These averages 
mask highly diverse situations. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), home 
to the majority of the world’s poor and vulnerable workers, is the 
region of greatest concern, but different dynamics are underway.
The boom of the labour force in SSA
SSA deserves specific attention due to the expected massive 
growth of its working age population in the coming decades, 
resulting from an unachieved demographic transition (cf. Figure 
18). By 2050, 69 percent of the expansion in the world’s potential 
labour force is expected to be in SSA5. This represents around 
730 million new workers and a total potential labour force of 1.35 
billion. One-third (410 million) is expected to consist of young 
people aged 15-24 (UN, 2017). Meanwhile, the rural population 
is forecast to increase in absolute numbers from 648 million in 
2020 to 909 million in 2050, although its share is expected to 
fall from 59 percent to 42 percent (UN, 2018). SSA is the only 
world region where the rural population is expected to continue 
to grow well after 2050.
Providing decent employment is SSA’s challenge of the century. 
Crises are already widespread in the region and many more are 
looming. Creating enough jobs would unleash the potential of 
a significant demographic dividend6 and boost the continent’s 
economic transformation. But how can this be achieved? 
Historically, the answer in most developed and emerging 
countries has been conducive institutional and economic policies 
S U M M A R Y
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), demographic growth, 
climate change, low manufacturing levels and 
even premature deindustrialisation are paving 
the way for a massive increase in the number of 
informal, vulnerable and extremely poor workers, 
especially among young people. This is fertile 
ground for food crises, social unrest, violent 
conflicts and migration, as seen in the Sahel and 
other regions around the world. The challenge is 
to find decent jobs for the 730 million people who 
will join the potential labour force between 2020 
and 2050, in addition to the 600 million currently 
making up the working age population.
1. CIRAD, UMR ART-DEV, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
2. CIRAD, UMR ART-DEV, 7535 Cape Town, South 
Africa; University of Western Cape, 7535 Cape Town, 
South Africa; University of Montpellier, F-34090 
Montpellier, France.
3. Vulnerable employment is defined as the sum of the employment status 
groups of own-account workers and contributing family workers (ILO, 2018).
4. Extreme working poverty includes workers whose per capita household in-
come or consumption is less than US$1.90 (PPP) per day. Moderate working 
poverty includes workers whose per capita household income or consump-
tion is between US$1.90 (PPP) and US$ 3.1 (PPP) (ILO, 2018).
5. The potential labour force corresponds to the working age population, i.e. 
the 15-64 population group. According to ILO, the labour force sensu stricto 
only includes persons in employment and in unemployment.
6. The demographic dividend is the “extra economic growth owing to falling 
dependent population/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both” 
(Eastwood and Lipton, 2011).
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along with the rapid modernisation of agriculture and 
industrialisation. However, the slow speed of both 
demographic and economic transitions in SSA seems 
incompatible with such a trajectory (Losch, 2016; 
Richard, John and Finn, 2018). New answers need 
to be developed in line with the current dynamics 
of African economies, their underlying employment 
structure and household adaptive strategies.
Mass unemployment is looming
In Low-Income (LI) countries, 63 percent of workers 
were still employed in the agricultural sector in 2018, 
down by only eight percentage points since 1991 (ILO, 
2019). In SSA, agriculture in a broad sense (including 
pastoralism, agroforestry and fishing) remains the 
mainstay of livelihoods, with 57 percent of the active 
population working in the sector (ILO, 2018). Most 
of these people are small family farmers, struggling 
to make a decent living and thereby falling into the 
vulnerable and working poor category.
Alternatives to agriculture are limited and offer 
opportunities which are little better. On the one 
hand, SSA is facing premature deindustrialisation (a 
decrease in the secondary sector’s share of GDP, with 
the exception of construction) limiting job creation in 
the manufacturing sector (Rodrik, 2016). Some 9.3 
percent of the active population was employed in 
manufacturing in 2010, reaching only 11 percent in 
2018, many of them in the food industry (ILO, 2018)7. 
On the other hand, the service sector is gaining 
ground, rising to 32 percent of the active population, 
but the vast majority of these are low productivity 
and informal jobs. Even if the current institutional 
and structural challenges are addressed, the general 
trend towards automation in the coming years is 
likely to limit manufacturing and service jobs.
In response to such difficult employment conditions, 
households have developed income diversification 
strategies, including various mobility patterns, 
blurring the boundaries between rural and urban 
areas and combining different types of activities and 
sources of income. In rural areas, while non-farm 
activities are rapidly expanding, not always leading 
to higher productivity jobs, on-farm activities remain 
the backbone of rural economies (Losch, Fréguin-
Gresh and White, 2012). These dynamics must be 
acknowledged in designing and implementing new 
job creation strategies.
Without adequate policies supporting a stable and 
conducive economic and institutional environment, 
SSA risks ending up with limited economic 
growth coupled with massive unemployment and 
underemployment. This situation could dramatically 
worsen if family farmers were forced away from 
agriculture because of the effects of climate 
change, continuing concentration in agriculture and 
inadequate rural development policies. There is 
an urgent need to plan for a new type of structural 
transformation which pays close attention to the 
decent job creation potential of food systems.
Decent job creation potential at risk
In SSA, the food economy is the biggest employer. In 
West Africa, for instance, it accounts for 66 percent of 
total employment (82 million jobs). Some 78 percent 
(64 million) are in agriculture, 15 percent (12 million) in 
marketing and 5 percent (four million) in processing. 
Among employed women, 66 percent work in the 
food economy, especially in segments such as street 
food, food processing and food marketing (Allen, 
Heinrigs and Heo, 2018).
The expected demographic growth should lead to an 
increase in food demand and continuing urbanisation 
to an increase in the urban/rural population ratio. 
A proxy for the urban market potential for rural 
producers, this ratio should double from 0.71 in 2020 
to 1.38 in 2050. Alongside this, a common pattern 
of urbanisation in every region of the world is its 
impact on eating practices, with people moving from 
starchy staple foods towards more diversified diets 
7. There is considerable controversy over the data. While the ILO estimates are based on labour market information provided by 
countries, Fox et al. (2013) based on various national surveys provide an estimate of only 2.6 percent.
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Figure 18: Projected increase of the working age population 
by major regions and countries (2020-2050). 
Source: Losch (2016) updated with the World Population 
Prospects 2017.
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BOX 9 
uneven economic diversification and 
employment challenges at the local level: 
illustrated in two regions in mali 
and madagascar1
The Ségou region in Mali (62,500 km2) and the Vakinankaratra 
region in Madagascar (19,000  km2) are, like most rural regions 
in SSA, characterised by a demographic boom in their regio-
nal capitals (Ségou and Antsirabe). However, in both regions, 
villages are mushrooming and the landscape is becoming in-
creasingly densely populated.
In spite of the Office du Niger’s irrigation project in Ségou 
and the special economic zone targeting industries in Antsi-
rabe, the local economy is based on the informal sector (97 
percent of jobs identified), dominated by family farming and, 
to a much lesser extent, by small urban businesses and handi-
crafts. Along with the lack of basic public facilities, inhabitants 
highlight the need for security for property and people. Large 
families, with at least four children per woman, are regarded 
as the best safeguard against uncertainty. The agri-food indus-
try is the main prospect for industrialisation and growth (the 
mostly informal craft sector facing cheap imports) but oppor-
tunities remain limited.
Between 2015 and 2035, the population of the Ségou region 
is forecast to increase from 2.5 to 4.2 million people, and from 
2 to 3.1 million in the Vakinankaratra region. By 2035, a total 
of one million new jobs will need to be created in Ségou and 
700,000 in Vakinankaratra. The rate of job creation is expec-
ted to  double. Even if migration is expected to increase, it will 
certainly remain out of step with the population boom. Wit-
hout increases in land and labour productivity and outwards 
migration, the Ségou and Vakinankaratra regions will have to 
expand their cultivated areas from 1.4 to 2.5 million ha and 
221,000 to 300,000 ha respectively, which will increase com-
petition for natural resources and produce potential conflicts.
In both regions, priority should be given to family farms, which 
are more likely to offer employment opportunities. The pros-
pects for labour-intensive agroecology practices, which are li-
kely to improve economic and social performance, should be 
explored, as well as the strengthening of value chains suppor-
ting upstream and downstream activities in secondary cities. 
This will require a rebalancing of urban policies towards rural 
towns and intermediary cities, and a consolidation of regional 
capitals which can offer the services and infrastructure re-
quired to make diversification of activities and jobs possible. 
Achieving the decentralisation process and empowering local 
bodies is crucial.
1. Based on Sourisseau et al., 2017.
including fruit and vegetables, meat and processed 
products8. As a result of these shifts in both quantity 
and quality, the value of the food market is expected 
to increase threefold by 2030, growing from US$ 
313 billion in 2010 to US$ 1 trillion in 2030 (Byerlee 
et al., 2013). In addition, boosted by falling transport 
and communication costs, this dietary shift could 
also provide export opportunities in both processed 
products and high-value crops for African countries.
However, these changes in demand could either 
offer tremendous opportunities for job creation or 
lead to the massive shedding of jobs in food systems 
because of major productivity and competitiveness 
issues. Indeed, Africa suffers from a significant yield 
gap. Capital-intensive agriculture and agribusinesses 
could be a short-term answer but force many workers 
out of agriculture, with dramatic consequences on 
income generation and access to food. Labour-
intensive solutions through agroecology, for example, 
are another option and would simultaneously provide 
answers in terms of both sustainability and natural 
resource management. Similar considerations about 
the importance of the development model and its 
degree of labour intensity exist for agri-industries, 
where small and medium-scale processing of 
agricultural products could provide significant 
employment opportunities, particularly in rural areas.
But employment policies generally target supply-
side constraints through the development of skills, 
particularly among youth and women. They usually 
lack an integrated strategy aimed at identifying 
job opportunities within food systems and do not 
provide enough focus on the need for an enabling 
environment which would help small and medium-
size businesses to grow through adequate fiscal 
policies, entrepreneurship services and ad-hoc 
training programmes.
An integrated strategy would also require the 
improvement of working conditions within food 
systems. Under-performance in the agri-food sector is 
related to poor working conditions, the continuation 
of child labour, gender and age inequalities, partial 
labour laws and their poor enforcement (resulting in 
the neglect of occupational safety and health (OSH)) 
and a lack of promotion of workers’ organisations.
Food systems will not be the only engine for 
structural transformation, but they could significantly 
contribute to inclusive economic growth, poverty 
reduction and food security, and have significant spill-
over effects on the rest of the economy and society. 
What is currently missing to support the definition 
of adequate strategies is a better understanding of 
the labour content in agriculture and food systems 
and the impact of different development models and 
modernisation policies on job creation. ●
8. See Chapter 5.4 on the risks related to changes in diets.
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RISKS OF SMALLHOLDER EXCLUSION 
FROM UPGRADING FOOD CHAINS
Guillaume Soullier1, Paule Moustier2 and Frédéric Lançon1
Poor smallholders in traditional food chains
In 2013, the extremely poor represented 10.7 percent of the 
world’s population (World Bank, 2016). Of these, 50.7 percent 
lived in sub-Saharan Africa and 33.4 percent in South Asia. Of 
extremely poor workers aged over 14, 65 percent worked in the 
agricultural sector (World Bank, 2016). 
Smallholders are characterised by limited productive assets, 
management implemented at the family level and an often 
informal legal status (Bélières et al., 2015). This definition mainly 
concerns agricultural producers, but it can be extended to 
downstream operators, who carry out trade, processing and 
retailing activities with limited assets. Smallholders include 
socially marginalised groups, such as women, young people 
and ethnic minorities. These groups have reduced access to 
resources and fewer opportunities than others (De La O Campos 
et al., 2018).
Smallholders operate in uncertain environments and have 
limited access to productive resources (Devaux et al., 2016). This 
constrains their innovation, quality management and access to 
output markets. As a result, they participate in traditional food 
chains, which provide products of heterogeneous quality and 
generate low incomes. This is particularly the case for domestic 
and staple chains.
The upgrading of value chains
Large agribusinesses are investing in new technologies in 
production, storage and processing, including in LI and LMI 
countries. They have access to bank credit, technology and 
information. They define the attributes of final products and 
develop new business models to control their supplies. They 
implement contract farming, which is “a sales arrangement 
between a farmer and a firm, agreed before production begins, 
which provides the farmer with resources or services” (Ton 
et al., 2018). Contract farming often includes the setting of 
standards, i.e. a set of quality criteria for product attributes. 
Some large agribusinesses also choose to control their supplies 
hierarchically. 
Large agri-industries are diverse in their origins, activities and the 
segments in which they operate. As a result, different patterns of 
upgrading coexist. The supermarket revolution relates to large-
scale investment in retailing, the centralisation of supply systems 
and the implementation of vertical coordination. The quiet 
revolution relates to investments in improved processing and 
storage, and direct sourcing from smallholder farmers (Reardon 
et al., 2012; Soullier and Moustier, 2018). 
S U M M A R Y
Large agri-industries fuel the upgrading of certain 
food chains. This chapter presents the risks of 
smallholders not benefitting from this upgrading. 
The first risk is that upgrading does not spread 
to all food value chains, generating territorial 
inequalities. The second is that the most endowed 
smallholders are included while the poorest are 
excluded. The third risk is that those smallholders 
who are included tend to be in a weak bargaining 
position against large agri-industries. As a result, 
most smallholders do not get higher incomes 
from upgrading food chains.
1. CIRAD, UMR ART-DEV, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
2. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
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It is still unclear whether smallholders manage to 
grasp the opportunities offered by the upgrading 
of food chains. This chapter discusses the risks that 
smallholders do not benefit from the upgrading of 
value chains and questions the contribution of food 
chain upgrading to the reduction of poverty and 
inequality.
Risk 1: Upgrading does not affect 
all food value chains 
Upgrading does not affect all food value chains, 
contributing to territorial inequalities. Several factors 
in certain territories generate costs and uncertainty 
which discourage agri-industry investments (Barrett 
et al., 2012). These comprise infrastructure quality 
(such as roads, irrigation and storage), degree of 
insecurity, institutional context, agroecological 
conditions and proximity to markets for quality 
products.
As a result, many food chains are not upgrading. 
Several domestic food chains in sub-Saharan 
Africa have received little investment or innovation 
(Soullier and Moustier, 2013). Indeed, domestic 
chains target national demand, do not benefit from 
a shift in demand for quality products, face various 
uncertainties and generate little income. Some 
traditional chains may also disappear when faced 
with a reduction in demand and competition from 
imported products or from agribusinesses. This has 
been observed in the milk sector in Brazil, where 
60,000 small dairy farmers went out of business 
in the second half of the 1990s, unable to invest 
in pasteurisation (Reardon and Berdegue, 2002). 
Consequently, the unequal geographical coverage of 
upgrading food chains tends to increase inequalities 
between territories. This is particularly the case in 
some parts of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 
which represent a major risk since these two regions 
are home to 84 percent of the world’s extremely poor 
population (cf. Chapter 4.3).
Risk 2: Less endowed smallholders 
are being excluded from upgrading 
food chains
Large agri-industries select business models and 
suppliers that best meet their quality standards and 
reduce their costs and uncertainties (Barrett et al., 
2012). They often prefer better endowed smallholders, 
who have access to technology, generate economies 
of scale and present lower transaction costs. For 
example, most farmers supplying supermarkets in 
Vietnam were found to be above the poverty level 
(Moustier et al., 2009). Poorer smallholders often do 
not have access to credit and cannot invest to meet 
agribusiness contract requirements. 
The number of smallholders included in upgrading 
chains is therefore very limited. Through a meta-
analysis of 26 case studies, Ton et al. (2018) have 
shown that in 61 percent of the cases studied contract 
farmers had larger landholdings or owned more non-
land assets than non-contracted farmers. However, 
exceptions do exist, particularly when operations 
are labour-intensive and collective action is possible 
(Reardon et al., 2009). But these cases are rare and 
in developing countries “the proportion of farm 
households involved in contract farming is probably 
in the range of 1-5 percent” (Devaux et al., 2016, p. 
136). While poorly documented, the inclusion of 
smallholders downstream may show similar results. 
In some cases, agri-industries fuel an increase in 
agricultural production and smallholders excluded 
from upgrading can continue their activities in 
traditional food chains. However, they remain stuck 
in low-income activities. In others, production does 
not increase sufficiently and smallholders risk being 
replaced by large agribusinesses. This has happened 
in some Asian countries, where medium and large 
millers replaced smaller ones (Reardon et al., 2012). 
In such situations, some become employees of large 
agri-industries (FAO, 2015) but not all, because these 
large agri-industries are capital-intensive rather than 
labour-intensive. Furthermore, smallholders do 
not necessarily gain higher incomes when they are 
employed. 
Risk 3: When included, smallholders 
may not always benefit
Upgrading may lead to asymmetries of power. Indeed, 
large companies integrate activities that generate the 
most added value and outsource those that are riskier 
and less profitable (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 
2005). They often outsource agricultural production 
to smallholder famers where contracts include risk-
transfer mechanisms. Large agribusinesses can also 
be opportunistic, with payment delays, no payment, 
purchasing price reductions or inappropriate rejection 
of products (Barrett et al., 2012). Some policies seek 
to balance power relationships in value chains, for 
example through multi-stakeholder platforms or 
inter-professional associations. However, multi-
stakeholder partnerships may also lead to exclusion 
practices (HLPE, 2018).
As a result, the incomes of those smallholders who 
are included may not improve. On average, contract 
farming increased farmers’ incomes by 38 percent, 
thanks to access to improved inputs and quality 
management (Ton et al., 2018). However, these figures 
hide a bias toward the studies showing positive 
impacts, which are more likely to be published and 
appreciated by donors and policy makers. 
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Nevertheless, some vertical coordination approaches 
can have no or negative impacts on smallholder 
welfare. For example, rice growers in Senegal 
committed to production contracts simply because 
it was their only way to fund rice growing, but they 
received an income almost 13 percent lower than 
producers using bank credit and marketing paddy 
with spot transactions. Why? Because the production 
contract included high interest and insurance rates 
(Soullier and Moustier, 2018). Furthermore, the 
impacts depend on the product and specificities 
of the value chain. Positive impacts are more likely 
in export chains of high-value products than in 
domestic staple chains. This can be a major obstacle 
to alleviating poverty because millions of family 
farmers only participate in domestic staple chains. 
Finally, upgrading could increase income inequalities 
within food chains. The total value added increases 
with upgrading, but its distribution becomes less 
favourable to smallholders (Reardon et al., 2009, 
2012). When included, smallholders receive higher 
incomes in absolute value, but their share of the total 
value added within the chain generally decreases and 
income inequalities between smallholders and large 
agribusinesses increase. For example, the upgrading 
of the rice chain in Bangladesh made it possible to 
produce high-quality rice but decreased producer 
shares of the total value added from 69 percent to 
38 percent  (Reardon et al., 2012). A similar trend has 
been observed in Senegal, where the upgrading of 
the rice chain decreased the farmers’ share of the 
total value added from 60 percent to 37 percent (cf. 
Figure 19). In Nicaragua, the supermarket revolution 
in vegetable chains has highlighted a similar trend 
(cf. Box 10). There are, however, some exceptions, 
such as in Vietnam where farmers’ organisations 
have contributed to improving the quality of lychee 
(Moustier et al., 2010) and secured a 25 to 42 
percent increase in the total value added (Moustier, 
2009). These inequalities seem to differ from one 
type of food chain to another. Value may be more 
concentrated at the wholesale level when products 
can be stored rather than in chains comprising a few 
intermediaries and supplying perishable products. ●
 
BOX 10 
do supermarkets in nicaragua strengthen 
inequalities?1
In Nicaragua, horticultural production (tomatoes, green pep-
pers, lettuce and cabbage) is conducted by farms with diffe-
rent structures. Around two-thirds are rainfed farms and the 
others are irrigated. Among irrigated farms, half are large, 
farming more than seven hectares. Before the 1990s, most 
of these farms marketed products in traditional value chains, 
made up of small collectors and retailers. Then two companies 
upgraded horticultural value chains by developing supermar-
kets: the national company La Colonia and the international 
company Walmart. In 2009, there were 65 supermarkets in 
Nicaragua. These supermarkets often used contracts to pur-
chase horticultural products and set quality standards. They 
purchased horticultural products from those farmers that of-
fered the lowest transaction and procurement costs. As a re-
sult, they preferred sourcing from the largest farms or from 
cooperatives, and from farms representing the lowest trans-
portation costs. Supermarkets also preferred sourcing from 
irrigated farms, because they could continuously supply pro-
ducts throughout the year, in contrast to rainfed farms. 
As a result, farmers located in very remote areas and growing 
rainfed produce on small farms were much less likely to be 
included in the upgraded chain. Furthermore, the supermar-
kets specified quality standards, defined in terms of variety, 
size, colouration, cleanliness, damage and weight. On average, 
supermarkets accepted 70 percent of the total production and 
rejected the remaining 30 percent. In contrast, the traditional 
value chain bought produce of all sizes and grades and pro-
vided outlets for produce rejected by supermarkets. Further-
more, the study has shown that farmers marketing to super-
markets did not receive higher prices than in the traditional 
value chain. La Colonia purchased vegetables at prices simi-
lar to those of traditional markets. Walmart even purchased 
tomatoes at prices 35 percent below the market price since 
Walmart’s prices were steady compared to traditional mar-
kets. This price might, however, include an overly expensive 
insurance against price risk.
1. Based on Michelson, Reardon and Perez, 2012.
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Figure 19: Distribution of value added in traditional and 
upgraded rice chains in Senegal. 
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RISKS OF INCREASING TERRITORIAL INEQUALITIES
Thierry Giordano1, Bruno Losch2, Jean-Michel Sourisseau1  and Élodie Valette1
Spatial inequalities: 
from dormant threat to crises
Many countries face huge economic and social inequalities, 
particularly in incomes, job opportunities and access to 
services. However, in developing countries, data remain too 
scarce to quantify the spatial dimension of these inequalities 
beyond specific case studies. Looking at the distribution of 
multidimensional poverty between and within countries 
provides a proxy for these inequalities. For example, 1.1 billion 
people are left behind in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia 
alone, representing 83 percent of the multidimensional poor in 
the world61. Some 342 million people are severely poor62 in SSA, 
i.e. 56 percent of the world’s severely poor (OPHI, 2018). At a 
territorial level, multidimensional poverty is more acute in rural 
areas, the starkest rural-urban difference being in SSA, where 
the level of wealth concentration in capital cities is another 
specificity. For example, in Chad “poverty ranges between 
48 percent in the capital city of N’Djamena to 99 percent in 
Wadi Fira, a region located in the eastern part of the country.” 
Similarly, in Mali “poverty in the southern capital city of Bamako is 
30 percent, but it is three times higher in the region of Timbuktu 
up north” (OPHI, 2018).
This spatial imbalance may result from the historical structural 
transformation processes observed, where specialisation and 
agglomeration of economic activities maximised economic 
growth and lead to polarisation (World Bank, 2009). However, 
in SSA, where there are major constraints to growth, spatial 
inequalities are cumulative and can increase the incidence of 
civil conflicts (Ezcurra, 2018). When the security, stability and 
prosperity of countries and regions are at risk and instability 
spreads to more prosperous centres, which is happening in the 
Sahel region, there is a need for a clearer trade-off between 
spatially-blind economic growth and greater spatial justice 
(AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2015; Barca, McCann and Rodriguez 
S U M M A R Y
In many countries, spatial inequalities are becoming 
so significant that they might compromise the 
prosperity, stability and security of entire regions 
trapped in poverty. Currently, in sub-Saharan 
Africa they result from unequal population, urban 
networks which reflect inherited colonial patterns 
and weak or uneven past development policies, 
with big cities rapidly developing and concentrating 
infrastructure and public goods. Intermediary cities 
and small towns have been forgotten, receiving 
little support from central governments. Territorial 
approaches to development barely exist, which 
means the multiple dimensions of inequalities 
cannot be addressed.
1. CIRAD, UMR ART-DEV, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
2. CIRAD, UMR ART-DEV, 7535 Cape Town, South 
Africa; University of Western Cape, 7535 Cape Town, 
South Africa; University of Montpellier, F-34090 
Montpellier, France.
61. Multidimensional poverty is a complement to income poverty as it 
captures the simultaneous deprivations that each person experiences in 
10 indicators clustered around health (nutrition, child mortality), education 
(years of schooling, school attendance) and living standards (cooking fuel, 
sanitation, drinking water, electricity, housing, assets) (OPHI, 2018). 
62. Severely poor people are deprived in at least half of the weighted 
indicators in health, education and living standards.
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Pose, 2012).
An accumulation of causes
Uneven spatial development is a key feature of 
both developed and developing countries and is 
particularly evident in SSA, where the exploitation of 
natural resources has for many years been the main 
driver of spatial development. The colonial past has 
shaped territories through a series of infrastructure 
projects and investments aimed at extracting 
rents. The natural endowment was the main factor 
dictating investment plans: infrastructure was built 
to facilitate the flow of goods to the coast for export, 
cities were created to aid colonial control and coastal 
ports were made capital cities. This development 
pattern exacerbated spatial differences between 
territories stemming from their natural capital 
endowment, geography and climate. Sectoral policies 
targeted high-potential regions, leading to the 
exclusion of large rural areas from significant public 
interventions and investments. These patterns have 
left a substantial footprint (Losch, 2016) that national 
policies and decentralisation efforts have not been 
able to balance (cf. Map 9).
The unique pace of urbanisation, coupled with 
the lack of industrialisation, has exacerbated this 
dependency on past territorial organisation (AfDB, 
OECD and UNDP, 2015). Urban development has 
been a clear focus of many policies, targeting mostly 
national and sometimes regional capital cities, 
neglecting intermediary cities and small towns and 
thereby strengthening inherited spatial inequalities. 
Better economic opportunities, infrastructure and 
services in large cities have contributed to rural 
out-migration flows directly targeting the main 
urban centres. However, urban growth has rapidly 
outpaced the management capacity of local and 
national governments. Urban development remains 
Missing data
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Map 9: Population of urban agglomerations of over 10,000 inhabitants. 
Source: Pesche, Losch and Imbernon, 2016.
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largely unplanned due to a lack of resources and 
technical capacities, cities sprawling outward instead 
of upward in the absence of land policies and 
regulations, often on agricultural land and creating 
strains on natural resources. Informal settlements 
are expanding, increasing backlogs of essential 
service provision, especially network services such 
as water and sanitation, transport and electricity and 
infrastructure to access education, health and food.
Finally, climate change, land degradation and 
shortage, natural resource depletion and biodiversity 
losses have worsened the situation, becoming push 
factors for many communities. They fuel migration 
to less affected rural areas and big cities, and limit 
the growth potential of regions, thereby increasing 
the risks of unemployment, non-decent jobs and 
extreme working poverty (cf. Chapter 4.1).
The lack of territorial approaches to 
development 
In SSA, food systems are increasingly seen as possible 
opportunities for economic diversification, growth and 
job creation, and for more sustainable development 
through their direct connection to natural resources. 
They benefit from the exploding domestic and 
regional food demand and their core position in 
the economic and social structure. From rural areas 
where the potential for productivity increases is 
still substantial, to urban areas representing a poor 
but huge domestic market, food systems could be 
one of the levers for spatial, economic and social 
rebalancing, in particular through the development 
of local agri-industries. They represent an untapped 
potential for all actors in food systems and could 
have leverage effects on the rest of the economy and 
society (Arnold et al., 2019). 
This would entail strengthening rural-urban linkages 
to make sure that food-related resources benefit 
both urban and rural food system actors (cf. Box 11). 
Intermediary cities and towns then become vital for 
bridging the rural-urban divide around which city-
region food systems could develop (Blay-Palmer et 
al., 2018). Highly embedded with rural economies 
and societies, emanating from the densification of 
what were previously rural areas (urbanisation from 
the bottom), intermediary cities and towns can create 
income and job opportunities by linking farmers to 
urban demand and input markets, and by stimulating 
non-farm sectors such as transport services and agri-
processing.
However, spatially blind policies have had dramatic 
consequences on intermediary cities. Most lack 
the very features of capital cities, preventing their 
development and the rebalancing of urban networks: 
infrastructure development is weak and service 
provision is limited, as is the presence of the state 
(devolved governance). 
While many SSA governments acknowledge 
decentralisation as a priority, it remains rather 
ineffective in practice: when the transfer of remits 
exists, it lacks the symmetric transfer of human and 
financial capacities, or any level of fiscal autonomy 
for these cities to address their citizens’ needs 
(Satterthwaite, 2017). Such a devolution of power 
is often seen as a threat to already weak central 
governments, which must retain their (for now 
limited) capacity to equalise development between 
regions. As a result, while intermediary cities could 
become critical economic, political and social hubs 
linking larger cities and backward rural areas, 
they struggle to attract and/or maintain industrial 
enterprises: many companies relocate to the capital 
city when they grow.
The absence of territorial approaches to development 
(TP4D, 2018) prevents differentiated strategies which 
would address the specificities of existing functional 
territories, i.e. geographical areas which can differ 
from administrative regions and where people 
conduct most of their economic and social life. This 
lack of territorial perspective jeopardises the ability 
of food systems to take up the challenge of growing 
food demand in SSA, increases the risk of food 
crises and misses a major opportunity for economic 
development. ●
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Urbanisation in Ethiopia has followed a similar pattern to many 
other SSA countries, with the urban population spread among 
many cities of very different sizes. While Addis Ababa, the capital 
city, houses one-quarter of the urban population, intermediary 
cities are on the rise and have undergone major growth over the 
past decade. How do urbanisation patterns affect output prices 
and farmers’ agricultural practices in rural hinterlands? This rela-
tionship is poorly understood.
In terms of both production and consumption, teff is an impor-
tant cereal in Ethiopia. It is considered a cash crop for most pro-
ducers as one-third of the production is sold. Teff is domestically 
consumed, mostly in urban areas, by better-off households. Ur-
ban growth and the accompanying growth in incomes are there-
by increasing demand for teff with significant consequences for 
local farmers, and very little influence from international trade 
and markets on prices. The closed economy nature of this value 
chain makes it particularly relevant for studying the impact of 
urbanisation on agricultural production and rural development.
Using large-scale survey data from teff producers, coupled with 
data on transport costs and road networks, it appears that the 
proximity of farmers to a city and the type of city have a strong 
impact on farmers’ incomes and behaviour, as described by the 
conceptual framework developed in this work. Not surprisingly, 
output prices and uptake of modern inputs and yields on farms 
decrease over distance (measured by transportation costs) to a 
primate city. However, the presence of an intermediary city intro-
duces a change through the urban demand it represents, making 
it profitable for rural hinterland farmers located far away from 
primate cities – and therefore excluded from this market – to pro-
duce for and sell to the urban market in the intermediary city and 
become responsive to price signals. Simultaneously, the interme-
diary city facilitates access to modern inputs and farmers tend to 
intensify their production. However, the benefits farmers can get 
from their proximity to secondary towns are smaller than those 
obtained when closer to primate cities. Therefore, it appears that 
agricultural price behaviour and intensification is determined by 
proximity to a city and the type of city, putting a strong emphasis 
on the importance of transportation costs and thereby the qua-
lity of infrastructure.
1. Based on Vandercasteelen et al., 2018. 
BOX 11 
the contribution of intermediary cities and small towns to rural developmen in ethiopia1
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EXCLUSION OF WOMEN 
AND VULNERABLE MINORITIES
Ninon Sirdey1 and Sandrine Dury1 
Women, key but underrated contributors 
to food systems, face inequalities 
in access to resources, services 
and remunerative opportunities
Women play a key economic role in urban and rural food systems. 
They cook for their families but also work in the food sector, as 
traders or processors. Due to their involvement in agriculture, 
they also play a role in natural resource management. According 
to FAO (2011), women comprise 43 percent of the agricultural 
labour force in developing countries and, in West Africa, they 
represent more than 70 percent of employees in the food 
processing and marketing sectors (cf. Figure 20). 
Yet women have less access than men to productive resources and 
opportunities. The gender gap exists for many assets (especially 
land legal rights and ownership of livestock), agricultural inputs 
(for instance, inorganic inputs and animal traction) but also for 
advisory, extension and financial services. Inequalities in access 
to resources and services, as well as in their ability to seize 
emerging employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, cause 
differences in access to remunerative opportunities between 
men and women farmers (FAO, 2011). Furthermore, development 
programmes have difficulty in reducing the gender gap. From a 
review of the impacts of eight agricultural development projects 
on individual and household assets in seven countries in Africa 
and South Asia, Johnson et al. (2016) have shown that all projects 
were associated with increases in assets and other benefits at 
the household level, but only one contributed to reducing the 
gender asset gap.
Women are also increasingly hired on industrial farms or in 
processing companies for high-value commodities. When 
women have paid work (which is already limited), they face less 
favourable employment conditions, such as lower wages and a 
higher prevalence of casual and seasonal work (FAO, 2011). 
Women are also self-employed in many chain activities in food 
systems, from transport to processing and catering. Women 
tend to dominate local markets, retail and cross-border 
informal trade (FAO and African Union, 2018). In Low-Income 
(LI) and Lower Middle Income (LMI) countries, urbanisation has 
been accompanied by a rise in informal street food vending 
and catering. This provides a key source of employment and 
earnings for women as well as supplying the urban poor with 
inexpensive food. However, they endure unstable business 
locations and inadequate infrastructure and productive assets. 
Their operations are labour-intensive and characterised by low 
profit margins.
S U M M A R Y
Women and various groups of vulnerable 
minorities (i.e. indigenous peoples) are major 
stakeholders in food systems. They are under-
represented in decision-making bodies and are 
not properly considered in various policies and 
interventions. Exclusion of these people in the 
design and implementation of public/private 
policies, development and economic programmes 
is a source of under-performance and conflicts in 
food systems and societies. 
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
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Despite their huge contribution, women are under-
represented in the governance of food systems and in 
the shaping of policies. Prevailing socio-cultural norms 
limit their ability to exercise power and autonomous 
decision-making within their households as well as in 
rural organisations and institutions, which therefore 
fail to represent their needs and interests as farmers 
and entrepreneurs. For instance, in 18 Latin American 
democracies, a study found only two women among 
76 ministers of agriculture and forestry at the 
beginning of the 2000s (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson, 2005). A study of around 125 agricultural 
research and higher education agencies in 15 sub-
Saharan African countries found that, on average, 
24 percent of the total professional posts and 14 
percent of management positions were occupied 
by women, with consistent differences across 
countries (FAO, 2011). Consequently, food system 
policies and interventions too often rely on gender-
blind approaches. More than half of the national 
agricultural investment plans of 38 African countries 
do not include any gender dimensions (FAO and 
African Union, 2018). 
In a context where food systems are under several 
serious, urgent and combined threats, this gender 
imbalance is a missed opportunity to make women-
specific issues heard and make progress in domains 
such as nutrition and health (Duflo, 2012), natural 
resource management and conflicts. Studies have 
shown that gender inequalities tend to lead to 
inefficient food systems while improvements in 
gender equality and economic growth may strengthen 
each other (World Bank, IFAD and FAO, 2009). In 
fact, gender-blind policies and programmes often 
fail to offer the enabling conditions for maximising 
the role of women in meeting the growing demand 
for agricultural products and the sustainable use of 
natural resources, and fail to promote healthy diets 
and decent employment. 
First, this exclusion prevents the implementation of 
effective research and development programmes. 
Improved varieties of sorghum (caudatum type), 
designed by research institutes between 1970 and 
1990, showed improved yields but poor technological 
and culinary characteristics (Trouche et al., 1999) that 
led to West African farmers refusing to use them. 
The fact that women, as researchers, farmers, cooks 
and final users have been absent from the breeding 
process is one reason for the failure of these 
programmes.
Second, agricultural interventions or modern value 
chains may increase women’s unpaid workload, 
which is a risk for their own health and nutrition and 
for those of their children. In West African cotton 
producing areas, the so-called Sikasso paradox 
provides a tangible example of the simultaneous 
improvement of cotton-maize production together 
with a high level of stunting in children because of 
women’s excessive workloads (Dury and Bocoum, 
2012). The same has been observed in contract 
farming. Where men control the contracts, women 
are often not well compensated in terms of control 
over additional income, yet their workload increases 
as family labourers (FAO, 2011). Coupling agricultural 
interventions with interventions to reduce the gender 
gap in agricultural activities is likely to make the 
former more effective in improving nutrition security, 
as has been highlighted in Nepal by Malapit et al. 
(2015) (cf. Box 12).
Third, even when they are visible in food and 
nutrition policies, women are very often considered 
as juveniles, incompetents or simply as bodies. 
Kimura (2013) developed this argument in her 
thesis concerning the fight against malnutrition in 
Indonesia. She showed that most policy makers, 
together with scientists, considered women as 
culprits, i.e. the source of their own and children’s 
nutritional problems. They displayed bad habits, 
inadequate cooking abilities, food practices and 
breastfeeding patterns that needed to be changed 
through education. Overlooking women like this 
presents a clear risk of disempowering them and, in 
the long run, of creating more under-development, 
frustration and exclusion.
Fourth, the frequent exclusionary practices affecting 
street food vendors may endanger food and nutrition 
security and social equity in the urban food economy 
(Loc and Moustier, 2016). This might increase 
inequalities since these vendors are often themselves 
part of the poorest segment of the population and 
will lose a livelihood opportunity.
Exclusion of vulnerable minorities 
and its consequences: the example 
of indigenous peoples
The same exclusion from shaping public policies and 
development programmes holds true for vulnerable 
minorities, such as indigenous peoples. Indigenous 
peoples represent 5 percent of the global population 
but 15 percent of the poor (FAO, 2013). They share 
a strong connection to their environment, unique 
cultures and have developed exceptional adaptive 
knowledge to deal with natural resources (Reyes 
Garcia et al., 2016; Eloy et al., 2018). However, global 
agri-food markets and industrial projects induce 
many threats (FAO, 2013): (i) indigenous peoples 
are affected by displacement that divests them of 
traditional practices and livelihoods; (ii) indigenous 
peoples are suffering from reduced environmental 
quality and will be among the first affected by climate 
change; (iii) the diversity of food utilisation and food’s 
cultural dimension are insufficiently recognised 
and the global food system contributes to the shift 
towards the consumption of more energy-dense 
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and industrially processed foods; (iv) traditional food 
systems and a way of life based on shifting cultivation, 
pastoralism or hunting is disregarded. Most rural 
policies and agricultural programmes still seek to 
replace shifting cultivation or hunting, even though 
this type of agriculture is both climate-resilient and 
essential for the way of life of indigenous peoples. 
Overlooking the considerations of indigenous cultures 
and livelihoods causes major disruption to traditional 
food systems, contributes to increased malnutrition 
and health problems in indigenous communities 
and homogenises foods and food practices around 
the world and risks exacerbating existing social 
vulnerabilities among indigenous peoples (Levang, 
Dounias and Sitorus, 2005). The overlapping axes 
of social differences (gender, rural status, class etc.) 
exacerbate the vulnerability of indigenous peoples.
Finally, for both women and vulnerable minorities, 
relative deprivation has been observed in multiple 
spheres, although these populations play a crucial 
role in food systems. Not giving them a voice and 
equal access to resources risks marginalising them 
still further and reducing their contribution to 
global food and nutrition security, mitigation of 
climate change, sustainable management of natural 
resources and prevention of conflicts. ●
Food 
agriculture 
Food 
processing
Food 
marketing
Food-away- 
from-home
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
Figure 20: Share of women’s employment by food segment 
in West Africa. 
Source: Allen, Heinrigs and Heo, 2018.
The crucial role of women’s empowerment in the achievement 
of food and nutrition security in LI and LMI countries is illustrated 
in a study conducted in Nepal. In Nepal, 25 percent of the 
population lives below the poverty line and 41 percent of children 
are stunted. Based on household survey data from 3,332 rural 
households, authors studied women’s empowerment with 
a measure of the roles and extent of women’s engagement in 
the agricultural sector in terms of decisions over agricultural 
production, access to and decision-making power over use of 
income and productive resources, leadership in the community 
and women’s time use. 
They first demonstrated that production diversity at the 
household level is positively associated with maternal and 
under-five-year-old child dietary diversity and higher nutritional 
scores for children. Second, in areas and households with lower 
production diversity, women’s empowerment (in particular 
lighter workloads and greater control over income) is found to 
mitigate the negative impact of less diverse production diversity 
on child diets and nutritional scores. Greater empowerment is 
also associated with greater maternal dietary diversity. 
This finding suggests that women’s empowerment is a key 
avenue for improving maternal and child diets and nutritional 
status, especially where the diversification of production may be 
limited by biophysical or agroecological conditions.
1. Based on Malapit et al., 2015.
BOX 12 
women’s empowerment mitigates the negative effects of low production diversity 
on child nutrition in nepal1
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UNCERTAIN IMPACTS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES: 
THE CASE OF DIGITAL AGRICULTURE AND BLOCKCHAINS
Sylvaine Lemeilleur1, Élodie Maître-d’Hôtel1, Olivier Lepiller1 and Alexandre Hobeika1
Digital agriculture: promising but 
hardly accessible in Low-Income (LI) and 
Lower Middle-Income (LMI) countries
Digital agriculture makes use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) to enable farmers to improve their 
agricultural production and marketing. Currently, most farmers 
make decisions on subjects such as fertiliser use and marketing 
based on a combination of practical experience and general 
advice from public or private organisations (companies, public 
authorities, NGOs). Digital innovations can provide farmers 
with more accurate information based on the use of specific 
information and tools such as sensors, positioning systems and 
databases, modelling software, communication networks and 
robotics. ICTs may enhance their ability to make decisions and 
have the potential to foster agricultural production and reduce 
production costs, while reducing environmental impacts through 
the promotion of cost-effective input approaches. 
Although widely employed in Northern America and expanding 
in Europe, digital agriculture is currently much less used in 
Low-Income (LI) and Lower Middle-Income (LMI) countries. 
However, some promising experiments are being conducted 
in sub-Saharan Africa. The most advanced of these (Ethiopia, 
Tanzania and Nigeria) are the ones conducted with the aim of 
providing farmers with site-specific information on fertiliser use 
decisions. In Ethiopia, major work has been underway since 2012 
by the Ministry of Agriculture to map soil fertility through the 
interpretation of satellite images and the analysis of soil samples, 
and to deliver site-specific information to farmers through a 
toll-free mobile phone service. More than seven million text 
messages and calls were received in the first year of operation 
and local wheat production has increased from one tonne per 
hectare to three tonnes per hectare (ATA, 2019). In Nigeria, the 
information received resulted in higher fertiliser use and higher 
yields. However, the positive impacts were significant only for 
farmers who received a full range of specific information, rather 
than general guidelines (Oyinbo, 2018; cf. Box 13). There is a risk 
of a two-tier agriculture developing, with territories not covered 
on the losing end. The diffusion of ICTs should be supported by 
public service providers or development organisations in the 
field to avoid creating greater inequalities, which comes at a cost.
In the private sector, a variety of startups are emerging (Ekewe, 
2017). For instance, several initiatives are seeking to connect 
farmers to credit (for example, for inputs), with service providers 
(to obtain accurate information about agricultural practices 
and marketing opportunities) and with food processors and/or 
distributors. Examples include the JAMI application in Senegal, 
FARMCROWDY in Nigeria and the ESOKO platform services in 
S U M M A R Y
Digital innovations are central to the 
transformation of food systems, from production 
and processing through to distribution. While they 
have the potential to enhance environmental and 
social sustainability across the value chain, they 
could also have disruptive effects on organisations 
and come with huge uncertainties in terms of 
access to these technologies, working conditions 
(‘Uberisation’) and governance. This chapter aims 
to briefly address the challenges associated with 
the diffusion of these technologies in developing 
countries. We focus on the examples of digital 
agriculture and blockchains.
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
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Ghana. In Kenya, the SunCulture company is selling 
solar irrigation kits in semi-arid areas that pump 
water, store it during the day and distribute it at 
night in order to optimise water use (AuSénégal.com, 
2018).
Digital agriculture has the potential to help poor 
farmers in developing countries increase their 
agricultural production while optimising water 
and input use. It could also contribute to reducing 
women’s workloads by enabling them to access 
key services (Treinen and van der Elstraeten, 2018). 
However, technology by itself does not ensure 
a move to greater equality and, depending on 
its implementation, also risks widening existing 
gaps. Costs for accessing technology are high and 
information on the long-term benefits is not always 
available. To secure its benefits and broad adoption 
by farmers, digital agriculture will require stronger 
collaboration among key stakeholders and need 
to be governed by inclusive policies, which address 
specific ICT needs and challenges. Further research 
is needed to assess the long-term impact of such 
innovations and the conditions required for scaling 
up and out.
Blockchains and food systems: 
risks of market exclusion and 
uncertainties about governance
Blockchain is being touted as one of the greatest 
technological revolutions available. It is catching 
the interest of a wide variety of industries and will 
soon penetrate the global market. Developing 
countries are not excluded from this technological 
development, especially as it provides great potential 
for food systems (Ge, 2017).
A blockchain is a decentralised digital accounting 
ledger that records all transactions made by its 
participants. Each user enters the data on the 
transactions he or she is involved in, for instance 
information about the goods they interact with. 
The data is shared and verified by all members 
using cryptography and collaborative verification 
algorithms. In comparison to traditional, centralised 
ledgers, the benefits are very high data security 
and disintermediation of transaction processing, 
in addition to speedier and automatically verified 
transactions. This technology therefore has the 
potential to facilitate trade and increase transparency, 
accountability and traceability.
It can be applied to long supply chains, land titles or 
creditworthiness. Blockchain is claimed to facilitate 
access to financial services and reduce transaction 
costs. In practice, each actor in a supply chain 
(producers, processors and distributors) enters the 
traceability data which concerns them for each batch 
of information such as the origin, detailed attributes 
of products, dates for treatments, harvesting, 
processing, selling etc. It allows smart, self-executing 
contracts to be implemented, which can enhance 
trust between sellers and buyers. The transparency of 
the data can also improve food safety, since it allows 
for easier regulatory control to detect fraudulent 
behaviour, improved monitoring for compliance 
with sanitary and phytosanitary regimes, and even 
a strengthened ability to respond quickly to disease 
outbreaks and contaminated agri-food products 
(Tse et al., 2017). Blockchain aims to strengthen the 
enabling environment for transactions with better 
informed policies. Some also say that it might replace 
certification for voluntary standards and reduce 
rejects at border crossings, especially for exports 
from developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the required integration of all the 
actors in supply chains into blockchain is challenging, 
will take time and involves numerous social and 
economic risks in developing countries.
The main obstacles to the implementation of 
this technology are the paucity of resources and 
skills. First, this technology can only be used with a 
computer network and will thereby exclude billions 
of people who do not have access to the internet 
(Map 10). This is a particular problem in Africa and 
Asia where coverage is patchy, with only 25 percent 
of the population having access, and connectivity is 
the most expensive in the world (A4AI, 2018). Second, 
while blockchain promises to make it possible for 
participants to incorporate better analytics in their 
operations, most small enterprises in the world do not 
keep a clear handwritten accounting register as many 
operations and transactions fall within the informal 
economy. However, the fast rise of mobile payments 
in the region could facilitate the deployment of these 
technologies. 
Until now, cooperatives or exporters have taken on 
responsibility for the complex and time- consuming 
red tape linked to transparency in the agri-food export 
sector. However, unless smallholder farmers, as well 
as micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
increase their capacity at least initially, blockchain 
may lead to greater marginalisation for some market 
participants. The reasons could be similar to those 
which tend to exclude diversified, small-scale farming 
from standards: third-party certification has a high 
cost, due to the work related to the certification 
procedure, the bureaucratisation and analysis of 
data, the cost of auditing, skills and travel expenses, 
which favours monoculture productions and agri-
food industries; and the centralisation of the design of 
the system (Lemeilleur and Allaire, 2018). Depending 
on the precise blockchain characteristics, these could 
be more-or-less mitigated.
Finally, challenges appear at the public governance 
level, particularly with regards to data access. Access 
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Map 10: Access to the Internet: still patchy in most LMI countries.
to data in blockchains can be private or shared, 
depending on the rules adopted, the purpose of 
the platform and the preferences of the users. In 
some ‘closed’ blockchains, a central actor controls 
permission to enter the system and access the 
data, and could exert undue market power. The 
choice among these different tools must juggle 
data accessibility so that all users can enjoy the 
benefits of the tools and, simultaneously, manage 
the protection of confidential information, such as 
personal data. Inter-governmental organisations 
and governments require clear regulations on data 
protection to determine how data should be stored 
and shared between public and private actors (World 
Bank, 2019).
Most of today’s innovations in ICT for agri-food 
systems are based on access to the internet. 
Although more than half of the world population 
is now connected, network coverage is still missing 
or limited in most LI and LMI countries, currently 
hampering their development. This map shows 
estimates of the percentage of individuals who do 
not use the internet (data from ITU, map from Tripoli 
and Schmidhuber, 2018). In most African and Asian 
countries, more than half of the population is absent 
from the network. The main reasons are the uneven 
coverage, as well as the high cost of equipment and 
lack of required knowledge (A4AI, 2018). ●
BOX 13 
site-specific soil fertility management 
recommendations: general improvement but 
also widening of the gap between farmers1
In sub-Saharan Africa soil fertility recommendations given 
to farmers are usually generic enough to be able to target a 
large area. In the maize belt of Nigeria, an ICT-based system 
has been tested, which tailors advice to make it site-specific at 
the farm or field scale. Ex-ante and ex-post surveys have been 
conducted to evaluate how this technology was received by 
farmers. According to the ex-ante study, most farmers were very 
interested by this tool, irrespective of their economic resources 
and farming model. They recognised the heterogeneity in 
their farming system and the use they could make of tailored 
recommendations. However, the ex-post survey shows that 
actual adoption of the technology varies widely, as is classically 
found in studies on the use of agricultural innovations. 
The authors identified two groups of farmers. The first, 
which includes innovators and likely adopters of technology, 
are better-off, less sensitive to risk, more likely to invest in 
farm inputs and indifferent towards more-or-less intensive 
production techniques. The second group includes farmers 
with lower incomes, lower productive assets, who are more 
sensitive to yield variability and prefer less capital- and 
labour-intensive production techniques. They are also more 
reluctant to be early adopters of innovations. Therefore, the 
introduction of this new service tends to reinforce the existing 
gap in economic performance between farmers. Policies need 
to be designed to compensate for this effect, for instance by 
putting efforts into considering the specific needs of small-
scale, diversified farmers.
1. Based on Oyimbo et al., 2018.
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CONCLUSION 
OF SECTION 4
Too many inequalities and vulnerabilities already exist 
within food systems in LI and LMI countries. Global socio-
economic trends, whether they be rapid demographic 
growth, the expansion of upgrading in food chains, 
territorial imbalances, the increasingly acknowledged 
role of women and minorities or the emergence of new 
technologies, raise many questions on the future of 
food systems, most of them open-ended and leading 
to major uncertainties. There is a high risk of ending 
up with a massive increase in informal, vulnerable 
and extremely poor workers, especially young people, 
women and minorities. This will provide fertile 
ground for food crises, social unrest, civil conflicts and 
migrations. Food systems are therefore at a crossroads: 
shaping these trends through public and collective 
actions would transition food systems towards much-
needed inclusive development. 
In light of the massive increase in the working age 
population, it is likely that 730 million new jobs will 
have to be created in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030. The 
decent job creation potential of food systems will have 
to be fully harnessed: integrated strategies coupling 
education, training and capacity building with job 
opportunities within food systems will help subsistence 
smallholders become commercial smallholders, assist 
unskilled workers in becoming valuable employees and 
stimulate innovation capacity among stakeholders. 
Decent job creation will contribute to poverty alleviation 
and the reduction of inequality, both multi-dimensional 
and spatial. Social protection, in all its dimensions, could 
complement the benefits of decent job creation within 
food systems and all along the rural-urban continuum. 
Large unplanned urban growth, especially in Africa and 
South Asia, and underinvestment in intermediary cities 
reinforce historical imbalances. Spatial poverty traps 
undermine the food security of both urban (slums) and 
rural households (hinterlands). For food systems to grow 
and have leverage effects on the rest of the economy, 
spatially planned investments in infrastructure and 
essential service provision are required to make 
intermediary cities and their surrounding rural areas 
economically and socially attractive.
PUTTING FOOD SYSTEMS 
AT THE HEART OF ECONOMIES 
AND SOCIETIES
Thierry Giordano1 and Alexandre Hobeika2
1. CIRAD, UMR ART-DEV, F-34398 Montpellier, France; University 
of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
2. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; University 
of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France.
Trade-offs should be found to balance the roles and 
responsibilities of large-scale and family farming, 
industrial agribusinesses and small entrepreneurs, 
global, domestic and local actors, and youth, women and 
minorities in the expansion of food systems. Labour- 
and/or capital- intensive food system options should 
be properly assessed. Upgrading of value chains offers 
opportunities that too many small-scale stakeholders 
are currently unable to seize due to limited access to 
financial services (credit, insurance or savings), and 
when they participate, they barely end up better off 
as they lack bargaining power. New technologies are 
critical in the upgrading process all along value chains, 
but the risks of exclusion are real: skills development, 
access to knowledge and affordability are among the 
key elements public policies should promote. Exclusion 
is even more pronounced for women, youth and 
minorities, despite the critical role they play in food 
systems. Gender equality and women’s empowerment 
are critical factors for the expansion of food systems and 
inclusive development. Significant efforts are required 
to address the structural causes of gender inequality 
and ensure that women have access to and control 
productive resources such as assets, and agricultural 
and financial services, and to improve their capabilities 
and decision-making power. This would enhance their 
active participation in food system governance, policy 
and planning so they can benefit as equally as men.
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LIMITED FOOD AVAILABILITY
Éric Malézieux1 and Marc Corbeels2
Increase in food demand 
Although global food production has been increasing dramatically, 
the world still faces a persistent food security challenge. 
Currently, many consider that we are producing enough food to 
meet the dietary needs of today’s global population. However, 
food security is one of the major issues worldwide and is a much 
more serious problem in LI and LMI countries, where 821 million 
people still suffered from undernourishment in 2017 (FAO, 
2018). Most people who are not able to afford enough food live 
in Asia (515 million people were estimated to be undernourished 
in 2017) and in sub-Saharan Africa (256 million). The proportion 
of undernourished people remains highest in Africa, where 21 
percent of people are suffering from hunger (FAO, 2018). 
Looking to the future, population growth and climate change 
may exacerbate the situation, especially in Africa. Analysis of 
recent data confirms that the world’s population is likely to 
continue growing for the rest of the century. World population, 
now standing at 7.7 billion people, would reach 10 billion in 2050 
according to the UN’s medium variant, compared to 9 billion in 
the lowest scenario and up to 11 billion in the high variant. It 
would increase to between 9.6 billion and 12.3 billion in 2100 
(Gerland et al., 2014). This projection hides important differences 
between continents. The Asian population is likely to peak 
around the middle of the century and then begin to fall. 
The main reason for the increase in the projection of the world’s 
population is the growth in the population forecast for Africa, 
with at least a 3.5-fold increase. In these conditions, how can the 
world be fed in 2050? First, we have to consider that global food 
needs will necessarily increase to satisfy the growing population. 
Looking at different scenarios in the literature, Le Mouël and 
Forslund (2017) suggest the range of expectations for future 
food needs will be an increase of between 29 and 91 percent 
over the 2010-2050 period, depending on the  assumptions 
for population growth, economic growth and dietary changes. 
Hence, global food demand is expected to increase by 60 percent 
by 2050 compared with 2005/2007 (FAO, 2017), with the rise 
being much greater in sub-Saharan Africa.
The challenge of meeting the needs
Feeding the world in 2050 will be a challenge as we must 
consider that we shall face limits and barriers to increasing 
agricultural supply in order to meet these needs. Indeed, in 
addition to land degradation and the limits of land availability, 
scarcity of resources such as water and phosphorus (cf. Chapter 
3.1) and climate change will also determine the future conditions 
and constraints in food production (cf. Section 2). Despite 
S U M M A R Y
While food security is a major worldwide issue, it 
is a much more serious problem in Low-Income 
(LI) and Lower Middle-Income (LMI) countries. 
Currently, sub-Saharan Africa is the sub-continent 
with the highest proportion of undernourished 
people, the largest gap between current and po-
tential yields, and between cereal consumption 
and production. Looking to the future, population 
growth and climate change may worsen the si-
tuation, particularly in Africa. African countries are 
still facing rapid population growth with uncertain 
prospects about the ability of their agriculture to 
meet growing food demand. In addition, without 
sufficient adaptation measures, climate change 
will negatively impact food production in most 
African regions.
1. CIRAD, UPR HortSys, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of  Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, 
France.
2. CIRAD, UPR AIDA, Nairobi, Kenya; CIMMYT-ICRAF, 
Nairobi, Kenya; University of Montpellier, F-34090 
Montpellier, France.
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technological progress, maize, rice, wheat and 
soybean yields are stagnating or have even fallen in 
several world regions (Ray et al., 2012). The causes are 
various and complex. In some cases they are linked 
to socio-economic and institutional constraints, 
whether these concern input availability in Africa or 
the intensification of rotations in the USA to increase 
incomes. It may also be explained by reasons 
doomed to persist in the long term, such as reaching 
physical limits in Bangladesh and parts of India and 
Europe, or the limitation on nitrogen inputs due to 
environmental concerns in Europe. Without sufficient 
adaptation measures, climate change will negatively 
impact food production in many areas (Lobell et al., 
2009). In addition, most of the large negative impacts 
are projected to be in very vulnerable areas that 
are highly dependent on agriculture in LI and LMI 
countries. This means climate change is a serious 
threat to crop productivity in regions that are already 
food insecure. Furthermore, it is projected that 
the impacts of climate change on food security are 
significant, with millions of additional people at risk 
of hunger by 2050.
Food availability 
in sub-Saharan Africa 
Despite the importance of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
domestic market (Bricas, Tchamda and Mouton, 
2016), it is one of the sub-continents with the largest 
gap between current and potential yields (cf. Figure 
21 and Box 14) and between cereal consumption and 
production, with current levels of cereal consumption 
already dependent on substantial imports. As climate 
change will exacerbate yield variability, with extreme 
weather events causing production shortfalls, the 
risks to food security associated with this productivity 
gap and market instability will continue to grow. Van 
Ittersum et al. (2016) have shown that nearly complete 
closure of the gap between current yields and yield 
potential will be needed to maintain the current level 
of cereal self-sufficiency (approximately 80 percent) 
by 2050, which is an extreme and improbable 
objective. As a result, massive cropland expansion 
with attendant biodiversity losses and greenhouse 
gas emissions and/or vast import dependency can be 
expected.
Another important reason to increase food production 
in LI and LMI countries is to improve local economies 
in areas where numerous poor small farmers and 
landless workers depend on agriculture and often 
already suffer from malnutrition. Agriculture-led 
growth and agriculture-based solutions can make 
significant contributions to reducing undernutrition. 
According to the World Bank, agricultural productivity 
is fundamental for reducing poverty, sustaining the 
nutritional and health status of billions of people, 
ensuring food security and generating the resources 
required to access adequate care, health, water and 
sanitation services (World Bank, 2007). Because many 
poor and undernourished people are smallholder 
farmers, it is often assumed that diversifying 
production would improve dietary diversity within 
the household. 
However, interactions between poverty, agricultural 
production and food security are complex. For 
example, a paradoxical situation has been identified 
in the Sikasso region in Mali where substantial 
agricultural production was concomitant with 
widespread child malnutrition (Dury and Bocoum, 
2012). The authors have hypothesised that child 
malnutrition, reaching the highest level in this region, 
is linked to less diversified food consumption and 
probably to a lack of care, as a result of an overload 
of agricultural labour. Hence, the interactions 
between health, nutrition and agriculture are 
mutual: agriculture affects health and health affects 
agriculture, both positively and negatively. In the 
absence of conclusive links, both on-farm production 
and diversity, as well as access to markets, might 
matter for the diets of smallholder families (HLPE, 
2017). Indeed, diversification of production at the 
farm scale can be both a sustainable pathway to 
increase productivity and incomes, but also a means 
to improving the food nutrition of poor smallholders.
So, in countries with a high prevalence of 
undernourishment it is very important to ensure the 
sustainable intensification of agricultural production 
in order to increase productivity and resilience to 
climate events that affect access to food. Moreover, 
increasing the incomes of poor populations, 
improving rural infrastructure and promoting local 
systems that ensure access to safe, affordable and 
varied foods are critically important for improving 
diets and reducing malnutrition.
Towards new solutions 
By 2050, the world will face the challenge of producing 
enough food for a projected 9 to 11 billion people, 
while taking into consideration the impacts of climate 
change, the growing scarcity of water and land and a 
change in consumption patterns. Innovative systems 
are needed everywhere to increase productivity 
without compromising natural resources (FAO, 
2018). Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be the most 
vulnerable region since it has the highest  prevalence 
of undernourished people in the world (FAO 2017), 
national economies are highly dependent on 
agriculture (and food imports) and most farmers are 
poor and have a limited capacity to adapt. There is an 
urgent obligation to find new pathways to guarantee 
harmonious agricultural development in rural areas, 
which is a necessary condition for ensuring food 
security. With regards to food security, and despite the 
fact conventional and biotechnological approaches 
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Figure 21: Yield gaps (yield potential minus actual yields, t/ha harvested area) in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: van Ittersum et al., 2016. 
Rainfed maize (A), rainfed millet (B), rainfed sorghum (C), rainfed wheat (D), rainfed rice (E), irrigated rice (F).
still appear to produce higher yields (but with high 
impacts on natural resources), new agroecological 
pathways, including organic agriculture, could be 
more efficient in meeting this goal (Schoonbeek et al., 
2013; Andriamampianina et al., 2018). ●
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BOX 14 
yield gaps in sub-saharan africa
The yield gap (Yg) is the difference between potential yield (Yp, for irrigated crops) or water-limited yield (Yw, for rainfed crops) and 
actual yield (Ya), as found in farmers’ fields. Yg is based on Yp or Yw that can be simulated with crop growth models using optimal 
agronomic management as inputs (i.e. cultivar maturity, sowing date and planting density). 
A global yield gap analysis (Licker et al., 2010) has shown that for many crops, especially maize and rice, yield gaps are at their largest 
in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, actual rainfed maize yields during the period 2003-2012 ranged from 1.2 to 2.2 t/ha, which 
represents 15 to 27 percent of the water-limited yield potential (van Ittersum et al., 2016). For all rainfed crops, the largest gaps are 
found in the more favourable (higher rainfall) regions of the savannahs and cooler highlands of Ethiopia and the northern Zambia 
plain (cf. Figure 21). Increasing maize yields from the approximately 20 percent of yield potential in 2010 to 50 percent by 2050 would 
require a doubling of annual crop yield increases compared with past decades. Although it is possible to achieve accelerated yield gains 
with improved cultivars coupled with good agronomy, increased fertiliser use and modern pest management practices, it is generally 
agreed that this will require greater investment in research and development in order to tackle the socio-economic constraints (for 
example, access to capital, infrastructure and markets) that have prevented smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa from achieving higher 
yields.
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RISKS OF HIGHER FOOD PRICES 
ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
Thierry Brunelle1 and Patrice Dumas1
Will high prices be the ‘new normal’? 
Following the food price peaks at the turn of the 2010s, debates 
have emerged on what the ‘new normal’ will be for the long-term 
trends in agricultural prices. An optimistic view has argued that 
the long-term trend in food prices should remain downward 
(Baldos and Hertel, 2016). This argument is based on an analysis 
of the main determinants of agricultural supply and demand: 
population, per capita income, diet, climate change, agricultural 
productivity and biofuel production among others. According to 
Baldos and Hertel (2016), the deceleration of population growth 
to 2050 and its concentration in developing countries, where 
per capita food consumption is relatively low, should more than 
offset the effect of global growth in per capita income. Moreover, 
growth in agricultural productivity should not necessarily 
weaken because substantial margins for growth remain in many 
countries around the world (Foley et al., 2011), and the effects of 
climate change will be felt mainly after 2050 (Rosenzweig et al., 
2013). Finally, demand for biofuels, which has driven agricultural 
prices since 2000, is not expected to change significantly given 
the criticism of its environmental impact and the low price of 
fossil fuels. 
However, there are several risk factors to consider that may 
temper this optimism. First, the UN’s demographic projections 
have recently been revised upwards (cf. Chapters 1.3 and 5.1). 
Changes in animal product consumption could also outpace 
income-based projections. The uncertainties are important. 
Given current population levels, there is a potentially huge 
multiplicative effect of changes in diet per capita if the traditionally 
vegetarian population of South Asia, in particular India, adopt 
Western consumption patterns. There are also concerns about 
the potential for future productivity growth (cf. Chapter 5.1).
It is equally important to highlight the important correlation 
between agricultural prices and energy prices. Optimism 
about the evolution of agricultural prices is largely based on 
the assumption of moderate growth in energy prices. If energy 
prices were to increase, in particular because of the increased 
scarcity of fossil fuels, there is a risk of a spill-over effect through 
the price of inputs, particularly fertilisers whose production 
process is energy intensive (Brunelle et al., 2015), or through 
the demand for biofuels. Climate policies in line with the Paris 
agreement objectives could also lead to increased energy prices 
as some relatively cheaper conventional and unconventional 
fossil fuel sources would be left untouched in order to avoid 
climate change.
In recent years, international trade has played an important role 
in moderating agricultural prices, in particular in responding 
to isolated shocks in production (for example, France in 2016). 
S U M M A R Y
Agricultural commodity prices have increased 
since the early 2000s in response to a combination 
of causes on the demand side (demographic 
growth, increased animal product consumption 
in emerging countries and biofuel mandates) 
and on the supply side (the phasing out of 
agricultural policies subsidising food supply in the 
European Union and United States, lack of public 
investment in agriculture, reaching ceilings in 
cereal yields in already high-yield countries and an 
increase in energy prices). The succession of food 
crises between 2008 and 2012 has brought the 
agricultural price regime and its implications for 
food security back to the forefront. Even though 
the increase of average agricultural prices could 
profit some farmers, part of the price increase 
corresponds to increased costs and urban 
dwellers, as well as many food-insecure food 
producers, depend on the market for their supply. 
In addition, environmental policies concerning the 
protection of biodiversity, climate mitigation and 
pesticide reduction could make these issues even 
more acute.
1. CIRAD, UMR CIRED, F-34398 Montpellier, France.
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However, increased trade flows tend to polarise 
situations with some regions taking an increasing 
share of the world market, particularly South 
America, while others are increasingly dependent on 
imports, such as Africa and China (Kastner, Erb and 
Haberl, 2014). The geo-political context will be a key 
determinant of how countries cooperate to ensure 
the global food balance. The hypothesis of regional 
fragmentation leading to trade wars, as is currently 
the case with the soybean trade between the US 
and China, could profoundly change the long-term 
dynamics of agricultural prices.
Food prices under scenarios of 
stringent climate change mitigation 
and environmental preservation
Over the past few decades, low-cost food and 
plentiful production have been the main outcomes 
expected from food systems. If environmental issues 
now become a higher priority, there is a risk that food 
prices will rise on international markets in the coming 
decades.
The most ambitious climate change mitigation 
scenarios are largely based on the agriculture, 
forest and other land-use sector (AFOLU), because 
the mitigation potential, whether through reduced 
emissions or carbon sequestration, is large and the 
costs of abatement are low compared to other sectors 
(Krey et al., 2014). Such a mitigation strategy may have 
major implications for our food future as research 
shows that the introduction of a carbon tax on the 
AFOLU sectors could have greater consequences 
for food security than the impact of climate change 
itself by 2050 (Hasegawa et al., 2018). However, it is 
important to note that these conclusions are based 
on assumptions that are not favourable for food 
security since in most models carbon tax revenues 
are not properly redistributed to the people affected 
in the modelling framework.
In most scenarios, ambitious mitigation targets 
cannot be reached without negative emissions (Rogelj 
et al., 2018). Given the lack of known alternatives, 
land-based mitigation options are the preferred 
choice to remove carbon dioxide, emitted in 
particular by non-agricultural sectors: bioenergy with 
carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS), biochar, 
afforestation/reforestation and carbon storage in 
soils. The land footprint of such techniques can be 
large and contribute to a profound change in global 
food balances. According to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change Special Report on global 
warming of 1.5°C (Rogelj et al., 2018), trajectories 
to maintain the average temperature increase 
well below 2°C (1.9 W/m2) would require between 
100 Mha and 700 Mha of additional energy crop areas 
by 2050 and up to nearly 1,000 Mha of additional 
forest areas. These changes would be at the expense 
mainly of pastureland (up to -800 Mha) and cropland 
(up to -450 Mha), with consequent significant impacts 
on food production and on agricultural commodity 
prices, with increases from 50 percent to 100 percent 
in 2050 and 140 percent to 340 percent in 2100. To 
this day, the assessment of the effects on agricultural 
production and prices remains difficult. It depends 
on assumptions about the potential for productivity 
increases in the livestock and crop sectors, whose 
realism is difficult to assess. In any case, given the 
scale of land-use changes, such scenarios will imply 
major changes for food security and in production 
processes, with intensification trajectories that 
may be a risk or an opportunity for smallholder 
agriculture. 
Changes in agricultural production systems in 
line with objectives for environmental protection 
would lead to sparing natural land for biodiversity 
(cf. Conclusion of Section 3), avoiding monocultures 
and diversifying land use, reducing pesticide use and 
avoiding nutrient leaching. 
A move towards healthier diets could have 
substantial co-benefits on food supply. For example, 
the processes involved in the production of vegetable 
proteins are much less land-intensive than those 
of animal proteins and therefore put less pressure 
on food systems (Hallström, Carlsson-Kanyama and 
Börjesson, 2015). Concerns about pollution, health 
and nutritional quality could lead to a reduction in 
mineral fertiliser use, an increase in nutrient recycling, 
a decrease in pesticide use and more diversified 
plant production. Currently, organic agriculture is 
the main system with reduced pesticide use that is 
developed enough to be analysed quantitatively, 
though it requires more land (Muller et al., 2017) 
and is more expensive than conventional systems 
(Seufert and Ramankutty, 2017). The major increase 
in demand for organic agricultural products in 
developed countries is an obvious reflection of these 
concerns, but food quality is also a growing concern 
in developing countries (Ndungu, 2013).
Caught between reduced land use for food production 
as more land will be needed for nature preservation 
or bioenergy production, and adverse impacts 
on yields for various reasons (climatic, economic 
and progressive withdrawal from conventional 
agriculture), long-term agricultural prices could 
return to an upward trend, creating major issues of 
access to food for various populations. ●
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WHY FOOD PRICES ARE LIKELY 
TO BECOME MORE UNSTABLE
Franck Galtier1
Many food prices are already unstable, both on international 
and national markets. Since food products account for a large 
share of household expenditure in many low-income countries, 
especially the poorest ones, sharp price increases have a very 
negative impact on food and nutrition security. Some households 
need to reduce their food consumption level or diversity, 
causing possible calorie or nutrient deficiencies, with possibly 
irreversible effects, especially for young children (Glewwe, Jacoby 
and King, 2001). Equally, price collapses affect food production 
and investment: as farmers are facing a huge market risk, they 
are not willing to invest and banks or microfinance institutions 
are not willing to lend them money. Food price volatility is likely 
to increase in the future for the reasons explained below.
Increased vulnerability to shocks 
Food markets are already highly vulnerable to shocks. This is 
because there is no mechanism to guarantee that stock levels 
are adequate to absorb significant shocks in supply or demand. 
Stocks usually have a stabilising effect on prices because storers 
usually buy when prices are low (thereby reducing the quantity 
available on the market and exerting an upward pressure on the 
price) and sell when prices are high (thereby releasing quantities 
on the market and exerting a downward pressure on the price). 
This mechanism applies to both private storers and the food 
reserve agencies that manage public stocks. However, if stock 
levels are sometimes sufficient (after successive good harvests), 
they are sometimes too low, allowing for sharp price increases, 
as illustrated by the international grain markets (European 
Commission, 2018). 
The trends analysed in Chapter 5.2 are likely to increase the 
vulnerability of food markets. Some world regions, especially 
Africa, will become more dependent on food imports and 
therefore more vulnerable to trade shocks. We note here that 
WTO disciplines on export restrictions are extremely weak and 
export bans were enforced by many exporting countries during 
the 2008 crisis, thereby penalising countries which import rice 
and wheat. 
Increased supply shocks
Climate change
Although climate change impact studies have mainly focused 
on changes in mean climate, IPCC (2012) acknowledges the 
fact that “a changing climate leads to changes in the frequency, 
intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of weather and 
S U M M A R Y
Extreme food price volatility is extremely 
damaging to food and nutrition security. It is likely 
to increase in the future because: (i) food markets 
will probably become more vulnerable to shocks; 
(ii) supply shocks can be expected to increase 
because of climate change, emerging diseases 
and armed conflicts that could affect production 
and trade; (iii) demand shocks are predicted to rise 
due to the growing links between the food, energy 
and financial markets.
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
University of Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier,  France.
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climate extremes, and can result in unprecedented 
extremes.” Changes in extreme events have been 
observed since 1950. Further changes may occur 
in the future, although there is no certainty about 
this in the IPCC projections. Current knowledge 
on the impacts of increased climate variability and 
extreme events have been reviewed by Thornton et 
al. (2014). Temperature extremes are expected to 
reduce yields: “rice yields [would be] reduced by 90% 
with night temperatures of 32°C compared to 27°C,” 
[whereas] “in maize, each degree day spent above 30°C 
can reduce yield by 1.7% under drought conditions.” 
“High temperature extremes during grain filling can 
affect the protein content of wheat grain” (Thornton et 
al., 2014). Changes in rainfall variability or seasonal 
patterns (both droughts and floods) are the principal 
cause of inter-annual yield variability (cf. Section 2). 
The probable increase in the frequency of extreme 
climate events is likely to render food production 
more unstable, at least in some parts of the world, 
thereby increasing price instability on national and 
international markets.
Emerging diseases
Emerging infectious diseases are diseases whose 
incidence has increased in the past 20 years and 
could increase in the near future (cf. Chapter 2.4). 
Climate warming may contribute to boosting their 
development (for more details on this, see FAO 
2018). Emerging diseases can affect plants, animals 
and humans. They could lead to more unstable 
food prices by affecting production and trade. For 
example, it is estimated that by generating labour 
shortages, the Ebola virus disease outbreak that 
affected West Africa in 2014 led to reductions in rice 
production of 11.6 percent in Liberia, 8 percent in 
Sierra Leone and 3.7 percent in Guinea (FAO, 2016). In 
addition, it disrupted the local rice trade both within 
and between countries because of traders’ fears of 
harvesting rice in affected areas and government 
decisions to close markets and borders. This resulted 
in worse connections between surplus and deficit 
areas, leading to both increases and decreases in 
prices.   
Conflicts 
Armed conflicts are already a huge problem in 
some regions of the world, including the Sahel. The 
probability of future conflicts is likely to increase 
with the growth of climate-driven migration and 
rising pressure on resources such as land and water. 
Analysis of existing conflicts shows that they can affect 
food supply by reducing production, disrupting trade 
or causing stock theft or destruction (as occurred 
with jihadist movements in northern Mali). The way in 
which Boko Haram’s attacks affect agricultural market 
activity has been studied in 112 markets located in 
northern Nigeria and in 2,429 reported conflicts for 
the period July 2009 to November 2016 (Van Den 
Hoek, 2017). Conflicts have been found to reduce 
market activity even though less than 2 percent of 
them occurred at or near markets. 
Increased demand shocks
As food markets will be increasingly linked to energy 
and financial markets, food prices will increasingly be 
affected by the shocks that occur on these markets.
Growing links between energy and food markets
Because of methodological challenges, the many 
econometrical studies carried out show diverging 
results regarding whether the instability of energy 
prices is transmitted to food prices (for a review, 
see HLPE, 2013). However, the more comprehensive 
and reliable approach (based on estimating the 
‘break-even point’ for a given food product, i.e. the 
price level below which using it to produce biofuel 
is profitable) clearly shows that the price of maize is 
driven by its break-even point, which in turn depends 
on the dynamics of ethanol and natural gas prices 
(cf. Figure 22 and HLPE, 2013). This is not the case for 
vegetable oils because their price is higher than their 
break-even point. In the future, the role of energy 
prices as drivers for food prices is likely to increase 
because of the on-going development of biofuel 
production in many emerging countries (HLPE, 2013) 
and the likely increase in energy prices (cf. Chapter 
5.2). The price of food products not directly used to 
produce biofuels may also become more unstable 
because when there are sharp increases in energy 
prices, land and scarce inputs are likely to be diverted 
from food products to energy feedstock crops. 
Within a few decades, the phenomenon may go 
beyond energy. To solve the problems related 
to increasing pollution and emerging scarcity of 
resources, biomass will probably be increasingly 
used for materials, as had been the case since the 
beginning of human history until the industrial 
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resulted in a strong relationship 
between maize prices and energy prices. 
Source: HLPE, 2013.
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revolution of the nineteenth century (Daviron, 
forthcoming). This return to a ‘solar economy’ (an 
economy based mainly on renewable energies) is 
likely to link food prices to the prices of all their non-
food substitutes.
Growing links between financial and food markets 
Food markets are being progressively linked to 
financial markets because agricultural futures 
markets are increasingly used by speculators 
following market deregulation at the end of the 
Grain prices are already highly volatile in the Sahel region, 
causing huge food crises. In Sahel countries, poor households 
mainly consume coarse grains (millet, sorghum and local maize 
varieties), whose production is highly sensitive to natural hazards 
(mainly droughts and locust attacks). It is difficult to offset 
deficits with imports because these grains are not available on 
international markets and the grains available (rice and wheat) 
are much more expensive. Therefore, coarse grain prices spike 
when harvests are bad (they increased by 150 percent in 2005 
and 80 percent in 2012), provoking food crises and famines. 
Grain price volatility is expected to increase still further in the 
future for two reasons. The first is related to climate change. 
Over the past decade, “the Sahelian rainfall regime [has been] 
characterized by a lasting deficit of the number of rainy days, while at 
the same time the extreme rainfall occurrence is on the rise” (Panthou 
et al., 2014). This more extreme climate is likely to increase the 
instability of food production. In addition, the seasonal pattern 
of rainfall has evolved: peak rainfall has shifted from late August 
(before the 1970s) to mid-August, therefore increasing the 
risk of water stress at the end of the millet production cycle. 
Projections for the late twenty-first century “reveal an extension 
of torrid climates throughout West Africa. In addition, the Sahel, 
predominantly semi-arid in present-day conditions, is projected to 
face moderately persistent future arid climate. […] Consequently, 
West Africa evolves towards increasingly torrid, arid and semi-arid 
regimes with the recession of moist and wet zones mostly because 
of the temperature forcing, although precipitation can be locally an 
important factor. […] Such changes point towards an increased risk 
of water stress for managed and unmanaged ecosystems” (Sylla et 
al., 2016). These developments may have a very strong impact as 
Sahelian countries are often ranked among the countries most 
vulnerable to climate change. For example,  Chad had the world’s 
highest Climate Change Vulnerability Index in 2016 and Niger the 
third highest. 
Another source of increased food price instability is the expected 
increase in the frequency and magnitude of conflicts. Armed 
conflicts are already a problem in the region, with the insecurity 
generated by jihadist or separatist movements disrupting 
production, trade and income (Van Den Hoek, 2017). The situation 
may worsen in the future because the likelihood of conflicts 
will rise with climate-driven migration. This kind of migration is 
already a reality (more than 500,000 people were displaced in 
Niger because of floods in 2012) and is likely to increase in the 
future (in terms of both people and distance). Another source of 
concern is related to the increasing pressure on land and water. 
This is a worldwide issue, but is likely to be particularly acute in 
the Sahel region due to the significant population growth that will 
occur over the coming decades.
twentieth century. Indeed, the proportion of contracts 
held by speculators jumped from 23 percent in 1998 
to 69 percent in 2008 (Masters and White, 2008). 
Although the responsibility of excessive speculation 
in the 2008 food price boom is controversial (Masters 
and White, 2008; Sanders et al., 2008), the growing 
nexus between financial and food markets is likely to 
foster an increasing transmission of the instability of 
financial markets to food prices. ●
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NUTRITIONAL RISKS OF UNHEALTHY DIETS
Sandrine Dury1 and Yves Martin-Prével2
Malnutrition in all its forms: 
current situation is alarming 
Currently, one in three people in the world is affected by at least 
one type of malnutrition and, if no action is rapidly taken, this 
could become one in two by 2025 (Glopan, 2016). Malnutrition 
is a multifaceted, truly universal problem. The number of 
undernourished people has again been growing since 2015 
and has now reached 820 million people (FAO et al., 2018). 
There are also 151 million under-five children whose stunted 
growth compromises the achievement of their full physical, 
intellectual and health potential and 51 million whose life is 
threatened by wasting. Anaemia in women is on the increase at 
the global scale (FAO et al., 2018); more than 500 million women 
of reproductive age suffered with anaemia in 2011 (Stevens 
et al., 2013). In addition, around 2 billion people suffer from 
micronutrient deficiencies. Simultaneously, around 2 billion 
adults are overweight, among which 670 million are obese. 
The world obesity epidemic continues to grow and to date no 
country has reversed this trend (Roberto et al., 2015). Overweight 
even starts at a young age as 38 million under-five children are 
overweight. This category of malnutrition contributes to the rise 
in non-communicable diseases (NCD) such as type 2 diabetes, 
hypertension, heart disease, strokes and some cancers.
While every country in the world faces at least one serious form of 
malnutrition, most countries face several nutritional challenges. 
The coexistence of persisting undernutrition and growing 
obesity and diet-related chronic diseases is a consequence of a 
rapid nutrition transition occurring in Low-Income (LI) and Lower 
Middle-Income (LMI) countries, leading to a double burden that 
is a complex issue to tackle for underequipped national health 
systems. There is even a triple burden in many countries, with 
deficiencies in some essential micronutrients added to the mix 
(cf. Map 11). Of the 141 countries with consistent data on three 
forms of malnutrition - childhood stunting, anaemia in women 
of reproductive age and overweight among women - 88 percent 
experience a high level of at least two types of malnutrition, with 
29 percent experiencing high levels of all three. Most of these 
countries are in Africa. Coexisting burdens bear down on millions 
of children, with 16 million children affected by both wasting and 
stunting, which increases the risk of child mortality, and 8 million 
children are affected by stunting and overweight (Development 
Initiatives, 2018).
There has been some progress in reducing malnutrition, but it 
has been too slow and not spread across all its forms meaning 
that projections for the next 20 years are threatening. The 
prevalence of overweight, obesity and diet-related NCD such as 
diabetes are increasing in all regions and most rapidly in LI and 
S U M M A R Y
Currently, one in three people in the world is 
affected by at least one type of malnutrition and, 
if no action is rapidly taken, this could become one 
in two by 2025. Different types of malnutrition 
coexist in almost every country, causing severe 
consequences in terms of human health and 
economic losses: 45 percent of the mortality in 
under-five children is linked to undernutrition 
and globally malnutrition in all its forms costs US$ 
3.5 trillion per year. Inadequate diets are a major 
cause of malnutrition and access to healthy diets 
for all would save 11 million lives per year.
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
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LMI countries. For example, for sub-Saharan African 
men, the growth rate of overweight and obesity 
now exceeds that for underweight and projections 
of these indicators suggest the situation is going to 
get much worse by 2030 (NCD-RisC, 2016). In 2017, 
there were 425 million adults with diabetes in the 
world, four in five living in LI and LMI countries. The 
projection is that 630 million adults in the world will 
be affected by diabetes by 2045 (IDF, 2017). Obesity 
contributes to an increase in chronic NCD, including 
diabetes and hypertension, which is why the World 
Health Organization is calling on countries to phase 
out artificial trans fats by 20233. 
Consequences of malnutrition 
are huge
The consequences of undernutrition are severe as 
it is linked to 45 percent of the mortality in children 
under the age of five (Black et al., 2013). In addition 
to affecting survival, undernutrition in childhood 
affects growth, development, health and educational 
and economic outcomes. It has lasting effects on 
following generations, hampering the human capital 
of countries and is a risk factor for overweight and 
NCD in later life (Branca et al., 2019). 
NCD were responsible for 41 million deaths (71 
percent of all deaths) in 2016 (Branca et al., 2019). 
Approximately 4 million people aged between 20 and 
79 died from diabetes in 2017. Diabetes accounted 
for 11 percent of the global all-cause mortality 
among people in this age group. This is higher than 
the combined number of deaths from infectious 
diseases. In Africa, 77 percent of all deaths due to 
diabetes occurred before the age of 60 (IDF, 2017).
The economic consequences of undernutrition 
represent losses in gross domestic product (GDP) 
ranging from 3 percent to 16 percent in various 
African countries. Conversely, investment in stunting 
reduction would generate a benefit-cost ratio of 
16:1 across 40 LI and LMI countries (Hoddinott, 
2016). Estimates of the economic consequences of 
nutrition-related NCD are also large. Globally, in 2014 
the total economic impact of obesity was about US 
$2 trillion (Dobbs et al., 2014). 
Inadequate diets are the major 
drivers of all forms of malnutrition
All forms of malnutrition have several drivers, 
including non-food related causes, but inadequate 
diets are common to all of them. The last global study 
estimated that a change towards healthy diets would 
save 11 million deaths per year (Willett et al., 2019).
Food production has benefitted from massive 
progress and change over the past century. Hunger 
(insufficient caloric intake) and undernutrition are no 
Map 11: Malnutrition burden across countries. 
Data source: Development Initiative, 2018 Globalnutritionreport.org.
3. The New York Times. Page A20 of the New York edition with the headline: Making Trans Fats History. May 14, 2014
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longer a problem of supply but a question of uneven 
distribution at the global or local levels. The average 
global food supply reached 2,904 kcal/cap/day in 
2015-17, compared to 2,196 kcal/cap/day in 1961. 
Despite this steady rise, progress in universal access 
to food is still too low: today there are still 820 million 
people who lack access to the minimum caloric intake 
needed to maintain a productive life. Most people 
suffering from undernourishment are the rural poor 
and live in South-East Asia, although the prevalence of 
undernourishment remains highest in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Simultaneous to progress in food production, LI and 
LMI countries have witnessed an unprecedented 
demographic transition, which was at the origin of 
the speedy nutritional transition in the global South 
(Popkin, 2006). Economic development, globalisation 
of trade and urbanisation, along with a decrease in 
the relative price of many foods, first helped improve 
access to higher quantities and diversity of food. 
However, today increased production of processed 
food, aggressive marketing and changing lifestyles 
have led to a shift in dietary patterns. 
With urbanisation and economic development, 
demand is growing for more processed and 
convenient food, street food and fast food. Many 
people in LI and LMI countries have access to cheap 
and empty calories, particularly in the form of ultra-
processed food, while the availability and affordability 
of nutrient-rich food is too low. Many processed 
products contain high levels of added sugar, salt, fat 
and other additives that could lead to NCD and death 
if consumed in large quantities. Taken together, the 
consumption of both healthy and unhealthy food 
items increased between 1990 and 2010, but the 
latter outpaced the former in most regions (Imamura 
et al., 2015). 
Beyond this threatening global picture, local diets 
and trends vary considerably across countries. For 
example, the consumption of sugar-sweetened 
beverages exceeds 400 g/cap/day in Latin America, 
followed closely by North America. This is in contrast 
to East Asia, where intakes are ten-fold lower (~40 
g/cap/day). In America and Europe, consumption of 
red meat is excessive in terms of both the health and 
environmental impact. It is associated with increased 
risk of type 2 diabetes and coronary heart diseases. 
At the same time, sub-Saharan African consumers do 
not eat enough animal-sourced foods (Willett et al., 
2019). 
These contrasting dietary and malnutrition patterns 
make it complicated to design simple and universal 
policies, especially when considering countries 
that have recently struggled to combat hunger 
and undernutrition and whose food systems are 
transitioning. However, there is a renewed and solid 
consensus for promoting multi-sectoral integrated 
approaches for transforming food systems, targeting 
the promotion of healthy food environments, 
including physical and economic access to healthy 
food items. ●
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FOOD SAFETY RISKS
Muriel Figuié1
The heavy burden of food safety 
Food safety is a major issue for LI and LMI countries. Unsafe 
food can be defined as food containing harmful microorganisms 
(bacteria, viruses, parasites etc.) or harmful amounts or 
combinations of substances (cyanide, aflatoxin, melamine etc.). It 
causes diseases ranging from diarrhoea to various cancers. It is a 
major issue in Africa and more broadly in LI and LMI countries (cf. 
Map 12). According to the WHO (2015), an estimated 91 million 
people fall ill every year in Africa after eating contaminated 
food (600 million worldwide), and 137,000 people die (420,000 
worldwide). In Africa, this death toll is mostly related to bacterial 
contamination and mainly affects children under the age of five. 
Data is lacking to track the trend of this burden in LI and LMI 
countries. We have known about some of these risks for 
decades, such as aflatoxin contamination (26,000 people living 
south of the Sahara die annually of liver cancer associated with 
aflatoxin exposure), but remain a major challenge (Unnevehr 
and Grace, 2013). Most likely, the burden of many of these 
risks will increase in the future. First, because exposure to 
food-related risks might rise. Foodborne outbreaks are mainly 
related to the consumption of animal products and fresh fruit 
and vegetables, the consumption of which is increasing as 
part of the dynamics of food transitions in urban settings, and 
simultaneously supply chains are getting longer. Furthermore, 
the uncontrolled industrialisation of food systems could 
increase the number and scale of the risk of contamination with 
potentially toxic substances (agrochemicals, food additives etc.). 
Second, vulnerability to foodborne diseases could increase with 
the development of antimicrobial resistance, whose impact is 
expected to be greatest in Africa (O’Neil, 2014).
Moreover, as shown with the problem of mycotoxins, unsafe food 
not only poses significant public health risks, but also contributes 
to major food losses (and consequently impacts food insecurity) 
and creates barriers to trade in agricultural commodities.
Managing food safety requires 
the involvement of all actors 
in the food chain
While a large proportion of this burden is related to general 
hygiene issues, including at the domestic level, other food system 
segments also have a large degree of responsibility. Different 
surveys quoted by Grace (2015) show that in LI and LMI countries 
a large amount of marketed foods do not meet the standards for 
common hazards. For example, only 6 percent of pork samples 
tested in Nagaland state (India) complied with standards. 
S U M M A R Y
Foodborne diseases are responsible for 420,000 
deaths each year, one-third of them in Africa. 
Food safety issues are usually attributed to 
traditional food systems, but the development 
of modern food systems in low-income (LI) and 
lower middle-income (LMI) countries brings with 
it new risks. The setting of private standards can 
counterbalance the poor capacity of States to 
enforce safety regulations, but can also contribute 
to a dual system that concentrates the flow of 
unsafe products on the most vulnerable section 
of the population. Unsafe food not only poses 
significant public health risks but also contributes 
to large food losses and insecurity, and creates 
barriers to trade. Dealing with it requires a multi-
sectoral approach.
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
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Similarly, only 2 percent of meat samples in the city of 
Ibadan (Nigeria) complied with standards and none 
of the milk samples in Assam state (India) did so. 
However, these hazards do not necessarily translate 
into risk because consumers in LI and LMI countries 
often use domestic risk mitigation practices that can 
be sufficient to deal with microbiological risks, such 
as boiling milk (Roesel et al., 2015). However, with the 
development of processed foods and consumption 
outside the home, consumers’ mitigation capacities 
lose efficacy (Bricas, Tchamda and Mouton, 2016) 
and are not adapted to the new kinds of ‘industrial’ 
risks that they have to face (for example, hormone 
residues in meat). The management of these new 
risks requires governmental control, oversight and 
enforcement.
However, public authorities in most LI and LMI 
countries have little capacity to set up and enforce 
safety standards. This context encourages the 
lack of compliance with food standards among 
stakeholders in food systems. The capacity to 
implement surveillance of foodborne outbreaks is 
also limited. As an example, the assessment by the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) of the 
performance of national veterinary services (based 
on the Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway 
(PVS) tool) indicates a lack of capacity in enforcing 
legislation in most LI and LMI2.
The lack of efficient public food safety authorities 
in many LI and LMI countries is an opportunity for 
the development of private guarantees aimed at 
high-income populations. These guarantees rely 
on brands (often in relation with Western imported 
products) and/or a distributor, such as supermarkets. 
Market incentives, through export value chains and 
high-income consumers, contribute to a duality 
in safety standards. While these private initiatives 
can contribute to the development of safe supply 
chains, they may also contribute to a concentration 
of the flow of unsafe products to the most vulnerable 
section of the population, one that cannot access high 
value-added chains and has less access to hygiene 
and health services. This development signals the 
difficulty of many LI and LMIC countries in assuming 
one of the sovereign functions of the State: ensuring 
the safety of its population. 
Improving food safety as a public health issue requires 
the involvement and coordination of a large range of 
stakeholders. Commonly, food chain stakeholders are 
insufficiently trained and organised to contribute to 
the implementation of the collective action required 
to improve food safety (for example, the adoption of 
good practice guidelines). Consumers’ associations 
are also too weak to protect consumers’ rights to safe 
food and mainly focus their efforts on food prices.
Industrialisation and the lengthening 
of food chains pose new challenges 
in a context of weak regulatory 
authorities
As mentioned above, industrialisation and 
the lengthening of food chains multiplies the 
intermediaries and can contribute to an increase in 
fraud and contamination. For example, fresh milk 
contamination tends to increase from farms to 
retail shops, as shown by Yobouet et al. (2015) in the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire. The industrialisation of food 
systems, from production to distribution, brings ‘new’ 
risks such as chemical hazards related to the growing 
and often uncontrolled use of pesticides, veterinary 
drugs and food additives, whose full impact on public 
health may only be visible and measured in the 
long term (Figuié et al., 2019). Moreover, industrial 
food systems generate large amounts of waste and 
food packaging that contributes to environmental 
pollution and impacts public health. Additionally, 
the weak capacity for controlling food safety at the 
national level in LI and LMI countries encourages 
imports of low-quality industrialised products from 
the international market.
Because of the growing speed and range of food 
distribution, hazards and their related risks can 
provoke large-scale outbreaks. For example, in 2018 
processed meat from a South African food factory 
was the source of more than 1,050 illnesses and 
in excess of 200 deaths, with possible spread in 
neighbouring countries3. 
Large-scale food safety crises can also result 
in systemic crises, since they generate distrust 
towards actors in the entire food supply chain and, 
more broadly, towards authorities, with potentially 
important political and economic consequences. For 
example, the 2008 milk scandal in China revealed 
broad and fraudulent use of a harmful additive, 
melamine, in the milk industry. The incident was 
not only a major event in terms of health, with more 
than 300,000 victims in China, but it also revealed 
the corruption of many politicians and damaged the 
reputation of China’s food exports.
This background of distrust is a breeding ground for 
rumours, such as the one related to fake Chinese rice 
2. http://www.oie.int/en/solidarity/pvs-pathway/
3. https://www.foodpoisonjournal.com/?s=africa
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(FAO and WHO, 2018) in Africa. In December 2016, 
it was reported in the Nigerian media that customs 
officials had seized 2.5 tonnes of plastic rice. Such 
‘revelations’ continue to make regular headlines even 
though no instances of ‘fake’ or ‘plastic’ rice have been 
substantiated by national authorities’ investigations.
Conclusion
Stakeholders in food chains in many LI and LMI 
countries face constraints in matching the ongoing 
transformations in food systems with their associated 
risks. Most projects to improve food safety focus on 
supporting high-quality value chains (for example, 
targeting export markets or high-income consumers) 
(Alonso, 2019). The development of some specific high-
quality and high-value chains may have a ripple effect 
on the quality of the whole market chain. However, it 
can also have a competitive effect, concentrating the 
distribution of poor-quality products to the poorest; 
the results are highly dependent on the economic 
context and commodities (Moustier, Anh and Figuié, 
2003). But, as health is a public good and food safety 
Map 12: WHO estimates of the global burden of foodborne diseases. 
Source: World Health Organization Map Production: Foodborne Disease Burden Epidemiology Reference Group (FERG), 
World Health Organization, 2015.
Hazards include diarrheal disease agents and invasive infectious disease agents (viruses, bacteria, protozoa), Helminths 
(cestodes, nematodes, trematodes), chemicals and toxins (cassava cyanide, dioxin, aflatoxin).
is not only a quality attribute, supporting the capacity 
of States to ensure the food safety quality of low-
cost food available to the poorest must be a priority. 
Obsolete, ineffective or simply missing food safety 
standards, combined with a lack of enforcement, are 
key to this issue. And as value chains need time to 
adapt, establishing modern food safety standards 
and their enforcement needs to be done in a gradual 
and measured way in order to avoid an immediate 
food security issue. As with other challenging global 
health issues (for example, transboundary infectious 
diseases, antimicrobial resistance, environmental 
contamination etc.), dealing with food safety 
requires an inclusive and adaptive approach, which 
is multidisciplinary and trans-sectoral (health, 
agriculture, environment and trade), as suggested by 
the One Health approach. ●
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The improvement in agricultural production observed in 
Vietnam over the past 20 years has relied on an intensification 
of production, particularly through the increased use of chemical 
inputs (fertilisers, pesticides etc.). Food processing has also 
been industrialised, alongside the retail sector (through the 
development of supermarkets). 
Food security has greatly improved but new food safety issues 
are emerging. The modernisation process in the Vietnamese 
food system operates in a context where authorities lack the 
capacity to properly monitor the sector. Checks are scarce and 
when they exist there is a low level of trust given the frequency 
of misleading information. Due to the lack of official monitoring 
and information, the media are the main source of information 
for consumers. 
Indeed, local media regularly reports cases of mass poisoning. 
Examples of fraud, such as reconstituted powdered milk sold 
as fresh milk and, more dramatically, imported milk from China 
adulterated with melamine in 2008, are numerous. Moreover, 
social media is developing thanks to increased internet access 
and contributes not only to providing information to consumers
but also acts as an amplifier of crises and contributes to the 
spread of rumours (for example, artificial eggs from China sold 
on the markets).
This context contributes to a growing food anxiety among 
consumers, mainly related to the presence of chemical residues: 
pesticides in vegetables, hormones in meat, preservatives 
in processed food etc. The safety of apples has been a recent 
topic of concern to Vietnamese consumers. In 2012, the media 
reported that Chinese farmers from Yantai had coated bags for 
apples with prohibited toxic pesticides (Tuzet and Asomate) and 
arsenical fungicide. China is the principal source of apple imports 
in Vietnam and Vietnamese consumption of Chinese apples 
has been deeply affected by this revelation. Media headlined 
the issue of ‘toxic apples’ and ‘toxic Chinese fruits’. Despite the 
problem being localised to one Chinese province, it affected 
trust in all apples, all fruit and then all products imported from 
China. This distrust remained even after the announcement 
that the company which had disseminated the toxic bags had 
been sanctioned. Consequently, Vietnamese imports of Chinese 
apples halved between 2009 and 2013.
1. Based on Figuié et al., 2019
BOX 16 
food safety and consumer anxiety in vietnam1
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CONCLUSION 
OF SECTION 5
There is a contrast in food and nutrition security issues 
between the global and local levels. At a global level, 
production of most food products has increased faster 
than population growth and now exceeds the nutritional 
caloric average requirements. Today, the average 
consumption of animal products, sugar, fat products 
and ultra-processed foods are far too high, leading to 
several global pandemics (obesity, diabetes, cancers 
etc.) (cf. Chapter 5.4). At the same time, important food 
shortage threats exist at local levels, especially in Africa, 
and many new food safety problems have emerged in 
LI and LMI countries due to the rapid industrialisation 
of food systems, increasing consumption of animal 
products and poor regulation capacity (cf. Chapter 5.5). 
No single and simple solution exists, and the 
contributions in this section shed light on the 
complexity of possible answers, especially with regards 
to production and marketing. 
Solutions based mostly on trade are not desirable since 
relying on the international market to import food on 
a regular basis or during specific events will become 
increasingly risky. On the one hand, increasing climatic 
shocks, together with erratic national decisions (do 
not forget the numerous export bans during the 2008 
crisis), are likely to make international staple food 
markets more unstable (cf. Chapter 5.3). On the other, 
there is a serious possibility that international food 
price trends will rise compared to their level before the 
2008 food price crises (cf. Chapter 5.2).
Instabilities in food supply and food prices are also 
locally driven. They have serious consequences for poor 
consumers for whom food accounts for a large share of 
total household expenditure. To smooth food supplies 
and reduce price variations, more investments could 
be steered towards physical investments in LI and LMI 
countries, such as transport and storage infrastructure, 
and market regulation policies. 
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In LI countries, and more specifically in Africa, there is an 
obvious need to reduce the yield gap and improve the 
productivity of cropland. But health, natural resources 
and climate issues mean conventional intensification 
is questionable. Agroecological intensification is 
therefore considered as a possible pathway (cf. Chapter 
5.1). However, the issue is controversial since the 
productivity of agroecological agriculture is deemed to 
be low and may lead to an expansion of cultivated land 
at the expense of tropical forests (cf. Chapter 5.2). 
Technology may contribute to meeting the growing 
demand in an increasingly risky context if it is able 
to reduce production sensitivity to natural hazards 
(climate shocks, pests and diseases), lags in production, 
and transport and storage costs. Research can help the 
required technologies to emerge, but a significant level 
of investment would also be necessary. In both cases, 
supportive policies will be required. 
However, tailoring food supply to meet the needs of a 
highly diverse and changing demand is only one side 
of the coin. On the other are public policies, which will 
need to contribute to driving consumption towards 
more sustainable and healthy diets.
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●	 FOOD SYSTEMS’ ROLES: FROM FOOD PRODUCTION 
 TO MULTI-PURPOSE
Until recently, food systems have been evaluated based on their capacity to ensure sufficient safe food to 
meet consumer food demand. At first, the main challenge for agriculture and food policy was to feed a growing 
population. This meant the priority was to increase agricultural production. The environmental, health and 
social equity effects of production, processing, trade and consumption patterns were considered externalities, 
side effects that were not included in performance measurement. In fact, over the past century and until now, 
food production has grown strongly almost everywhere in the world. Food availability has even outpaced 
the growth in the world’s population. Food has diversified, product quality has improved and ‘caloric’ food 
insecurity has decreased, though it can still be considered too high. The planet now produces more than its 
nutritional needs. These findings could suggest that these ongoing trends will help to eliminate what has been 
known as “the world’s hunger” since the 1950s.
When other food systems outcomes are considered, alongside the risks threatening these systems, three 
phenomena are challenging this highly optimistic projection:
• First, the future of food production is threatened by both overexploitation or depletion of resources, 
environmental degradation, climate change and the poverty which is still found in many rural areas. Not all of 
these threats are exogenous to food systems. Some development models generate or increase these threats. 
In contrast, other models contribute or can contribute to maintaining biodiversity, capturing carbon and 
managing resources more sustainably. Environmental effects can no longer be considered as an externality of 
food systems but have become one of its purposes.
• The second phenomenon is longstanding and was first revealed by Amartya Sen: food insecurity is more a 
question of access than availability. The challenge of food security is therefore not only to produce enough 
food but to make it accessible to all, which means combatting poverty and inequality. Again, food systems can 
make a significant contribution to this objective through price and income stability where stocks (savings and 
capital, food reserves and seed banks) can play an important role. They can also contribute through income 
creation. In countries where the rural population is predominant and continues to grow, these systems can 
play a significant role in facilitating access to food. To this end, development models for food systems should 
focus on job creation. They must not only create added value but, crucially, ensure it is redistributed more 
equitably among value chain actors, and governance models must enable the most vulnerable to better 
defend their interests. And it is on these economic and social functions that food system interventions must 
be designed and evaluated.
• The third phenomenon is nutritional transition. Although far from being eliminated, nutritional deficiencies 
are now coupled with excessive malnutrition and new safety risks. Again, depending on the development 
model, which may or may not promote sustainable, diversified and healthy diets, food systems can contribute 
to worsening or reducing their effects on nutrition, health and well-being and therefore a country’s economic 
situation. 
So, beyond their initial purpose of qualitative food production, food systems must also be assessed on their 
role in creating jobs, stabilising livelihoods, reducing inequality between stakeholders and between territories, 
and preserving and improving environmental integrity. The challenge is not only to reduce threats to the 
future of food production. The challenge is to contribute more broadly to the Sustainable Development Goals, 
including goals that do not directly address the issue of food security. It is about contributing more broadly to 
building a sustainable planet in the longer term. Assigning this plurality of purposes to food systems, as has 
been done with the concept of multifunctional agriculture, leads to a complete rethinking of them, a better 
understanding of the interconnections between their outcomes and an assessment of them across a plurality 
of criteria and not only their productive capacity. The way their performance and efficiency are measured must 
be completely revised.
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●	 A COMBINATION OF RISKS
The steady reduction in undernutrition observed since the 1960s seems to have stalled or even gone into 
reverse since 2015. The number of undernourished people is increasing, both in quantity and in proportion 
to the world’s population. Is this recent evolution accidental or does it mark the beginning of a new era? It 
is a difficult question to answer, but a number of findings presented in this report are worrying. They reveal 
that some regions of the world are now subject to a combination of risks of different kinds resulting from 
climate change, land degradation, collapse in biodiversity, pollution, resource depletion, epidemics, non-
communicable diseases driven by unhealthy diets, new health risks, conflicts and civil insecurity, etc. Trend 
predictions and their consequences for food systems demonstrate a superposition and multiplication of risks 
in certain parts of the world, especially in LI and LMI countries. These combinations of risks are relatively new. 
Some authors emphasise the relationships between droughts, climate change, displacement and conflict 
(Raleigh, Choi and Kniveton, 2015; Burrows and Kinney, 2016). Others underline the common causes of these 
risks (Mason and Lang, 2017). Such accumulations of risks bring the world into an unknown period, with 
levels of uncertainty that raise fears of new food crises. They invite us to go beyond sectorial approaches to 
risk (climate, demographics, pollution, resources, etc.). Risks cannot be analysed and addressed in isolation. 
Rather, a systemic approach (cf. Figure 23) is urgently needed. This may explore the effects of interactions 
between risks, particularly their synergistic effects, and take into account feedback effects, spillovers, tipping 
points and the irreversibility of vicious circles.
On the one hand, such an approach should seek to avoid crises, for example, by reducing the pace of negative 
drivers or by stabilising the environment. On the other hand, it should lead to developing resilience trajectories 
that make it possible to resist and recover from unavoidable
Dealing with risk: the need for a better assessment of resilience factors
While this study has focused on risks, further work is needed on the resilience factors in food systems, in all 
their components and functionalities. All societies, organisations and human communities have a greater or 
lesser ability to cope with unexpected events, to adapt and to transform. They have human, social, economic 
and diversified resources (knowledge and skills, stocks and capital, etc.) that can be mobilised to deal with 
shocks. People can more or less easily change their production methods or consumption patterns, migrate 
and share risk through solidarity systems, etc. Depending on the way they produce, exchange and consume, 
food systems themselves can more or less adapt to situations of instability or crisis. Assessing the risks in each 
situation is not enough. It is also necessary to be able to assess the resilience factors in societies and their food 
systems. However, paying more attention to resilience does not mean giving up on ways of mitigating risks. In 
its most comprehensive sense, resilience also includes the ability of societies to mitigate risks.
Assessing risks and resilience factors on a case-by-case basis
In some cases, a territorial scale analysis may be relevant. Within large countries, the risk mix can vary 
significantly from one region to another and between rural and urban areas. Moreover, it is at the territorial 
level that risk management practices and innovations implemented by stakeholders to change food systems 
can be identified. Recognising these capacities, evaluating their performance, identifying the obstacles to their 
wider implementation and supporting the development of these capacities requires a break in the way food 
risks are managed. To take into account the specific combinations of risk factors particular to each territory, 
universal solutions for a single purpose are of little interest. Such solutions are often promoted by a few large 
powerful actors with an economic or political vested interest. These actors tend to marginalise local actors, to 
neglect the capacities of the latter to mobilise their resources and invent their own solutions, often combining 
solutions from other territories and adapting them to local contexts. One of the ways to manage risks in food 
systems is therefore to also reconsider their governance. The challenge is to reconfigure the balance of power, 
giving more weight to those who suffer most from food insecurity and not to those who seek to benefit from it.
The potential severity of the combinations of risk to which LIC and LMIC food systems are exposed requires 
a change in their transformation pattern. It is not a question of replacing one model with another but rather 
of envisioning, with all the actors in the territories, a diversity of transformation trajectories built on new 
performance criteria that integrate concerns about food security, environmental integrity, job and income 
generation and the reduction of inequalities.
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Figure 23: Food system drivers combine and generate cumulative risks.
Source: Authors.
Map 13: Schematic overview of risks associated with main agricultural production systems.
Source FAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department (fishery and aquaculture statistics).
●	TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 
 FOR ASSESSING AND TRANSFORMING LOCAL 
 FOOD SYSTEMS
Just as food systems face locally specific combinations of risks, they also have to meet locally specific objectives 
of food security and nutrition, decent job creation and inequality reduction, as well as environmental integrity. 
Faced with high level of uncertainties, food system actors have to anticipate. First and above all, this calls for the 
cooperation of key political, economic, and social actors to be fully invested in the codesign of the assessment 
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and future options. This calls also for the development of operational and forward-looking methods for 
diagnosing food systems, which fully integrate food systems’ long-term contribution to environmental and 
socio-economic outcomes. Based on this analysis, this food system diagnosis framework must meet a set of 
indispensable requirements: it must be systemic (and not value chain centred) to embrace the locally specific 
features and combination of risks food systems face; applicable at different scales depending on inner features 
of food systems; dynamic to unravel past evolutions and imagine future scenarios and their main drivers; and 
operational to identify the potential policies, projects and programmes – and the critical stakeholders – which 
could radically transform food systems in the future. Such a diagnosis framework does not yet exist, but is 
urgently needed.
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N E W  T R E N D S  A N D  C H A L L E N G E S
FOOD SYSTEMS AT RISK
The way food systems have evolved over past decades means that they now face 
major risks, which in turn threaten the future of food systems themselves. 
Food systems have seriously contributed to climate change, environmental
destruction, overexploitation of natural resources and pollution of air, water and 
soils. Despite the global average improvement in calorie production and major 
development of the food and agricultural product markets, huge inequalities in 
food access and repartition of the added value have emerged, leading to new 
serious nutritional and social problems.
Based on a review of the most recent scientific knowledge, this report paints
a gloomy picture with an emphasis on Low-Income and Lower Middle-Income 
countries where the population faces greater challenges than elsewhere.
Different threats are adding up and there are few options to adapt or mitigate 
these combinations of risks.
This is a call for all those - businesses, policy makers, consumers, funding
agencies - who are engaged in food systems transformations to bear in mind their 
systemic aspects and their multiple outcomes and risks in order to be able to 
fashion more sustainable and equitable food systems.
